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When we founded New City Agenda earlier this year, we did so with the aim of helping Britain’s ﬁ nancial 
sector realise its enormous social and economic potential. One of the many tragedies of the ﬁ nancial crisis 
was seeing so much hard work, talent, and ingenuity directed towards such selﬁ sh and often immoral ends. 
In more ways than one, Britain was being short-changed.
It seemed obvious to us, then, that the treatment of customers by banks, and banking standards, should be 
the initial focus of our work.
And that is why this report, produced in collaboration with CASS Business School, explores an issue at the 
very heart of the ﬁ nancial crisis and the litany of scandals which have subsequently come to light: culture.
Every major policy document and analysis of the ﬁ nancial crisis and mis-selling scandals highlights the 
importance of culture. The fact that these scandals have cost retail banks and building societies over £38.5 
billion in ﬁ nes and redress for customers over the last ﬁ fteen years illustrates the need for change. 
There has, however, been no systematic analysis of the culture of British retail banking, and the progress 
that has been made since 2008.
With this report, we hope to have ﬁ lled that gap.
Our ﬁ ndings are clear: 
Grasping the Nettle: Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, it is obvious to us that in the last few years 
banks have ﬁ nally started to reform their cultures and practices. Every major bank we talked to not only 
acknowledged the toxicity of previous working cultures, but had programmes in place to ensure their 
business treated customers fairly. Encouragingly, we also found among challenger banks a real willingness to 
avoid the kind of mistakes made by their more established competitors; a desire which was often reﬂ ected in 
their policies, controls, and structures
A Generation to Change: Secondly, it is equally clear that this journey towards a healthier culture is 
nowhere near complete. A toxic culture decades in the making will take a generation to clean up. Some 
frontline staff told us they still feel under signiﬁ cant pressure to sell. Complaints continue to rise and trust 
remains extremely low. Most of the people we talked to believed that real change, and as a consequence the 
better treatment of customers, will take some time to achieve.
You can’t regulate your way to a better culture: Culture change is the responsibility of banks: senior 
leadership must be accountable for embedding good behaviours throughout their organisations. They must 
also ensure that such change remains a priority. The Banking Standards Review Council represents a unique 
opportunity to help drive standards across the entire industry. We believe it should survey front line staff, and 
report its overall ﬁ ndings to the Treasury Select Committee on a annual basis. 
We hope that by 2019, the date by which Britain’s largest banks must ring-fence their retail and wholesale 
operations, most of the drivers of poor culture have been addressed. If that is to happen, and public trust 
regained, a great deal of work remains to be done by those attempting to bring about such a transformation. 
Their task may be difﬁ cult, but their success is essential. 
The Rt Hon the Lord McFall of Alcluith
The Rt Hon David Davis MP
The Lord Sharkey
Preface
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Executive Summary
Background and purpose
A near death experience. Retail banking is a vital part of the UK economy.1 Following the ﬁ nancial crisis 
which began in 2007, the sector was thrown into crisis. Some banks failed. Others came close to failing. 
Despite this near death experience, banks continued to engage in sharp practices up until about 2012. 
The resulting ﬁ nes, increased compliance costs and loss of reputation has cost customers, banks and their 
shareholders billions of pounds. The banks have paid out £38.5 billion in ﬁ nes and customer redress relating 
to their retail operations since 2000.2 Banks have also received 20.8 million complaints between 2008 and 
the ﬁ rst half of 2014, and 25 million between 2006 and the ﬁ rst half of 2014. Complaints to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service about banks shot up from 75,000 in 2008/09 to over 400,000 in 2013/14.
1 In this report we are using the term ‘banks’ and ‘banking’ to refer to licensed banks as well as building societies. We recognise there are important differences 
between the two models. We think this point is reﬂ ected in the ﬁ ndings of our report.
2 The ﬁ gure cited relating to ﬁ nes and redress is based on identiﬁ able provisions from bank and building society annual reports, press statements and information 
published by regulators. These ﬁ gures cover retail banking scandals and exclude penalties in investment banks for misconduct such as LIBOR manipulation. 
Culture as cause and solution. These costly failures have led policy makers, regulators and banks to 
ask what went wrong. Inquiries have unearthed many causes. One of the most important causes was a 
widespread and aggressive sales culture. In recent years, major banks have committed to change this culture. 
What progress? What remains unclear is how banks are changing their cultures, the barriers they face, and 
whether this change process is effective. These are the questions we explore in this report.  
Methods
Written evidence. We collected and analysed all the major policy documents related to the crisis in the 
UK banking sector following the ﬁ nancial crisis. We examined a wide range of ranking exercises produced by 
independent bodies which look at the ﬁ nancial and non-ﬁ nancial performance of banks. We also examined 
background documents, annual reports and other material provided by banks and regulators. 
Interviews. We spoke with 26 senior representatives from 11 retail banks. This included three of the four 
major UK banks (RBS, Barclays and HSBC), three medium sized ﬁ nancial institutions (Nationwide, TSB and 
Santander), and ﬁ ve well-known challenger banks (First Direct, Handelsbanken, Shawbrook, Metrobank and 
Virgin Money). Our sample covers the majority of the UK retail banking market. We also spoke with 12 front 
line employees from the four major banking groups. Finally we spoke with 19 stakeholders from 16 different 
organisations. This group included policy makers, regulators, investors, consumer advocates and employee 
representatives. In total, we interviewed 57 people. 
Findings 
An aggressive sales culture was a major driver of bank failure. There is signiﬁ cant evidence of a wide 
spread ‘sales culture’ which rewarded staff for aggressively promoting ﬁ nancial products, irrespective of 
risk and customer needs. This led banks to make risky loans and engage in bad practices, resulting in toxic 
loan books and mounting ﬁ nes. This has undermined the balance sheets of the banks as well as the public’s 
conﬁ dence in them as trusted institutions. 
Policy interventions address structural issues, but leave culture change to the banks. Public inquiries 
into the banks have identiﬁ ed a wide range of changes needed in the sector. Many of the ‘harder’ structural 
changes such as ring-fencing and measures to hold senior leaders to account have been taken forward 
into legislation. However, the ‘softer’ cultural changes have been largely left up to the banks themselves 
to execute. 
All banks have some kind of culture change process underway. In response to regulatory and policy-
maker pressure, banks have sought to improve their cultures. The largest banks are seeking to set the tone 
from the top and then cascade cultural change down their organization. Some small and medium sized 
institutions think they broadly had the right culture to begin with, and are now seeking to reinforce it. A 
number of challenger banks are seeking to change the industry culture by importing models from other 
industries (such as retail and leisure) and other countries. 
Cultural change in major banks remains fragile. Cultural change initiatives, particularly in the large 
institutions, remain relatively fragile. Senior leaders are committed to these initiatives, and progress has 
been made. However, there is widespread concern that the message could get lost in the middle of these 
large institutions and ultimately fail to make a difference on the front line. Some customer-facing employees 
told us they still feel under signiﬁ cant pressure to sell. 
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Culture is better in challenger banks. We found small and medium sized institutions had better cultures. 
Instead of struggling with ‘turning around the supertanker’, their senior management were mainly focused 
on reinforcing more customer focused cultures. These smaller banks seemed to have signiﬁ cantly different 
cultures from the largest institutions. Big banks have made progress, but in terms of culture change the 
smaller players are still out in front. 
Many expect bad practices to continue. While the largest institutions focus on improving their cultures, 
some of the customer outcomes continue to decline. Many customer complaints are still not dealt with 
fairly, customer satisfaction remains low and public trust in banks continues to languish. Based on our 
discussions with stakeholders, it would not be a surprise if more instances of bad practices come to light. 
It seems that often banks have been aware of problems for several years before they have tackled them. 
The reason given for not changing bad practices in the past was that everyone else was also engaged in 
these practices. There has been progress in improving the ﬁ nancial stability of these institutions and 
removing short term incentives for sales. However, much remains to be done.
Improving culture will take a generation. Our over-arching conclusion is that it will take a generation 
to create a new culture in UK retail banks. An aggressive sales mindset has been rewarded and reinforced 
across the industry for over a decade. Making signiﬁ cant progress will take ﬁ ve years. This is going to be 
tough. Banks already have many demands on their plate such as increasing tier one capital, implementing 
ring-fencing, instituting the senior persons’ regime, upgrading systems and restructuring. The good news is 
that banks have made a positive start. The ‘tone from the top’ is there. But this alone is not enough. There 
needs to be a sustained focus on driving change down through all levels of the organization. This can only 
be achieved through banks asking how their culture is lived on the front line. It is vital that culture change 
enables employees to feel like they can actually serve their customers’ needs in a better and fairer way. 
To sustain this change, collective action is required across the industry. This needs continued efforts not 
just from the banks, but from other stakeholders like regulators, policy makers, customer and employee 
representatives and investors. The bottom line is that banks should have made signiﬁ cant progress with 
their cultural change initiatives by 2019. 
Recommendations
Banks need to commit themselves to continuous and consistent delivery of their culture change 
programmes. Delivering meaningful change is likely to take ﬁ ve years. Completely transforming the culture 
is likely to take a generation. Tone from the top is necessary, but not sufﬁ cient. Banks need to make sure 
the message does not get lost in the middle. It is vital cultural change is driven down to the front line. 
Banks also need to ensure culture change improves the conditions of employees and allows them to deliver 
better outcomes for customers. Part of this is putting systems in place to surface and rapidly address small 
problems before they become big ones. Banks should use a range of metrics that give them a rich sense of 
their own culture. Too often senior management are completely disconnected from the culture of the rest 
of the organisation. Banks also need to give the newly established Banking Standards Review Council (BSRC) 
their unconditional support, ensure it is properly resourced, truly independent, and has the required level of 
co-operation. Finally, banks need to remain, or in some cases become, focused on their broad social purpose.
Regulators need to recognise that improving competition is important, but will not alone deliver 
improvements in culture. There also needs to be close attention to tracking culture within ﬁ rms. One way 
to do this is observing what culture is like at the customer service coal face. Regulators should be wary of 
ongoing restructuring efforts which may impress investors, but result in heightened risks within the ﬁ rm. It 
is important there is a healthy relationship between the BSRC and regulators. Finally, regulators should play 
a role in encouraging industry level culture change. Their role is to ensure banks do not get distracted from 
delivering the changes and values they have publicly signed up to. 
Policy Makers should provide the banking sector with the time needed to change their cultures. This does 
not mean taking a completely hands-off approach. Rather, it means maintaining pressure on the banks to 
move their culture in the right direction. One way to do this is by keeping the agenda as set out by the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS) alive and ensuring all the recommendations are 
revisited. There is a risk that some issues will slip off the agenda. As a result, many problems in the sector 
may remain unresolved. 
The Banking Standards Review Council (BSRC) is a welcome initiative, but it has a difﬁ cult task. In order to 
maintain its public credibility and independence, it’s senior positions must not be solely ﬁ lled by secondees 
from banks, nor can there be allowed to develop a revolving door between banks, audit ﬁ rms and the BSRC. 
The BSRC should survey front line employees on a regular basis and make the results publicly available. 
Frontline staff should be asked questions about how they are actually assessed and measured. This will help 
track whether an aggressive sales culture lives on. Finally, the BSRC should present its annual assessment of 
the state of the sector to the Treasury Select Committee. 
Investors need to recognise that if they want to reduce the signiﬁ cant regulatory, reputational and 
redress costs the banks face then they need to provide consistent support for the culture change processes 
underway. Culture change projects are likely to take years to deliver meaningful results so investors will need 
to have some patience. By providing managers with time, banks will be able to put themselves on a more 
stable footing. This should allow them to deliver sustainable returns. Clearly, investors should keep up the 
pressure for these change processes to be delivered. However, there is a danger that if they begin to apply 
pressure for other outcomes, all the investment in culture change processes will be lost.
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Introduction
High Street Banking: An Institution in Crisis
High street banks are a vital part of the UK economy. The vast majority of the population is a customer of 
a bank. We often become customers of a bank at a very early age. Many of us preserve a relationship with 
our bank for decades. We rely on banks for depositing money, making payments, accessing loans, and many 
other services. 
High street banks had traditionally been relatively conservative institutions. For nearly a century, they 
relied on a simple business model. Banks played an important part in their community. Managers of the 
local branch were often important local ﬁ gures. Employees saw themselves as ‘tellers’ whose job it was to 
process transactions. 
All this changed during the 1980s when large UK banks moved from a branch banking model to a universal 
banking model. They expanded their riskier activities on the wholesale side of the market. As the banks 
extended beyond the relatively simple business model of the past, retail divisions faced increasing pressure 
to return high rates of proﬁ t. To address this challenge, they developed aggressive sales cultures. They 
refashioned themselves as machines for aggressively marketing new ﬁ nancial products to customers. The 
result was ‘tellers’ within bank branches started to see themselves as ‘sellers’. This profound shift did not 
just happen in one ﬁ nancial institution – it happened across most of the industry.
This aggressive sales culture contributed to increased proﬁ tability of high street banking, vastly expanded 
ranges of products, and signiﬁ cantly more access to borrowing. However this came at a cost. Banks were 
wilfully ignorant of the risks involved in some of this lending. They designed poor quality products and 
marketed them to all customers regardless of whether they were appropriate. It was only following the 
ﬁ nancial crisis beginning in 2007 that the full implications of this aggressive sales culture became evident.
The results of the aggressive pursuit of sales has been grave: The near collapse and subsequent public 
bail-out of systematically important banks; the widespread mis-selling of ﬁ nancial products like PPI; the 
payment of billions of pounds in compensation and ﬁ nes for sharp practices; rock-bottom levels of public 
trust in banks. By 2012, British retail banks were truly institutions in crisis.
Transforming Banking and Transforming Culture 
The crisis in retail banking has promoted the entire industry to ask profound questions about itself. There 
have been a stream of inquiries beginning with the Future of Banking Commission and culminating in the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Each inquiry has identiﬁ ed a wide range of problems 
which need to be addressed in the industry including how banks are structured, how bankers are paid, how 
risk is managed, how banks are regulated, and how individuals are held to account for their decisions. But at 
the heart of all these issues is a deep concern about the shared culture within the banking industry. 
There is a consensus that if we are to avoid a re-run of the ﬁ nancial crisis, it is vital to profoundly change 
the culture of banking. At the same time, there is a recognition that changing the culture of banking 
is difﬁ cult. A new culture can’t just be regulated into being. Rather, culture change is something banks 
themselves must take responsibility for and be held accountable for. Broader change in the industry 
culture should be a matter of collective action. 
The banks have made efforts to address this great challenge. All the major banks have invested signiﬁ cant 
resources in large-scale culture change. Smaller challenger banks continue to develop what they see as 
unique cultures which are more customer focused. Banks have also clubbed together to establish the Banking 
Standards Review Council (BSRC) to support the general lifting of standards across the industry. 
While there are clearly signs that the UK banking industry has started to grasp the nettle, it is not clear 
exactly what progress they have made. Questions remain about what measures banks have taken, how 
adequate these initiatives are, and what might be done to support them. This report sets out to answer 
these questions. 
Structure of the Report 
In this report we examine the progress UK high street banks have made in transforming their culture. 
A report on the culture of Br tish retail banking |
We have also included two short appendices. The ﬁ rst appendix details the methods used to gather evidence 
for this study. The second appendix details what we mean by culture and provides an overview of some ways 
which culture can be measured. 
In Chapter Seven, we outline some concrete recommendations for a range of groups in the 
industry including the banks themselves, regulators, the banking standards review council, 
investors and policy makers.
In Chapter Six, we reﬂ ect on the progress made in reforming culture in the retail 
banking industry. 
Chapter Four examines the progress which UK banks have made in transforming their 
culture, and the challenges which they face as part of this process. 
Chapter Three looks at the progress which has been made by the industry on the basis 
of various ﬁ nancial and non-ﬁ nancial metrics.
Chapter Two analyses the various inquiries into the ﬁ nancial crisis and identiﬁ es the 
core causes and remedies which have been identiﬁ ed. 
Chapter One looks at the history of the industry and charts a gradual shift towards 
a sales culture. 
In Chapter Five we look at stakeholder reactions to these cultural changes. 
| A report on the culture of Brit sh retail banking
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Chapter One: Shifting 
Cultures of UK Banking 
Currently, the UK banking industry is in a state of upheaval. However, this is not the ﬁ rst time there has 
been a profound cultural shift in the UK banking industry. Looking back at the history of banking in the UK 
over the last ﬁ ve centuries, we see there have been a number of profound shifts in the culture of banking. 
There have been many models of banking (see Table 1.1). The past provides a rich store house of alternative 
models of banking culture which today’s institutions might learn from. Understanding the past allows us to 
see where the problems which we face today have some from. 
Table 1.1: Shifting cultures in British banking
Goldsmith bankers 
Early modern banking began with the repeal of Usury Laws in 1546. At this time, banking services were 
largely provided by Goldsmiths. As a side-line to their core business, Goldsmiths exchanged foreign currency. 
Following the debasement of currency during the English Civil War, Goldsmiths gradually separated 
their banking business from their main goldsmithing business. Goldsmith Bankers emerged as one of 
the ﬁ rst forms of banking. They were dominated by a Guild Culture which was shaped by membership 
of the Goldsmiths Company, the apprenticeship system, participation in common practices like clearing, 
intimate geographic co-location around Lombard Street in London, strong interpersonal networks and the 
overwhelming importance reputation. 
Private banking
An important shift happened with the foundation of the Bank of England in 1694. It became the 
government’s bank and the bankers’ bank. The renewal of the Bank of England’s charter in 1706 effectively 
prohibited other banks becoming joint-stock companies. This led to the development of the private banking 
model. These were partnerships, made up of up to six partners. The vast majority had only one branch. Some 
banks founded during this period still exist today such as Coutts and Co and Hoare’s Bank. The informal 
regulation of the Goldsmith-banking era was replaced by more formalised regulations. Judgements of 
character and integrity continued to be important in maintaining reputation. Partners were personally liable 
and intimately tied to the bank. The partners were the bank. Family relationships were vital in the ownership 
and control of the banks. Because, there was only one branch, there was ongoing personal contact between 
owners and employees of the bank. 
Model
Goldsmith 
Banking
Joint Stock 
Banking
Clearing Banks
Private 
Banking
Building 
Societies
Banking
17th Century
19th Century
1918 – 1980’s
18th-19th 
Century
19th Century 
– Today
1980’s – Today
Owned and 
controlled 
by individual 
master banker
Joint Stock 
Partnership
Listed 
Company
Partnership
Customer 
Ownerships
Company
Guild
Civic 
Capitalism
Paternalistic 
Welfare
Character
Democratic
Sales
City
City/Local 
Communities
National
City
Local 
Communities, 
then National
Global
Currency 
Exchange
Promissory 
notes and 
chequeing
Deposits
Deposits
Loans
Deposits
Payment Services
Loans
Deposits
Loans
Deposits
Payment Services
Lending
Trading
Core Business Culture
Geographic 
Scope
Ownership
and Control
Era
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Building Societies 
Alongside Private and Joint-Stock banking, a third model of banking appeared – the Building Society. Building 
societies were originally small self-help groups which sought to deal with the needs for housing a growing
Joint stock banking
With the onset of industrialisation, demand for capital expanded. The limitations of the partnership banking 
model became apparent. In 1826, a change in regulation allowed banks to become joint-stock companies 
outside a 65 mile radius of London. Joint-stock banks rapidly grew in number, size and inﬂ uence. In 1854, 
these new banks were admitted to the Clearing House, giving them additional power. In 1883, the joint-stock 
model became possible in London. The result was the rapid ascendency of the joint stock model of banking 
over the private banks (See Figure 1.1). Joint-stock banks were rooted in a particular region or city. They had 
close ties to the industrial and business community within that community. However, because there was a 
separation between the ownership and the management of the bank, an individual or a group of individuals 
was no longer an embodiment of the bank. Character and integrity became less important. The size of the 
banks grew, and branch networks began to develop. The result was that relationships in the bank became 
more impersonal. However, as most joint-stock banks remained relatively small, the managers continued to 
have intimate knowledge of customers as well as employees. 
Figure 1.1: Banks in England, 1784-1937
urban population. They emerged out of the Friendly Societies. The ﬁ rst building societies were founded in the 
Midlands in the 1770s, and rapidly spread through industrialising parts of England. By 1900, there were 2286 
building societies in the UK. A crucial feature of building societies was they were non-commercial and were 
primarily driven by the housing needs of their members. They were also democratic insofar as customers 
were effectively owners of the society. Originally, building societies were rooted within particular localities. 
However, national branch networks developed from the 1930s onwards. 
The big ﬁ ve
Following the explosion of joint-stock banking in the 19th century, there was a wave of acquisitions within 
the industry. This was mainly driven by the desire to achieve economies of scale and have access to larger 
pools of capital. By 1918, ﬁ ve major banks had captured the great majority of deposits. These national 
clearing banks established national branch networks, had low levels of leverage, and made the vast majority 
of their money through interest on lending. This meant they had a relatively simple business model which 
was dependent on longer term relationships with borrowers and lenders. This was reﬂ ected in a paternalistic 
welfare culture which offered life-time employment, and highly structured career progression. Despite their 
cosy and clubby nature, banks placed signiﬁ cant emphasis on professional standards.
The big bang
The dominance of the Big Five led to repeated concerns about collusion in price setting, lack of competition 
and the failure to support the development of British industry. This began to slowly change with a number 
of important shifts in the 1970s and 1980s. These included the Competition and Credit control being 
introduced by the Bank of England in 1971. This change allowed banks to participate in the wholesale 
market. It also relaxed their liquidity requirements. The 1979 Banking Act effectively increased competition 
from foreign banks and non-bank institutions within the UK. During the 1980s, increasing ﬁ nancial 
liberalisation, economic globalization and the dropping of restrictions on foreign participation in the UK 
stock market fundamentally changed the landscape of industry. 
The Big 5 became universal banks which offered a wide range of product and services which extended well 
beyond savings, payments and loans for retail and business banking. As their income from interest remained 
relatively ﬂ at, they began to increasingly rely on non-lending sources of income (see: Figure 1.2). To do this 
they developed increasingly complex business models. They raised money on the wholesale markets rather 
than through deposits. This removed an important constraint on their ability to grow lending. There were also 
continued mergers and acquisitions as well as international expansion (see: Figure 1.3). Retail banks became 
tethered to investment banking businesses. Building societies were demutualised and were taken over by the 
large banks (see: Figure 1.4). The impact this had on the culture of retail banking was signiﬁ cant. The strategic 
goals of the banks were focused on generating short term returns to shareholders. There was an increasing 
distance between senior executives and the daily realities of retail banking. Many of the senior leadership 
of the banks came from investment banking rather than retail or commercial banking. To meet increasingly 
tough demands for short-term performance, a competitive ‘sales culture’ became wide-spread throughout 
most of the banks (See: Box 1). This created a wide-spread focus on bonuses and performance incentives 
which reached right down to the lowest levels of banks. Staff and branches had their sales performance 
monitored on a monthly, weekly or even daily basis. Those working on the shop-ﬂ oor of banks made the 
journey from being ‘tellers’ to being ‘sellers’. 
Sources: Collins (1988), Pressnell (1956) and Bank Calculations
Adapted from ‘Evolution of the UK Banking System’, Quarterly Bulletin, Q4, Bank of England, 2010
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Figure 1.2: Sources of earnings in UK banks, 1980-2010 Figure 1.4: Building societies in UK, 1960-2010 
Figure 1.3: Mergers and acquisitions of UK banks, 1960-2010
Sources: Bank of England and Published Accounts
Adapted from ‘Evolution of the UK Banking System’, Quarterly Bulletin, Q4, Bank of England, 2010
Sources: Building Society Association and Bank Calculations
Adapted from ‘Evolution of the UK Banking System’, Quarterly Bulletin, Q4, Bank of England, 2010
Sources: Bankers Magazine, Collins (1988), published accounts and RBS Archives
Adapted from ‘Evolution of the UK Banking System’, Quarterly Bulletin, Q4, Bank of England, 2010
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valued scale and ﬁ nancial performance. Employees felt unable to question the new growth targets – 
which contributed to poor ﬁ nancial and acquisition decisions. Employees attribute this to a ‘culture 
of fear’ (particularly, it seemed a fear of not achieving targets) as well as to weak central oversight 
-  Description of Culture in Retail and Commercial Bank in Salz Review of Barclays, 2012.
‘A ‘sales culture’ had been created, with many employees in the bank now measured according 
to rigorous targets dictating how much they must sell in the way of products to customers. ‘We 
created a monster,’ (Cameron) McPhail told friends
-  Former RBS executive quoted in Iain Martin’s book ‘Making it Happen: Fred Goodwin, 
 RBS and the men who blew up the British Economy’
In one Halifax branch, there was a weekly ‘Cash or Cabbages day’. Employees who exceeded 
their sales were publicly rewarded cash. Those who missed their bonuses were given cabbages.
-  Report by Paul Moore, former head risk manager at HBOS who interviewed 140 staff, 2004. 
Two tellers at branches of the bank in Glasgow and Paisley had the vegetables placed on their 
desks within full public view. In the ﬁ rst case, an 18-year-old male teller was said to be deeply 
upset by the cabbage put on his desk. In the second case, which only emerged yesterday, a 
24-year-old had a cauliﬂ ower placed on her desk. She was apparently told she could only pass 
it on when someone opened an account.
-  Bank of Scotland, Reported in Guardian, 17 August 2005
Meeting one, 9am to 9.35am
“All sellers and managers sit at a table with the customer information that is in each seller’s diary 
for that day. Each seller is grilled about which products customers can be cross-sold. Either that or 
they are referred to another seller to sell them something. That leaves people so disheartened and 
demotivated it’s untrue. How can you know a customer’s needs without ever speaking to them?”
Meeting two, 11.30am (15-20mins)
“A check-in, in the same room with a member of counter, banking hall, sales and management staff. 
We all write on the board what sales have been done that day. These are transferred into “points” 
and the branch roughly has to do 5,000 points per day. If we are behind, everyone at that check-in 
is grilled on how to get more points.”
Meeting three, 12.30pm (15-20mins)
“The same as meeting two. If sales aren’t being met, all advisers who don’t have appointments 
are forced to cold-call existing customers about potential products they could want.”
Box 1.1: What is a sales culture? 
A root cause of failings in UK banking sector is the adoption of a ‘sales culture’. This is a a set of 
organizational norms and practices that encourages employees to aggressively focus on making 
short term sales. Often this happens at the expense of longer term customer satisfaction, providing 
with customers with the products they actually need, or even operating within the bounds of 
personal integrity or professional ethics. 
Sales cultures were originally applied in some UK retail banks during the 1980s. Executives assumed 
that shop-ﬂ oor employees were not sufﬁ ciently driven to maximise sales for many ﬁ nancial 
products which the bank offered. The aim was to encourage shop-ﬂ oor employees to promote 
these products to customers in every interaction possible. Initially, sales cultures were adopted in 
marginal ﬁ nancial institutions. Demutualised Building Societies were often particularly keen on 
developing these aggressive sales cultures. Mainstream Universal Banks responded by adopting a 
similar approach. Some of the remaining Building Societies made some steps in a similar direction. 
To create a sales culture, retail banks changed the way their branches looked. Out went typical 
banking counters where customers were separated from staff by bullet proof glass. In came open 
plan lay-outs which were supposed to encourage more natural interaction between customers 
and staff. Out went relatively routine transactions between customers such as taking deposits, 
dispensing cash and on the rare occasion consulting the bank manager about a loan. In came 
constant questions about whether a customer ‘would like something else’, and active suggestions 
of new banking products such as loans, credit cards or services like PPI. Increasing sales were 
reinforced through incentive systems which rewarded shop-ﬂ oor staff for up-selling. Staff 
performance was typically made public through whiteboards which displayed employees who 
were leading sellers and who were laggards. Achievements in sales were publicly celebrated. Not 
achieving sales targets was punished. Most retail banks declared their commitment to building 
a sales oriented culture. Underlying all this was the assumption that by building a sales culture, 
retail banks would be able to compete in an increasingly aggressive market, maximise their proﬁ ts 
and by doing so, increasing returns to shareholders. 
 
Examples of aggressive sales culture abound. Here are some illustrations of what it 
looked like in different institutions: 
You had to sell, whether it was for the customer or not. You’d like to think that if you knew the 
customer you could sell them the right product but some people didn’t do that because they were 
trying to reach a target and they sold whatever they could. 
-  Evidence from Employee of HSBC to the Future of Banking Commission, 2010.
 
In 2007, Frits Seegers was appointed to run GRCB. He drove its international expansion, some felt 
with insufﬁ cient focus on risks and controls. There was a material shift from client focus to one that 
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Conclusion 
Many of the early models of banking persist in one form or another. Guilds and close personal relations 
continued to play a role – albeit a reduced one - in the banking community (particularly in London). Some 
partnerships still existed, but largely in private and investment banking and also in banks based outside 
the UK. Many of the private banks and early joint-stock banks such as Coutts and Co still live on as part 
of larger banks. The building societies remain a vital part of the banking landscape. However, much of the 
diversity had gone. The market continues to be dominated by universal banks. In retail banking, an aggressive 
sales culture became the norm. Even in many institutions which were not part of a Universal Bank (such 
as ex-Building Societies), an aggressive sales culture took hold. The results of this approach only became 
completely clear with the onset of the ﬁ nancial crisis, which we will explore in the following chapter. 
Meeting four, 3pm (15-20mins)
“Pressure is put on staff again to ﬁ nd more points from customers before 5pm.”
-  Diary produced by un-named Halifax employee in Observer, March 2013
 
Staff can sell credit cards to ‘win’ Wimbledon tickets, ﬂ og loans to gain iPods and peddle bank 
accounts to go to the Grand Prix... There is an overall branch leaderboard - and also a personal 
banking adviser and cashier leaderboard. The latter is based on referrals to advisers, with 
cashiers encouraged to push customers carrying out simple tasks into seeing one.
-  Report on Santander in Daily Mail, November 2012
 
‘Personally I have witnessed mis-selling of products including long term savings accounts, life 
cover and home insurance policies. I need to highlight to the FSA what I feel are the main 
causes for this culture.’ He says a large part of this ‘mis-selling’ comes from the pressure of 
league tables that are published on the intranet each week. This shows branch staff and their 
current performance to target with a red, amber and green system
-  Report on a Letter sent to FCA by Derbyshire Building Society (owned by Nationwide) 
 published in The Daily Mail, May 2013
Each of the examples are only anecdotal. However, there is signiﬁ cant evidence to suggest 
they are far from outliers. There are dozens of academic studies published over the period of 
twenty years which document the emergence of a sales culture in a number of UK retail banks 
and building societies. A 2012 survey of over 500 front line retail bank employees by Which? 
found evidence of widespread sales culture. The study found 65% of front line staff said there 
is more pressure than every to achieve their sales targets. A 2012 study by the FSA of 22 retail 
ﬁ nancial service ﬁ rms of all sizes found widespread evidence of incentives designed to support 
a sales culture. 
Martin Wheatley, the Managing Director of FSA described how ‘most of the incentive schemes 
we looked at were likely to drive people to mis-sell to meet targets and receive a bonus, and 
these risks were not being properly managed’.
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Chapter Two: A Crisis of 
Culture in British Banking 
Introduction
On the eve of the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis, there were many problems with UK banks. However, it was only with 
the onset of this once in a generation crisis that these problems became evident to the public, policy makers 
and many senior executives. The ﬁ nancial crisis involved the widespread failure of ﬁ nancial institutions, a 
massive injection of public funds into the banking sector, a global economic crisis which retarded economic 
growth for many years, and a deep state ﬁ scal crisis which starved many public services of much needed 
funds. This sparked public anger and an extended period of reﬂ ection on what went wrong in the sector. It 
also resulted in the introduction of some measures to ensure such a disaster did not happen again. 
In this chapter we will look at what went wrong, the impact it had, and the various regulatory and non-
regulatory responses. We will see that banking culture was a central driver of the ﬁ nancial crisis. There have 
been many proposals about how to deal with culture change. However, the overwhelming consensus is that 
culture change is something which could not be regulated into being. Professions play an important role. But 
most agree that culture change is something that banks should be responsible for driving themselves and 
held accountable for. 
The ﬁ nancial crisis
The global ﬁ nancial crisis has undoubtedly altered the landscape of banking in the UK. The crisis occurred 
in three waves – the immediate crisis of 2007 – 2008 when the focus was on ensuring ﬁ nancial institutions 
continued to function, 2008-2012 where the widespread nature of misbehaviour within the banking sector 
became evident, and 2012-present when evidence emerged of continued bad behaviour following the 
ﬁ nancial crisis (in particular, the manipulation of LIBOR) and more far reaching changes within the banks 
began (See Table 2.1, Appendix Three). 
2007-2008 
In the run up to the ﬁ nancial crisis, UK ﬁ nancial institutions had enjoyed a decade of continued growth. 
However, much of this growth was based on shaky foundations. There were signs of distress in the Northern 
American market in 2006 when default rates on home loans increased. However, the ﬁ rst signs that 
something was wrong in UK retail banking came in September, 2007 with a liquidity crisis at Northern Rock, 
which eventually led the nationalisation of the institution in February 2008. Following prolonged warnings 
from consumer groups and extensive regulatory inquiries, evidence of widespread mis-selling of Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI) also began to appear about the same time. 
It became clear that problems were not limited to Northern Rock when Lehman Brothers collapsed in September, 
2008. When this happened, global capital effectively seized up, and the funding positions of the universal banks 
was thrown into doubt. In the UK, Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) was rescued by Lloyds during September, 
2008. In the following month, Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) were bailed out by the UK government. 
2009-2012
Following the government bail-out of Lloyds/HBOS and RBS, a period of self-reﬂ ection began. This included 
a series of investigations and subsequent reports by the Future of Banking Commission, the FSA, the Treasury 
Select Committee, and the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB). These reports identiﬁ ed problems at 
the root of the collapse of apparently stable ﬁ nancial institutions. They also suggested some mechanisms for 
resolving these problems. 
At the same time, a stream of penalties and ﬁ nes began to appear. The investigations associated with these 
ﬁ nes revealed widespread misbehaviour within the banks which went far beyond the mis-selling of PPI. 
This included poor complaints handling, mis-selling of investment products, insufﬁ cient controls for money 
laundering, aggressive tax avoidance and mis-selling interest-rate hedging products. At this point, there was a 
widespread perception that something was fundamentally wrong within the banks, but they were doing little 
to fundamentally change their practices. 
2012 - Present
A watershed moment came with revelations that UK Banks had been involved with the manipulation of 
the LIBOR rate. What was perhaps most striking about these revelations was that misbehaviour happened 
after the bail-outs of 2008 and much of the self-reﬂ ection which followed. Many members of the public 
took this as evidence that despite many ﬁ ne words, little had actually changed in the banking sector. This 
sense of dismay was only ampliﬁ ed by continued news of misbehaviour such as mis-selling of card and 
identity protection, insufﬁ cient protection against money laundering, increasing complaints about packaged 
accounts, and mis-selling of structured products. Evidence of new misbehaviour in the banking sector 
appeared on the horizon including allegations of manipulation of the foreign exchange and gold markets. 
A clutch of important reports into the continuing crisis in banking appeared during this period. These 
included the Salz review of Barclays and the reports resulting from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards (PCBS). The latter led to a series of new laws to regulate UK banks. In addition, most of the UK 
banks launched large-scale change programmes. Many of our respondents noted that LIBOR was an important 
moment for the banking industry. It forced many in the industry to face up to the fact there could not be a 
rapid return to business as usual. Industry insiders started to accept fundamental change was needed.
The roots of the crisis
The various reports on banking which appeared following the ﬁ nancial crisis have delivered a remarkably 
consistent message: the failure of banks is due to a number of complex interlocking underlying issues. 
Simply rooting out objectionable practices such as mis-selling products, the manipulation of industry 
bench-marks or lax risk management practices is not enough. Banks need to address the root causes of 
these problems. This will take time and require fundamental transformation in these institutions. Each report 
identiﬁ ed relatively similar root causes including macro-economic issues, the structure of the marketplace, 
psychological factors, the structure of banks, failures of governance, poorly designed incentive structures, a 
lack of punishment and failures of over-sight and regulation (see Table 2.2, Appendix Three).
Progress
Some underlying issues have been addressed through legislative or regulatory intervention. Moral hazard 
has been reduced through the introduction of alternative mechanisms for dealing with failing banks such 
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as bail-ins. Competition in the retail industry has been encouraged through the new account switching 
mechanism which allows customers to easily shift between banks. Responsibility for failure has been 
enhanced through the senior persons’ regime. Problems raised by the integration of investment and retail 
banking are being dealt with through the forthcoming introduction of ring-fencing. The focus on compliance 
rather than proper conduct is being dealt with through the FCA’s focus on monitoring conduct issues within 
banks. European and national regulation around remuneration has led to different structuring of bankers’ 
remuneration which limits the role of bonuses, extends the vesting period for up to 7 years and allows the 
possibility of clawing back remuneration in the occasion of signiﬁ cant failures. Finally, stress testing has seen 
UK banks improve the ratio of tier one capital which they hold with the aim of making them more resilient 
in the face of losses on their loan book. 
Legislation has been passed to deal with most of the issues which we listed above. However, much of the 
new laws have not fully come into effect yet. This means banks are currently engaged in complex processes 
of implementing a range of changes at once to comply with different regulatory demands. This often requires 
changes to systems which demand signiﬁ cant commitments of resources and time. 
In process 
There are number of issues which banking bodies have started to address in recent years. These include: 
Improving professional standards within the banks by establishing the Banking Standards Review Council; 
Reducing the complexity of products through voluntary compliance and targeted interventions by the 
FCA; Reforming the ﬁ nancial incentive schemes for frontline staff; Increasing diversity at senior levels 
through voluntary programmes designed to promote diversity in particular banks and the sector as a whole; 
Attempting to ensure customers are more informed about products through increased information provision 
by banks and some public education campaigns on the part of regulators and industry bodies.
Untouched issues
There are a number of issues identiﬁ ed by various post-mortems of the ﬁ nancial crisis which have not 
been substantially addressed either through legislative mechanisms of voluntary compliance. These 
include: Ensuring banks have means of learning from past crises; Dispelling the misplaced faith in complex 
mathematical models in place of judgement; Enhancing capital requirements for operational risk and 
misconduct; Creating ownership structures which encourage more long-term oriented behaviour; Removing 
incentives for rapid growth.
‘On a journey’
As a result of a process of collective reﬂ ection, many changes are underway at once within the banking 
sector. The result is compliance and regulation now takes up a signiﬁ cant part of the agenda of boards 
of directors as well as senior executives. It also means resources devoted to complying with regulation 
have signiﬁ cantly increased. There are a number of signiﬁ cant, complex and overlapping change processes 
underway at once within banks. Many of our respondents described these changes as the ‘start of a journey’. 
The collective hope is that once these change processes are completed, the banking sector will look quite 
different to the one which generated the ﬁ nancial crisis beginning in 2007. 
The role of culture 
One factor identiﬁ ed by all inquiries has been cultural failures. The inquiries have pointed out that an 
aggressive sales culture within retail banking drove much mis-selling of products. While many other root 
causes of the crisis have been addressed through legislative changes, culture has not. Many people we 
interviewed admitted that the cultural components were one of the hardest aspects to address. They also 
pointed out that it is difﬁ cult or impossible to regulate for the right culture. The key reports have identiﬁ ed 
some mechanisms for changing culture within the banks. In what follows we look at common themes in 
these reports. 
Confused about culture. The understanding of culture was very mixed in each of the reports we reviewed. 
Sometimes there was a stricter focus on core cultural issues such as norms, assumptions, beliefs and values. 
But frequently, analyses of culture bled into other areas such as governance and standards. Links with other 
issues such as incentive structures, performance measurement and whistle-blowing structures was also 
frequently mentioned. In each of these reports, there seemed to be a commonly held view that culture is 
important, but that it is difﬁ cult to get your hands around. The confusion about what exactly culture is and 
a preference to focus on more tangible aspects such as remuneration structures was also reﬂ ected in our 
interviews with regulators and some banks.
Cultural change is vital, slow and the responsibility of the banks. Across each of the reports, there is 
broad agreement that cultural change is vital for addressing the crisis in banking. There is also an agreement 
that the process of culture change will be particularly slow. Finally, there is broad agreement it is difﬁ cult 
to regulate for better culture. Changing culture is seen as being the responsibility of the banks themselves, 
possibly supported by industry bodies such as the Banking Standards Review Council and the professions. 
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Dimensions Description
Tone from the Top
Accountability
Incentives
Effective Communication 
and Challenge
Board and Senior Management are starting points for setting core values 
and expectations of risk culture, and their behaviour must reﬂ ect the values 
being espoused
Relevant employees at all levels understand the core values of the institution 
and its approach to risk, are capable of performing their prescribed roles, 
and aware that they are held accountable for their actions in relation to the 
institution’s risk-taking behaviour. 
Financial and non-ﬁ nancial incentives support the core values and risk culture 
at all levels of the institution
A sound risk culture promotes an environment of open communication and 
challenge in which decision-making processes encourage a range of views. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have outlined out how the banks have been through signiﬁ cant changes since the 
ﬁ nancial crisis beginning in 2007. Despite an early lack of responsiveness, UK retail banks seem to have 
been prompted into action by 2012. This resulted in regulators proposing a long list of regulatory and non-
regulatory changes which need to take place. Progress has been made in many areas such ring-fencing, 
competition, remuneration and capital ratios. However, there are some areas such as culture change where 
the progress is much less certain. One important step is the establishment of industry body to reinforce 
banking standards (in the form of Banking Standards Review Council). However, all reports we reviewed 
highlighted that culture change is largely the responsibility of banks themselves. The question of how far 
they have come in achieving this goal will be picked up in the next chapter. 
Banks have misplaced optimism in their own institutions. Bankers tend to systematically show 
misplaced-optimism about their own institutions in comparison to peers. A survey by The Economist found 
that 71% of executives thought their ﬁ rm’s reputation outperforms the industry. Perhaps more worryingly, 
executives are overly optimistic about the ability of their bank to create cultural change. A survey by 
Deloitte found that banking executives estimated it would take on average 2 years to address many of the 
culture issues in their own bank, but say it would take their competitors over 3 years to do the same thing.
Multiple levers. When trying to identify how cultural change might be pursued, there was some 
uncertainty about which levers might be used. The reports we analysed identify a wide range of potential 
levers for change including risk management, remuneration, codes of conduct, governance, leadership, 
recruitment, employee engagement, whistle-blowing policies, diversity, product design, management 
information, interaction with customers and training. This wide range of levers means the task of culture 
change can seem diffused and over-whelming. It is also interesting to note that almost all these levers 
are outside the typical tool-kit used in culture change programmes such as leadership, human resource 
and symbolic activities. Rather, they are levers which are often owned by professional groups such as 
accountants, risk managers and corporate governance experts. Underlying this is the assumption that in 
order to really change culture in a bank, only focusing on HR and symbolic interventions will not be 
enough. There needs to be an attempt to change more ‘strategic’ issues which senior executives ﬁ nd 
appealing like leadership, governance and risk management.
Uncertain metrics. While there was signiﬁ cant agreement about the need for change, there was less 
understanding of how it might be measured. Some reports pointed out that there are no rigorous 
measurement systems that can be used to track culture. Others have measured ‘input factors’ such as 
gender diversity, or ‘output factors’ such as customer satisfaction, customer complaints and regulatory 
compliance. Still others have identiﬁ ed metrics for capturing culture through employee and stakeholder 
surveys and investigation of critical incidents such as whistle-blowing incidents. The Banking Standards 
Review Council identiﬁ es a set of areas in which metrics may be developed. 
Distributed ownership. The responsibility for carrying out cultural change is largely placed on the 
shoulders of the board and senior executives. Many of the reports we reviewed place great store by ‘tone 
from the top’ and highlight the role of senior executives such as the CEO as ‘champions of change’. The 
board is typically seen a ‘guardian of culture’. Earlier analyses such as the report by the Future of Banking 
Commission note that ‘tone from the top’ should be supported and tested by outside parties such as ratings 
agencies and auditors. These external actors should ensure transparency and accountability. In addition to 
‘tone from the top’, more recent reports highlight the importance of middle management in embodying 
cultural change. They point out that cultural change is often driven off track by the vested interests of staff in 
the middle of the organization. They highlight that many banks had mission statements, codes of conduct or 
expressions of business principles but that these were largely meaningless as they were not monitored and 
made little practical difference to how staff had their performance measured. Finally, there is emphasis that 
culture must be reinforced and displayed in the day-to-day behaviours on the branch ﬂ oor. This reminds us 
that the embodiment of an organisational culture for most staff is their ﬁ rst line supervisor.
Regulators as supporters of cultural change. Regulators are seen as supporters rather than drivers of 
cultural change. In most reports, there is an agreement that regulation alone is not an answer. The regulator 
should set the limits and ensure these are maintained. The main mechanism for driving cultural change are 
the banks themselves as well as professional bodies and new institutions such as the Banking Standards 
Review Council. 
The thorny question of reporting. There appears to be less agreement on the extent to which cultural 
issues might be reported by banks. Early analyses such as the Future of Banking Commission suggest some 
issues which banks might report on including auditors articulating all signiﬁ cant risk factors – which may 
include culture issues. Later reports such as the Salz Report have suggested banks report on progress against 
particular metrics they themselves have established. Finally, the Lambert report recommends self-assessment 
data (See Table 2.3). All this suggests that it remains unclear whether banks should report on cultural issues, 
and if they are to do this, how it might be achieved. 
Table 2.3: The Lambert Report Recommendations of how to measure culture
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Chapter Three: Progress 
in UK Retail Banks 
Introduction
Following the ﬁ nancial crisis, there has been a widespread call for various changes in the UK banking industry. 
Well established refrains include the need to increase competition, improve capital ratios, improve outcomes 
for customers, ensure banks are more ethical, eliminate aggressive sales incentives, improve employee 
satisfaction and ultimately improve public trust in the banks. In this chapter, we look at what progress retail 
banks have made in addressing each of these issues. In particular, we pay close attention to performance of 
the largest players in the market on each of these dimensions. 
32  |  A report on the culture of British retail banking    A report on the culture of British retail banking  |  33
Table 3.1: Basic information on UK banks
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Headquarters
Total Assets (mil GBP)
Net income (mil GBP) Bankscope
Dividend paid (mil GBP) Bankscope
Long-term issuer default rating (Fitch) Bankscope
Leverage ratio (%) - CRD IV tier 1 Annual Reports
Percentage of gross mortgage lending 
of all banks in the UK (Dec 2013) Mintel
Estimated small business customer 
share (Oct 2013) - Others 7%
Mintel
Number of complaints (2014 Q1/Q2) 
- total number of new cases Financial Ombudsmen
Number of Employees Worldwide
Main Subsidiary Brands 
Number of Subsidiaries
Year Founded
Number of Branches in the UK (estimate)
Indicators
Bankscope
Bankscope
Bankscope
Bankscope
Bankscope
Bankscope / Google
Annual Reports / Google
Source
Edinburgh
1,019,934
-7,264
N/A
A
3.5
8
21
6,072
Manchester
43,396
552
N/A
B
2.4
N/A
N/A
1,665
106,100
Citizens 
(US), 
Natwest, 
Coutts, 
Direct Line
280
1874
608 (Natwest)
1392 (RBS) 
7,526
Smile
N/A
1872
294
London
862,004
-366
25
A
4.1
21
21
30,768
London
1,892
-42
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0
97,869
TSB, 
Bank of 
Scotland, 
HBOS
134
1765
1,300
1,031
N/A
1
2010
26
London
315,488
248
425
A
N/A
10
12
7,876
Newcastle
25,752
272
N/A
AA+
N/A
N/A
N/A
65
19,643
Abbey 
National, 
Alliance & 
Leicester
64
1944
1,157
2,637
N/A
7
2011
74
Edinburgh
24,954
177
N/A
AA+
4.6
N/A
N/A
N/A
Stockholm
213,499
1,228
901
AAA
N/A
N/A
N/A
0
4,721
3
1810
600
11,503
N/A
792
1871
161
London
1,345,833
N/A
1,242
A
3.1
10
17
26,955
Leeds
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
140,300
Woolwich
360
1896
1,560
N/A
N/A
N/A
1989
N/A
London
811,695
2,540
2,014
AA-
4.4
8
22
12,429
Swindon
189,926
549
N/A
A
N/A
15
N/A
4,886
69,824
N/AN/A
171
1865
1,200
17,268
N/A
42
1848
750
Brentwood
1,662
14
N/A
AA+
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
400
N/A
10
2011
N/A
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Many players. The UK banking market is made up of 157 banks incorporated in the UK, 177 foreign banks 
and 46 building societies. Many of these institutions are very small and account for less than 1% of the UK 
retail banking marker. Others banks, particularly foreign banks, largely operate in the area of wholesale markets. 
There are only a handful of institutions of any signiﬁ cant size which operate in the UK retail banking market. 
High concentration. The UK retail banking market remains highly concentrated. A recent study by the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) found that the four biggest banks (Lloyds, RBS, HSBC, and 
Barclays) accounted for 77% of the 65 million current accounts in the UK and 85% of the 3.5 million 
business accounts in the UK.3 Other signiﬁ cant participants in the UK retail banking market include 
Santander, Nationwide, the Co-operative Bank, TSB and Virgin Money. There are also a number of so-called 
challenger banks which are gradually establishing market share such as Metro and Handelsbanken. There 
also continue to be smaller building societies with very limited shares of the market. This means although 
there are many companies operating in the UK market, the reality is the majority of business is done by 
only a handful of companies. There have been policy measures designed to address this problem. The 7 day 
switching mechanism is now in place. An initiative to match rejected SME loan applicants with alternative 
providers is afoot. However, the recent CMA consultation concluded that there are ‘reasonable grounds to 
suspect’ that various features of the UK retail and SME banking market ‘prevent, restrict or distort competition’. 
Table 3.2: Market share
Strengthening balance sheets. The UK banks appear to be making progress at moving towards a more 
stable ﬁ nancial footing. Following an analysis of tier one capital ratios by the Bank of England and the 
Prudential Regulatory Authority, all the major UK banks now have improved their balance sheet and now 
exceed requirements by having 3% of end-point tier one capital, and 7% of common tier one capital. The 
Bank of England has recently announced that by 2019, systemically important banks will need to hold up to 
4.05% tier one capital, with an additional buffer of 0.9% during upswings in the economic cycle. However, 
there continues to be debate about whether 7% is an appropriate level of tier one capital or even whether 
risk-weighted capital requirements give a realistic assessment of a bank’s solvency. Some commentators 
argue that the amount of tier one capital needs to be much higher – some suggesting up to 25%. Along 
with increasingly healthy balance sheets, UK banks have reasonably healthy credit ratings which indicate 
they are investment grade assets. Only the Co-op Bank has a rating below the investment grade level. This 
indicates that following the signiﬁ cant uncertainties of the ﬁ nancial crises, UK banks are better capitalised, 
have higher credit ratings and are by implication increasingly safe from a prudential stand-point. Finally, UK 
banks appear to be increasingly safe in the face of extreme circumstances. Two annual stress tests by the 
European Central Bank found that the four major UK banks appear to have sufﬁ cient capital to weather 
adverse economic conditions. 
Rising complaints. Despite improvements in the prudential base of most banks, there have not been similar 
clear improvements in customer complaints. There have been year-on-year increases in the number of 
complaints which were lodged with the Financial Ombudsman Service. In the year to the end of March 2014, 
there were over 2.3 million enquiries from consumers and the service took on over 500,000 new complaints. 
78% of these new complaints relate to payment protection insurance (PPI). 63% of the total complaints 
related to four largest banking groups (Lloyds, RBS, HSBC, Barclays). Between 2009 and the present, the 
most new complaints were received about  Lloyds, followed by Barclays, RBS, and then HSBC. Based on 
ﬁ gures from the FCA, and its predecessor the FSA, we calculate that banks received 20.8 million complaints  
between 2008 and the ﬁ rst half of this year. Banks have received 25 million complaints since 2006. Despite a 
rising number of complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service, the large banks have become increasingly 
efﬁ cient at resolving them. It is important to note that a rising number of complaints do not necessarily 
mean there has been a deterioration of service quality in banks. In many cases, new complaints relate to 
past misdemeanours which have been corrected (in particular PPI). In addition, rising complaints levels may 
reﬂ ect other factors such as increasing activity by claims management companies, increasing awareness of 
the ability to complain, and generalised public dissatisfaction with banks. Many of our interviewees pointed 
out that an increase in complaints did not equate with poorer customer service levels. While complaints may 
be high now, we would expect them to come down over the medium term if banks are indeed improving 
their practices as they claim to be.
Compiled by Matt Scuffham and Steve Slater; editing by Tom Pfeiffer and Pravin Char
Lloyds Banking Group
RBS (Excluding Williams & Glyn)
Barclays
HSBC
Santander
Nationwide
TSB
Co-Op
2,253
1,900
1,577
1,144
1,034
700
631
324
25-27%
17-18%
17-18%
12%
10%
6%
4.2%
2%
20-24%
21-25%
18-21%
16-19%
6%
N/A
4.2%
1-2%
Branches Current Account 
Market Share (%)
Small Business 
Market Share (%)
3 This ﬁ gure includes TSB which was part of Lloyds when the study was undertaken. 
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2009 H1 1,812 2,379 6,947 2,177 8,283 N/A 391 N/A N/A 1,149
2010 H1 2,250 2,810 12,750 3,286 7,991 4,881 697 N/A N/A 1,104
2011 H1 5,863 5,628 19,569 10,072 16,864 6,434 1,410 N/A N/A 2,309
2012 H1 3,053 3,679 12,235 7,164 23,703 5,072 603 N/A N/A 4,553
2013 H1 11,268 11,222 59,753 14,869 43,612 8,539 1,536 N/A N/A 9,032
2014 H1 6,072 7,211 30,768 12,429 26,955 7,876 1,665 N/A N/A 4,886
2009 H2 2,557 2,919 9,952 3,048 9,836 2,983 796 N/A N/A 1,349
2010 H2 3,286 3,760 12,234 6,736 6,535 6,759 521 N/A N/A 1,530
2011 H2 1,827 2,737 7,467 4,430 11,524 5,439 566 N/A N/A 2,513
2012 H2 8,446 8,679 45,727 12,784 44,725 1,064 1,403 N/A N/A 9,847
2013 H2 7,656 8,723 40,500 15,286 36,506 8,389 1,786 N/A N/A 6,436
Totals 54,090 59,747 257,902 92,281 236,534 57,436 11,374 N/A N/A 44,708
The Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland Plc
National 
Westminster 
Bank
Lloyds 
Bank Plc
Barclays 
Bank Plc
Co-operative 
Bank
Metro
Bank Plc
HSBC 
Bank Plc
Santander 
UK Plc
Svenska
Handels-
banken
Nationwide 
Building 
Society
Table 3.3: Customer complaints (Financial Ombudsman Service data) Table 3.5: Financial Ombudsman - total complaints about banks
Table 3.4: FSA/FCA reportable complaints – banks
Average customer satisfaction. A more accurate measure of customer outcomes might be gained 
from data collected by the consumer group, Which? who ask members of the general public about their 
experience of using their banking providers. Their annual aggregated analysis of the results of their customer 
satisfaction surveys placed First Direct as the highest rated bank by its customers. It was followed by 
Coventry Building Society and Nationwide. The majority of the top ten ﬁ nancial institutions as rated by 
their users were mutually owned institutions. The Co-Operative bank came in 10th place and Santander in 
11th place. The majority of the brands owned by owned by the Big Four banks came much further down the 
league table. This suggests that despite claims about improving customer service levels, the largest banks in 
the UK continue to have only average or below average levels of customer satisfaction. Further, the majority 
of UK banking customers who are customers of the big four banks only receive average levels of customer 
service. Finally, if we are interested in understanding how a bank might create high levels of customer service, 
it would pay to look more deeply at banks like First Direct and Nationwide.
2006 - H1 2010 - H2
Number of complaints received
2006 - H2 2011 - H1
2007 - H1 2011 - H2
2007 - H2 2012 - H1
2008 - H1 2012 - H2
2008 - H2 2013 - H1
2009 - H1 2013 - H2
2010 - H1 Total
2009 - H2 2014 - H1
2004/05 31% 110,963 34,399
Banks Proportion Total New Cases Banks - Total New Cases
2005/06 26% 112,923 29,360
2006/07 30% 94,392 28,318
2007/08 59% 123,089 72,623
2008/09 59% 127,471 75,208
2012/13 76% 508,881 386,750
2009/10 61% 163,012 99,437
2013/14 79% 512,167 404,612
2010/11 66% 206,121 135,009
Total 65% 2,223,394 1,438,880
2011/12 66% 264,375 173,166
798,775 1,275,025
843,090 1,255,529
1,604,589 1,590,467
1,041,101 2,596,519
1,018,548 2,267,634
1,082,364 1,863,024
1,189,076 1,598,018
1,299,543 25,104,203
2,225,458 1,555,443
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Footnote: Score shown is the Customer Score ( Which?’s composite measure of customer satisfaction and likelihood to recommend). Sample size for each provider shown in brackets Providers 
shown here have a minimum sample size of 30 responses in at least two product areas, and their products are open to new customers. n/a means the bank isn’t active in that product area; 
– means the sample size was too small. 5,002 people were asked about their current account in July and August 2014. 5,138 people were asked about their credit card in March 2014. 5,004 
people were asked about their savings account in July. All surveys conducted with GP sample using panel provider GMI.
First Direct 82% (352)
69% (452)
62% (351)
64% (462)
N/A
57% (495)
55% (482)
58% (483)
60% (452)
62% (350)
53% (351)
66% (144)
65% (278)
58% (186)
63% (280)
64% (34)
53% (339)
54% (285)
53% (332)
54% (286)
55% (169)
53% (213)
67% (269)
58% (388)
50% (271)
51% (392)
52% (170)
50% (379)
52% (304)
52% (388)
50% (364)
57% (272)
47% (247)
79% (131)
69% (620)
64% (50)
54% (615)
54% (91)
62% (523)
62% (254)
61% (189)
57% (261)
47% (53)
51% (152)
74%
65%
59%
58%
57%
56%
56%
56%
55%
55%
51%
The Co-Operative Bank
Virgin Money
HSBC
Santander
Barclays
Lloyds Bank
TSB
Nationwide Building Society
Current Accounts 
(Customer Score)
Savings Accounts 
(Customer Score)
Credit Cards 
(Customer Score)
Mortgages 
(Customer Score)
Overall 
(Customer Score)
Natwest
Royal Bank of Scotland
Table 3.6: Customer satisfaction
Poor ethical outcomes. A further concern raised about banks in the wake of the ﬁ nancial crisis was the 
ethics of these institutions. Today, most ﬁ nancial institutions claim to have developed more ‘ethical’ cultures. 
However, a recent survey by the Ethical Consumer Magazine in conjunction with Move Your Money casts 
some doubt on these claims. Their ‘scorecard’ ranks ﬁ nancial institutions on a range of dimensions including 
honesty, customer service, culture, supporting the economy and ethical lending. Smaller Building Societies 
and specialist ethical banks such as Triodos come at the top of the list. Challenger banks such as Metrobank 
and Handelsbanken also perform relatively well. The big four banks appear at the bottom of the league table. 
Barclays, RBS, HSBC and Lloyds are all in the bottom quartile.  
Nationwide √ 6411
Lloyds Bank √ 214
√
Santander √ 255
Virgin Money 618
Source: Ethicalconsumer.org
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Metro Bank √ 7711
Co-Operative 
Bank
Royal Bank 
of Scotland √ 7
51
1
8
Handelsbanken √ 749
First Direct
Natwest
√
√
21
7
3
1
TSB
HSBC
√
√
21
21
4
3
Barclays √ 41
Best Middle Worst
Table 3.7: Ethical ratings
Declining pressure on staff for sales. Despite widespread recognition that a high pressure sales culture 
may have been at the heart of many of the problems within retail banks, analyses suggest that little may 
have changed following the ﬁ nancial crisis. A 2011 study of sale incentives by the FSA of 22 ﬁ nancial 
institutions uncovered widespread practices of incentivising behaviour aimed at encouraging aggressively 
sales. 20 of the 22 institutions incentivised staff in a way which increased the risks of mis-selling. In 6 ﬁ rms 
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there were signiﬁ cant failings. 11 ﬁ rms had not addressed the risk of mis-selling and in 4 ﬁ rms the risks 
were signiﬁ cant. A companion study published in 2012 by the consumer advocacy organisation Which? 
mirrored these results. It found that 43% of staff surveyed in the largest ﬁ ve banks felt pressurised into 
selling by the culture, and 46% said they knew colleagues who had mis-sold products to meet targets. Lloyds 
appeared to perform particularly poorly, with notably higher numbers of staff answering ‘yes’ to questions 
which would indicate a high pressure sales culture. The scale of this high pressure sales culture led the FCA 
to issue guidance on ﬁ nancial sales incentives in 2013, which identiﬁ ed the characteristics of poor practice. 
These include sales incentives based on sales volume, incentive schemes which are hard to manage, complex 
incentive schemes, and a lack of punishment for poor quality sales. It also identiﬁ ed the design of incentive 
systems which might decrease the likelihood of mis-selling such as emphasising quality, claw-backs, capped 
incentives, deferral of payments, rolling sales targets and balanced score-cards. A subsequent review by the FCA 
in early 2014 found that all the major banks had signiﬁ cantly changed their practice. The investigation found 
that no major ﬁ nancial institutions have the kind of high pressure ﬁ nancial sales incentives schemes which 
were at the root of previous problems. However, there still remain questions concerning whether reforms have 
tackled the implicit pressure to sell which can come from the performance management of staff. 
Questionable employee satisfaction. There are no standardised surveys of good employment practices or 
employee satisfaction levels within the UK banking industry. However, an analysis of some of the standard 
lists of top employers in the UK shows that banks are noticeably absent. There are no retail banks listed in 
the Sunday Times Top 100 companies to work for in 2014 (although there are a number of small ﬁ nancial 
services ﬁ rms listed). Santander is the only retail bank which appears in the Guardian’s 2014 list of top 
employers. It is notable that a number of larger insurance companies appear on both lists. With regards 
to work/life balance issues, banks seem to perform slightly better. The Top Employers for Working with 
Families Award shows banks featuring more prominently, with Barclays, Lloyds and RBS all receiving awards 
or commendations. The Sunday Times list of ‘Top 50 Employers for Women’ in 2014 includes Barclays, 
Santander, RBS, Lloyds, Nationwide and HSBC. It should be noted such rankings and awards are not complete 
and rigorous analyses of the entire industry. They tend to involve voluntary participation, so the sample can 
be skewed. They do however give a broad indication that employee satisfaction levels in retail banking may 
be out of line with other industries. 
Low public trust. One of the most concerning statistics in the banking sector are measures of public trust in 
the sector. According to Edelman’s ‘Global Trust Barometer’, banks and ﬁ nancial service ﬁ rms remain at the 
bottom of the list of companies trusted by the public (see Table 3.8). At a global level, only 51% of the public 
trust banks. In the UK, this number is 32%. It has seen a slight improvement from 29% in 2013. Edelman 
found that the most important driver in increased trust in the banks appeared to be better government 
regulation. Voluntary aspects such as improved ethics, improved culture or the industry playing a new role 
were seen as slightly less important. A recent survey by PWC conﬁ rmed Edelman’s ﬁ ndings – 32% of us trust 
retail banks, while only 15% of people trust investment banks. It found that the major factors driving this 
mistrust for retail banks were personal dealings with their bank (41%), press coverage (30%), transparency 
of pricing and terms and conditions (27%), and conversations with friends and family (20%). The major 
factors which respondents thought could redress this loss of trust was greater transparency on products and 
services (46%), stricter codes of conducts for employees (41%), changes to remunerations and rules (40%) 
and improved internal governance (37%). However, this low number indicates widespread public mistrust 
of banks. Taken together, this suggests the public continue to distrust banks and if the banks want to rebuild 
this trust, a mixture of government regulation, greater transparency about products and changes to internal 
processes are needed. 
Rising provisions for misconduct and mis-selling. Since 2000, retail banks and building societies have 
had to set aside over £38.5 billion to pay ﬁ nes and compensation for mis-selling and misconduct (see Table 
3.9). Over the past 15 years they have been embroiled in a number of scandals starting with endowment 
mortgages and spanning precipice bonds, unfair bank charges, investment and mortgage advice, structured 
products, ID theft and Payment Protection Insurance. They do not appear to have learned lessons from earlier 
scandals. Banks have also taken some years to recognise the scale of their misconduct, to deal fairly with 
complaints and to make appropriate provisions. For example, Lloyds Banking Group originally set aside £3.2 
billion for PPI mis-selling and has subsequently more than tripled this amount to over £11.3 billion. Coming 
on top of misconduct in their investment banking arms, these provisions have placed signiﬁ cant strain on 
bank balance sheets. Since the ﬁ nancial crisis, their misconduct has cost the banks and their shareholders 
more than twice as much as their total losses on all UK mortgage lending. In extreme cases the scale of the 
scale of these provisions has affected the stability of individual banks. At the Co-operative Bank, provisions 
for mis-selling and misconduct accounted for 46% of its £1.5 billion capital hole.4
Source: Edelman Trust Barometer UK Results 
Technology 72% 79% +7%
2013 2014 2013 vs. 2014
Table 3.8: Trust in companies in the UK
4 Consumers International, Risky Business: The case for reform of Sales Incentives Schemes in banks, October 2014
Energy 38% 32%
Brewing 62% 71% +9%
Food 66% 70% +4%
Consumer 57% 69% +12%
Entertainment 60% 69% +9%
Automotive 65% 64% -1%
Consumer 56% 64% +8%
Telecommunications 55% 62% +7%
Pharmaceuticals 56% 59% +3%
Chemicals 47% 49% +2%
Financial 34% 44% +10%
Media 36% 43% +7%
Banks 29% 32% +3%
-6%
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Conclusion
There have been widespread calls for a banking sector with more competition, safer banks, better customer 
outcomes, more ethical decision making and greater employee satisfaction. Some signiﬁ cant progress has 
been made on the resilience of banks and reforming ﬁ nancial sales incentives. One aspect where banks have 
made some progress is in strengthening their balance sheets. This has involved improving capital ratios, credit 
ratings and is proving to be robust in the face of stress testing. This ensures banks are relatively safer. In 
addition, the large institutions have made progress in eliminating ﬁ nancial incentives for high pressure sales 
tactics. This should go some way in decreasing the pressure on staff to mis-sell products.
There is little evidence of progress in increasing competition, customer outcomes, ethicality and public 
trust in the banks or in acknowledging and providing adequate provisions for past misconduct. The evidence 
from a range of sources suggests that less progress has been made on each of these dimensions than 
might be hoped for. Following the ﬁ nancial crisis, the banking sector has become more, rather than less, 
concentrated. Customer complaints continue to increase. There continues to be ethical problems in the 
largest banks. The presence of good employment practices are uncertain. Public trust in the banks remains 
at low levels. Provisions for mis-selling and misconduct continue to increase and have to be revisited as 
they prove inadequate. 
One particular striking ﬁ nding is that the largest banks continue to under-perform their smaller peers on a 
range of metrics. What this suggests is that larger players may have much to learn from smaller institutions 
as they seek to rebuild themselves to be more customer centric and ethical. 
Unfair Unauthorised 
Overdraft Charges
Endowment Mortgage 
Mis-selling
Investment Advice / 
Products Mis-selling
Pensions Mis-selling
Consumer Credit Act Breaches
Other (Mortgages, ID Theft 
insurance, Miscellaneous redress)
Total
0.5
1.8
0.5
0.6
0.7
3.3
38.5
2006-2007
2002-2006
2003-2014
2000-2002
2013-2014
2000-2014
2000-2014
PPI Mis-selling
Interest-rate Hedging 
Products Mis-selling
27
4.1
2010-2014
2012-2014
Type of Miconduct Provisions (£ Billion) Years provisions were incurred
Table 3.9: The cost of misconduct in UK retail bank operations, 2000-2104
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Chapter Four: Cultural Change 
in the UK Banking Sector 
Introduction 
Following the ﬁ nancial crisis, there was widespread agreement that retail banking had a culture problem. The 
sales culture which had progressively strengthened in the industry since the 1980s was at the root of many 
high proﬁ le scandals such as the mis-selling of PPI. In order to ensure such scandals do not happen again, 
multiple inquires have recommended that banks move away from an aggressive sales culture and start to 
develop a more consumer focused culture. However, all these reports also agree that such a change in culture 
cannot be regulated into being. Rather, it is something which must be created by banks themselves and that 
they should be held accountable for the results. 
In this chapter, we will ask what progress banks have made in moving beyond an aggressive sales culture. 
To explore this question, we examine the various culture change initiatives being pursued by retail banks 
in the UK. We analyse the background of these initiatives, how each institution understands culture, the 
particular culture they are trying to create, the programmes they have put in place to build this culture, 
how these cultures are being created, the way culture is being measured, any perceived barriers to cultural 
change, leadership issues associated with culture, understandings of the need for change, and their views on 
regulation – particularly as it pertains to culture. We have included a summary of these results in Table 4.1, 
Appendix Three. After considering each of these issues in turn, we identify three dominant models of cultural 
change which appear in the industry. 
Historical background
LIBOR as a trigger. Many of the larger institutions noted that the LIBOR scandal and subsequent public 
anger and government inquires was the trigger for many of the culture change initiatives. An executive 
in one major bank told us that culture was initially seen as a ‘ﬂ uffy’ issue which only slowly began to be 
taken seriously. This seems to be backed by the fact that many of the large scale cultural transformation 
programmes in large banks were launched following the LIBOR. These cultural transformations were often 
associated with turn-over in top management. The exemplar of this is Barclays which launched its ‘transform’ 
program following the wide ranging Salz inquiry and the appointment of Anthony Jenkins as CEO. 
Realigning with societies expectations. The big banks which we spoke with saw themselves as trying 
to come back in line with changed social expectations. They were seeking to address a culture which had 
gradually built up in their organization over a period of time. They would often emphasise how this culture 
was partially reﬂ ective of wider changes in society which occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. However, 
they see themselves as out of line with some demands from society today. What this suggests is large 
players see themselves as trying to be in line with the social demands of the time. Partially, this involved 
returning to values which were seen as important within the large banks in the past. For instance, part of the 
culture programme at Barclays is a short video in which viewers are taken through the 300 year history of 
the bank and invited to reconnect with the bank’s Quaker roots.  
Business as usual. While the larger banks saw a need to transform their culture, some of the smaller 
institutions which we spoke with saw themselves merely continuing in line with a long established culture. 
In these cases, these were organisations which had not been involved in large scale crises like LIBOR or 
had exceptionally high rates of mis-selling. Both Nationwide and Handelsbanken told us they did not have 
any radically new culture initiatives, but simply aimed to continue building a culture which they have been 
reinforcing for decades. Handelsbanken told us they simply aimed to reproduce the decentralised model 
which had been established by Jan Wallander, the bank’s well known ex-CEO, some 40 years ago. Nationwide 
told us they have had the same set of values for over a decade, and only very infrequently make incremental 
changes to these. Culture programs in these organisations were seen as reinforcing a set of values and 
assumptions which have worked in the past. 
Importing culture. In other cases, challenger banks did not have a history and deeply ingrained culture 
which needed to be transformed. They saw their challenge as creating a culture from scratch. In order to do 
this, they often focused on importing models of organizational culture from outside the UK banking sector. 
In some instances, they look towards banks in other countries. Metrobank for instance has sought to draw on 
many ideas developed by Commerce Bank in the New York metropolitian area of the United States. In other 
instances, banks have sought to import culture from other sectors in the UK economy. Our interview with 
senior executives at Metrobank was interrupted by a group of employees walking through the ofﬁ ce (one 
dressed as a giant ‘M’) singing ‘Metro Man’ to the tune of ‘Macho Man’ by the Village People. The executives 
explained it was in aid of a charity funding raising initiative. Virgin Money has sought to import customer 
service models from other industries which the Virgin group operates in such as airlines and ﬁ tness. When 
we visited a Virgin Money lounge, we were greeted by a host who took our jackets and offered us a cup of 
coffee. Her career experience had largely been in the ﬁ tness and leisure sector. The aim was to deliver a great 
experience for the customer. 
Understanding of culture 
Fuzzy understanding of culture. Throughout our interviews, we were struck by the many different things 
‘culture’ was used to refer to. Representatives of banks referred to a wide range of issues under the heading 
of culture. For instance discussions included issues such as organisations structures, incentive systems, 
remuneration, architecture, hiring policies, history of the organization, business models, training, openness to 
feedback and leadership style to name just a few. This indicated a number of things to use. First, banks have 
moved beyond just thinking about culture as a list of ofﬁ cial values. Second, there was little in the way of 
common understanding about what exactly culture means – even among the most senior people charged 
with culture change in initiatives in the industry. Finally, culture is seen by the industry as an all-embracing 
issue which binds together a range of diverse aspects of an organization. Despite this lack of a common 
understanding of what culture is, we noticed there were three broad perspectives on culture among the 
people we interviewed: as an existential issue; as a set of practices; and as a tool.  
Culture as existential issue. Perhaps the broadest approach to culture we noticed among some banks was 
to see culture as an existential issue. Culture provided an answer to the question of identity such as ‘who we 
are’ as an organization. It gives an answer to the purpose such as ‘why we exist’. It also furnishes members 
with answers to ‘what we believe in’. This approach to culture seeks to get at the underlying assumptions 
of the organization. We noticed that large banks which had faced large scale traumas such as involvement 
with the LIBOR scandal were most likely to see culture in terms of these basic existential questions. By 
asking these questions, senior management seem to be pushing for a fundamental rethinking of the basic 
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identity, purpose and values of the institution. This seems to go beyond the ofﬁ cially articulated values and 
get at some of the basic unofﬁ cial assumptions about why the bank exists. For instance, some of the big four 
banks have focused parts of their culture change programmes around bringing to the surface and discussing 
the purpose of banking for the broader society. The aim of these initiatives seemed to be to encourage 
employees to balance commercial pressures and think beyond a narrow focus on proﬁ t and sales and think 
about the broader social purpose of a bank (in the generic), and their bank (in particular). In one large bank 
senior leaders were encouraged to confront emotive issues such as their banks involvement in money 
laundering. There was also a great emphasis on confronting issues of personal authenticity, mapping their 
‘Moral DNA’ and creating alignment between their personal values and the values of the organization.
Culture as a set of practices. We also found that some banks understood culture as being a set of practices, 
as ‘the way things are done around here’. These practices were intimately linked with each other and 
reinforced through a set of systems and prompts. This was the focus of banks which felt they did not need to 
change their culture. The focus of these institutions was on reinforcing and generating day to day practices. 
Existential questions about purpose tended to be taken for granted and not discussed. In these contexts, the 
focus was very much on the details or ‘how’ rather than the justiﬁ cations of ‘why’. For instance, at First Direct 
there was a great focus on tracking the detailed aspects which improve interaction with customers. 
Culture as a tool. The ﬁ nal approach to culture which we noticed in some institutions was to see culture 
as a tool which could help them to achieve strategic objectives. In these contexts, culture was seen as 
something which was more or less manipulative. This could be achieved through various Human Resource 
practices such as recruitment, selection, induction, performance monitoring, promotion and reward. 
For instance in one challenger bank, all organizational systems from recruitment and rewards down to 
annual celebrations were designed to create and reinforce a highly customer oriented cultures. Some 
employees even wore cuff-links with the bank’s logo emblazoned on them. Here it was assumed that senior 
management had some degree of control over culture and they could push it in one direction or another 
with enough careful manipulation. 
Content of cultural change programmes 
Formalised values. Each of the banks which we spoke to had a list of formalised values. In some cases these 
were relatively new values which were unveiled as part of a culture change or ‘values refresh’ program. For 
instance, Barclays launched a new set of values following the appointment of Anthony Jenkins. These values 
are prominently displayed throughout their headquarters in Canary Wharf. In other cases, banks emphasise 
sets of values which had been quite long standing. For instance, Nationwide has only made very minor 
changes to their ofﬁ cial set of values during the past 15 years. There are clearly differences between the 
values of each bank. However, we noticed that there were a number of common strands which are shared 
across each of these different organisations. These include being customer centric, transparent, having 
integrity, beneﬁ ting the community and developing some degree of simplicity. Virgin Money was unique in 
that it talks about making a “fair but not excessive” proﬁ t.
Customer centric cultures. All the banks which we spoke with told us they had, or were trying to build, a 
customer centric culture. In some cases, this involved shifting from a sales culture towards a culture which 
placed a great emphasis on delivering results which would contribute towards the bottom line to a culture 
which involves serving customer needs ﬁ rst. Some banks talked about how they designed products and how 
there was now a greater focus on how precisely they made money from their customers. Making this shift 
will require varying degrees of effort. This is because some institutions thought they already had a customer 
focused culture. For instance, Metrobank told us their entire business model was based around what the 
needs of the customer were. In contrast, others noted they had previous emphasised sales over customer 
needs. What is notable here is that all banks tell us they are fostering the same overarching goal. However, 
there were clear differences in the points they are beginning from, and also exactly how they seek to fulﬁ l 
this goal.  
Integrity and authenticity. Many of the banks pointed out that they wanted to move away from a culture 
based on compliance and rule-following cultures towards one where good behaviour is governed by integrity. 
The central idea here appears to be that instead of relying on tick-box regulation, members will ask whether 
a particular product or service is right for customers through reference to a set of values. Some times this 
was to be based on organizational values. But in many cases, there was a greater emphasis on individual 
values. In some cases individuals were encouraged to make decisions by asking themselves whether the 
decision would be acceptable if it was public knowledge, or whether they would sell their grandmother a 
particular product. For instance in RBS, all employees are encouraged to perform a ‘Yes Check’ when making 
decisions (see Box 4.1). Underlying all this seemed to be broader desire to create connections between 
people’s personal values and the values which they bring to work. 
Box 4.1: RBS Yes Check
1 Does what I am doing keep our customers and the bank safe and secure?
Consider the impact of what you are doing. Rehearse a brieﬁ ng with your boss.
2 Would customers and colleagues say I am acting with integrity?
Consider: would I do this to someone in my family or a friend?
Would I do it to myself?
3 Am I happy with how this would be perceived on the outside?
Consider the impact of this in the outside world. Try writing the press release – does it sound good for customers?
4. Is what I am doing meeting the standards of conduct required? 
Think. If you are unsure then seek a second opinion.
5. In 5 years’ time would others see this as a good way to work?
Will this have a positive impact? Imagine writing it on your CV.
The Yes Check: Ask Yourself...
Simplicity and transparency. Another notable value which seemed to run throughout many of the banks 
which we spoke to was a value of simplicity and transparency. For instance, Santander’s core values are 
being ‘Simple, Transparent and Fair’. This industry wide focus on simplicity and transparency seemed to be a 
reaction against what had been perceived to be the overly complex and complicated nature of the ﬁ nancial 
services sector prior to recent changes in culture. It also was a reaction to the sense among the public and 
regulators that banks had often been underhanded about their operating procedures, the way they sold their 
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products and charged customers for them. This emphasis on simplicity and transparency was both embodied 
in espoused values. In many cases, it was also embodied in the visual images which banks use and the design 
of branches. For instance, one challenger bank told us they had installed a glass safe into a ﬂ agship branch to 
display their commitment to transparency. When groups of school children visited the branch, they would be 
locked into this transparent safe as part of the tour. 
Questions about importance of espoused values. There was a widespread awareness among the banks 
that simply looking at espoused values was not as important as the harder measures which were designed 
to actually reinforce these values. Little time was spent during the interviews going into formal values. 
There was a greater emphasis on mechanisms which were involved in reinforcing these values. We spent a 
long time talking about performance measurement, reward systems and similar matters. Some of the banks 
we spoke to pointed out that their business models were actually far more important than their espoused 
values. For instance, Handelsbanken simply told us they wanted to create ‘Handelsbankers’. The rest of the 
interview was focused on explaining their unique business model, a subject they were very enthusiastic 
about. What this suggested is that espoused values may be important, but other aspects are seen by senior 
executives as being more important in creating culture change. 
Programmes
Cascade down. The ﬁ rst broad type of culture change programme which we found in banking involved 
a process of cascading culture change downwards. This approach was most common in the largest banks. 
Generally these programmes initially focused on leaders at the top of the organization. They emphasised 
creating common values. They would focus on creating a need for change, developing a common purpose, 
articulating appropriate behaviours, and working with leadership on leadership issues. They would often take 
the form of training courses, coaching and wider cultural change initiatives. In many of these programmes 
there is a signiﬁ cant emphasis on getting leaders in the bank to recognise there is a need to engage in a 
culture change process. They often focused on encouraging senior leaders to stop leaving their ‘humanity’ 
at the door. Finally, there is an aim to reinforce many of the new values within the bank. The hope is that 
by inculcating the need for change in senior leaders, they will be able to begin to cascade these new values 
down the organization. 
For instance, in one major bank the top 125 leaders engaged in a ‘transformation journey’. This entailed 
a series of day or day and a half workshops which focused on culture and leadership issues. This was also 
backed up with a process designed to establish ‘leadership standards’ where all senior leaders went through a 
360 degree evaluation focused on cultural issues. This involved getting feedback from superiors, subordinates, 
peers as well as their own feedback with regards to their leadership behaviour. These initiatives focused at 
the top were then backed up by a number of workshops designed for people with leadership responsibilities 
throughout the bank. Included in these workshops were people with widely varying responsibilities. 
Reinforcement through everyday processes. The second approach to culture we found were elaborate 
integrated systems which operated from the bottom-up to constantly reinforced culture. This approach 
involved using a mixture of HR processes such as recruitment, selection, performance measurement and 
remuneration to ensure a culture was encouraged in day-to-day behaviours. Instead of largely focusing on 
top leaders and hoping that they would cascade a new culture down the organization, this approach tended 
to focus on all members of the organization and seek to re-enforce what were taken to be widely shared 
sets of values. The form this took was often quite different. For instance in Handelsbanken, it was largely 
done through an informal and bottom up reinforcement of culture in everyday interaction in small, tight-
knit branch teams. In contrast at First Direct, there were very detailed systems in place which were designed 
to constantly reinforce high-levels of customer service. What these two quite different cases share is a 
commitment to bottom up reinforcement. 
Building systems from scratch. The third approach to deploying culture which we noticed involved building 
systems which reinforce a culture. Often this was the case in organisations which were made up of parts of 
another ﬁ nancial organization such as TSB and Virgin Money. In each of these institutions we found they had 
developed a number of formal systems such as HR processes, internal communications processes and risk 
management processes and giving a clear message to staff that feedback was welcomed by senior managers. 
Virgin has implemented its own HR processes within old Northern Rock branches. TSB seems also to have 
made good progress in integrating various systems to reinforce a common culture. At the other end of the 
spectrum was a bank like Shawbrook, where many of the processes which would reinforce culture remain 
largely parts of the separate businesses which it is made up of.
Processes
Tone from the top. One of the most frequently referred to processes within the large institutions was the 
idea of establishing the right ‘tone from the top’. This involved ensuring the correct values were expressed 
and embodied by the CEO. But it also involved other senior management seeking to ‘live the values’. In one 
bank, senior executives were asked to consider the scripts which they had used in the interactions in the 
past, and then to create new scripts to guide their interactions. The hope was these senior leaders would 
become ‘cultural enablers’ who would cascade the desired values down the organization. In order to get 
these top leaders on board, they would often go to rely on immersive experiences designed to unsettle their 
attachment to the previous culture by looking at its dark side. For instance, one large bank asked its senior 
leaders to participate in a ‘truth and reconciliation’ style workshop where they forced into an uncomfortable 
environment and were shown various videos of recent wrong-doings of the bank. In another bank, ‘Values 
Leaders’ were asked to attend a Roman style ‘Agora’ where they are encouraged to discuss the core values of 
the bank and what they mean for them.   
A pervasive experience. Many of the banks we spoke with noted how culture was rolled out and reinforced 
by a wide range of formal systems within the ﬁ rm. Instead of focusing on large scale changes in employee’s 
understanding of the values of their organization which they are asked to embody as leaders, they largely 
focused on processes of constantly reminding and reinforcing the culture in people. This involved HR 
systems, recruitment processes, communication processes and interaction with branch managers. In these 
organisations, culture was seen as being something which was not just embodied or promoted by senior 
managers, but is pervasive throughout the organization. For instance at Metrobank, almost all aspects of 
the organization from the workplace architecture to informal rituals to reward systems were designed to 
consistently reinforce a customer centric culture. 
Piece-meal attempts. A number of the smaller banks which we spoke with were engaged in many of 
the similar aspects of culture change which we saw in others banks. For instance, they had performance 
measurement and reward systems not exclusively focused on bonuses, they had institutions risk 
management training, they had limited employee engagement exercises, and their senior leaders emphasised 
values such as being customer focused. However each of these elements did not seem to be brought 
together into an over-arching system. They often followed this approach because they were not under the 
same kind of pressure to dramatically change a large institution (as big banks were). They also did not clearly 
seek to compete on the basis of a unique culture. In newly established institutions, these piecemeal changes 
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could be understood as ﬁ rst steps on a journey to develop a more integrated culture. In others institutions, 
they might be seen as a response to regulators demands. 
Measures
Pervasive metrics. All the organisations we spoke with had complex metrics. We found they had shifted 
their measures away from sales focused metrics and towards metrics which were largely focused on 
customer needs. There were also metrics which were focused on other issues such as ethics, integrity and 
the careful monitoring of risks. There were some differences insofar as organisations adopted metrics which 
were focused on culture related issues. At one extreme were banks such as Handelsbanken which relied on 
relatively minimal sets of metrics, but high levels of local empowerment and direct feedback. At the other 
extreme was a bank like First Direct which carefully measured a wide range of aspects about the customer 
service experience. Looking across each of these institutions which we spoke with, we found there were three 
areas associated with culture they measured: attitudes, behaviours and outcomes. 
Attitudes. All the banks we spoke with had some kind of measures of employee attitudes. At a minimum, 
banks would conduct an annual survey of employee attitudes. Often there would be some components of 
the survey looking at understanding or alignment with aspects of the company culture. Larger organisations 
would also look at to what extent employees were attached to various aspects of the organization such as 
units, branches, divisions or the whole organization. These surveys would then be fed into decision making 
processes throughout the bank. In addition to formal measurement of attitudes, one challenger bank 
we spoke with closely monitored the online employee discussion forums. By looking at the tone of the 
conservation, and issues mentioned, they would give them a general sense of the mood and climate within 
the organization as a whole. This only seemed to be practical for smaller organisations.   
Behaviours. Some of the banks measured behaviours in different ways. Within the large banks, much of 
these behavioural measures were focused on senior management who were involved in formal culture 
change processes. For instance at RBS, in some parts of the group the behaviour of senior managers 
was observed and feedback and development provided. In HSBC there were measurements to check 
behaviours were in line with the values of the organization. At Barclays, there are a set of measures for 
senior management around what they are doing and how they are doing it. In each of these cases, the focus 
appears to be on leadership and management style and checking whether senior ﬁ gures are ‘living’ the values 
of the ﬁ rm.
At the branch level, most banks put into place more customer centric measurements and targets such as 
‘customer needs assessed’ or ‘customer needs met’. They had also instituted some kind of balanced scorecard 
at most levels of the organization where employees are measured not just on hard ﬁ nancial outcomes, but 
were also measured on softer outcomes such as customer service levels or alignment with ﬁ rm values. For 
instance, at Santander, employees are assessed equally on performance and behaviours that obtain the right 
outcomes for customers. The “Santander Way” sets out the behaviours of “Simple, Personal and Fair” which 
apply to its people, customers, communities and shareholders. . In some institutions, there were deeper 
investigations into employees with extremely high sales performance to see whether they were engaged in 
risky or untoward behaviours. 
In some banks, there was a greater focus on measuring detailed interaction with customers. For instance, at 
First Direct there was a battery of measurements and assessments of the quality of customer interactions. The 
focus was very much on the process of the customer interaction rather than the outcome. Where there were 
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uncertainty about individuals’ positions. The upshot is that many individuals remained uncertain about 
further culture change initiatives. 
Integration challenges. Some organisations pointed out there were problems with integrating a number of 
different cultures. This was the case where organisations had merged. Even a number of years after mergers, 
quite different cultures seemed to persist at different parts of the organization. In some cases this proved 
to be a problem. However, there were cases where having separate cultures seemed to be beneﬁ cial. For 
instance, First Direct has a distinct and separate culture from its parent company HSBC. It has also helped 
to instruct its parent body about what it means to build a customer service culture. Another interesting 
permutation are cases where employees did not feel the integration process proceeded quickly enough. For 
instance at Virgin, some employees who had previously worked for Northern Rock branches wanted to have 
more aspects of Virgin Money more quickly than senior management had planned. 
Guilt shifting. Another challenge in creating culture change was that some employees were not willing to 
take responsibility for required changes. This often happened when they recognised things had gone wrong 
in the past, but they then saw the blame for these practices as sitting with other aspects of the business. 
This approach was particularly prevalent in large banks where members of the retail division externalise 
blame onto the investment bank and other aspects of the institution which had been involved in high proﬁ le 
scandals such as LIBOR. 
Giving up before change is completed. A number of the people we spoke to told us that the change 
process within their organisations will take some time to complete. They pointed out that senior executive 
attention is focused on culture change issues now. However, they pointed out that there is a major risk that 
the attention of senior executive will shift. They warned this could result in the banks effectively dropping the 
agenda around culture change before it had been adequately worked through. The result, they feared, would 
be a return to past approaches to culture. 
Demand for proﬁ ts. Another major potential barrier to culture change were demands for returns from 
shareholders. Some of our respondents noted that processes of regulatory compliance and culture change 
programmes have been costly. Some saw shareholders being relatively impatient to draw a line under culture 
change initiatives and return to state of normalised returns. Some of those driving culture change initiatives 
within banks were concerned that this would lead to a return to activities which would increase short term 
shareholder returns and may conﬂ ict with the new focus on customer and integrity. 
Overloading. A ﬁ nal concern which many of the banks mentioned was the overloading associated with 
change initiatives. They pointed out that there were a range of new regulatory and compliance requirements 
which needed to be integrated into their activities. When placed alongside the drive for culture change, they 
were concerned it would overload the organization. Some pointed out that the regulatory and compliance 
demands may actually lead to more rationalisation rather than actually creating a better culture. 
Regulation 
Regulation as a nudge in the right direction. Many of the institutions we spoke with acknowledged that 
recent regulation was nudging the industry in the right direction. They told us it was helping to change what 
had previously been problematic patterns of behaviours. Some of the smaller institutions pointed out that 
little would change within the industry without pressure from the regulators. Overall, there seemed to be 
agreement that the broad direction of recent regulatory changes is right. However, there was some degree of 
dismay about the detailed ways in which new regulation was being taken forward. 
outcome measurements, they were about customer focused aspects such as satisfactory resolution of customer 
needs. This was facilitated by the fact that all interactions were over the phone and could be easily monitored. 
Finally, we noticed in some organisations, there were behavioural measures associated with creating ‘the 
right environment’. For instance, at Barclays there was measurement of how staff contributed to creating 
an environment of dialogue and communication. At First Direct, employees were measured on the basis of 
employees’ contribution to creating the right environment.  
Outcomes. Each of the banks which we have spoken to had moved away from a strict focus on sales and 
ﬁ nancial outcomes. Instead, they have adopted a wider pallet of outcome measures. One set of measures 
focus on the quality of sales by looking at the potential risks associated with the ﬁ nancial products sold. 
Another set of measures focuses on customer outcomes such as customer satisfaction, net promoter scores, 
and even customer happiness. There were also customer measures which captured the negative side of 
the equation. This included customer complaints, speed at resolving complaints and whether customers 
thought their complaints had been dealt with sufﬁ ciently. A range of employee related outcomes were 
also captured through HR data such as misconduct disciplinary cases, long term absences, and employee 
engagement scores. Close attention was also paid to the outcome of whistleblowing cases in many of the 
organisations which we talked to. However, to our knowledge there was no information provided about the 
positive business beneﬁ ts gained from whistle-blowers and nor were they celebrated internally. Data was 
also collected about rewards and remuneration. One institution we spoke to paid close attention to unusual 
patterns, outliers and spikes in sales patterns. These were more closely investigated. 
Questions about outcome measures. There was some debate within the banks we spoke with about the 
usefulness of various customer metrics such as customer complaints resolved and customer satisfaction. 
Even high level executives pointed out that at times these metrics can be unrelated with current levels of 
service quality. For instance, customer complaints are often associated with a product which had been sold 
in the past rather than products currently being sold. One large bank told us they recognised much customer 
data could be ‘gamed’. For instance rates of customer complaints resolved could be cut by simply focusing 
on easy to resolve complaints within the time-window which was deemed to be appropriate, and then 
‘parking’ complaints which could not so easily be resolved. A focus on numbers of FCA reportable complaints 
was also noted to exclude complaints which were dealt with before the close of the next business day and 
therefore was even more vulnerable to gaming.
Challenges
The old culture is engrained. A number of banks told us that one of the largest challenges they faced was 
that the existing culture was highly ingrained in their people. This is because many employees had ‘grown 
up’ in an outcomes focused culture. This made it difﬁ cult for them to change their underlying beliefs and 
assumptions. It also triggered a sense of fear and in some cases self-protection whereby executives and 
employees were extremely uncertain about what the future held for them. It seemed many bank employees 
were concerned about whether the skills and attitudes which they had developed over a long period of time 
within a sales culture would be relevant in a new culture placing greater emphasis on customer focus and 
integrity. This also made it difﬁ cult for some employees to really understand and implement this new culture. 
Wariness of change. One large bank pointed out that employees were generally wary of further change 
initiatives. This is because they have been through large scale shifts within their business during the past 
5-7 years. This included large scale job losses, frequent changes in senior management and considerable 
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Regulation could crowd out good judgement. One of the major concerns which banks communicated with 
us was whether the increasing weight of regulation meant that ‘good judgement’ was being crowded out. In 
particular, they point out that many of the processes which they need to go through in order to show that 
risk has been adequately managed can result in staff simply going through routines rather than exercising 
their professional judgement. A number of respondents did however acknowledge that the processes that 
regulators had put in place helped to prompt good judgements in a number of contexts. 
You can’t regulate for culture. Many of the representatives of the banks we spoke with pointed out that 
regulating for culture is difﬁ cult, if not impossible. This is because culture is something which is created 
through intangible aspects which are very difﬁ cult to control, let along regulate. According to most banks, 
culture is a matter that should be driven either by sectoral leadership or leadership within the bank. Attempts 
by the regulators to intervene in ﬁ rm level cultures were seen as being inappropriate and ineffective. In some 
cases, this was thought to be because regulators would not solve the issue by putting additional rules in 
place if ﬁ rms continued to look at ways to evade them. 
Unnecessary steps for customers. Some of the banks we spoke with warned that the increased regulatory 
burden could result in transactions and customer service interactions being unnecessarily slowed down. 
One institution told us that the introduction of regulatory checks resulted in the slowing down of customer 
service interactions. Others suggested that longer appointments were held with customers than were 
necessary in order to comply with regulatory process requirements. There was a concern that further 
regulation would result in further impediments to customer service. 
Regulatory fatigue. A number of the larger institutions we spoke with noted the constant waves of new 
detailed regulation they have been faced with following the ﬁ nancial crisis. This included regulation of 
remuneration, ring-fencing and many other large scale initiatives. As a result, their risk and compliance 
departments have increased markedly in size. This comes with signiﬁ cant increased costs. In addition, the 
agenda of the board is increasingly focused on regulatory issues. There is a concern that by adding more 
regulatory requirements around culture, banks could become over-burdened.
Unintended consequences of metrics. Some of the banks we spoke with were concerned that when the 
regulator begins to measure something, it can result in unexpected consequences. Some of our respondents 
told us that any ﬁ gures which were measured often become the focus of manipulation and gaming. For 
instance, past practices may simply be relabelled. In other cases, there may be a focus on simply hitting the 
numbers with a broader disregard for the underlying principles. One current example of this gaming which 
one bank mentioned was dealing with customer complaints.
Conclusion 
The UK retail banking sector has been undergoing signiﬁ cant culture change in recent years. Following 
criticism of the widespread sales culture, all the major banks have launched large scale culture change 
programmes. The smaller challenger banks have also developed and extended cultures which focus more 
squarely on customer service. It therefore appears UK banks are beginning to take steps in the right direction. 
While all banks had some kind of culture programme in place, we noticed there were three distinctively 
different approaches to culture change within the industry: 
Turning around the super-tanker. The major banks frequently referred to culture change as a slow and 
difﬁ cult process akin to ‘turning around a super tanker’. These culture change programmes were typically 
triggered by the LIBOR scandal and involved an attempt by the banks to realign themselves with wider social 
expectations. They often did this by approaching culture as a matter of existential questions about identity, 
beliefs and purpose. There was a signiﬁ cant emphasis on values such as integrity and authenticity. Initially, 
culture change was targeted at higher level executives with the intention to cascade the change downwards. 
These banks faced the greatest challenges in changing their cultures. These challenges came from ingrained 
existing cultures, a widespread wariness of change, demands from shareholders and the danger of giving up 
change processes before they are adequately completed.
Business as usual. A number of well-established players within the industry pointed out that they did not 
need to fundamentally change their culture. These banks sought to continue existing cultures which they 
thought had led to good outcomes in the past. Their focus was on reinforcing culture through daily practices. 
The aim was to reinforce a wide-spread and pervasive experience of a culture and ensure continuity with 
past values. 
Challengers. A third model of culture change which we came across were new banks which were either 
being built from the ground up (such as Metrobank) or fundamental transformation of existing branch 
networks (such as Virgin Money and TSB). In these contexts, culture came to be seen as something which 
should be designed into many aspects of the organization. Often inspiration is borrowed from other 
industries such as retail or other national contexts. In some cases, the new culture was presented as being an 
all-encompassing package. It other cases, it was reinforced through a range of elements which still required 
some degree of coherence.  
Although there was some difference in each of these models, we noticed there were some signiﬁ cant 
similarities in how the institutions measured culture. They all had some mixture of measures which 
captured attitudes, behaviours and outcomes. There appeared to be a number of industry standard measures 
(particular with regards to customer outcomes). However some institutions had more well developed 
measures in other areas – particularly with regard to behavioural outcomes. 
Finally, all the banks we spoke to concurred that regulation had given their cultures a nudge in the right 
direction. However, they were wary of regulatory attempts to interfere into their cultures. They thought this 
may crowd out space for good judgement, add unnecessary steps which complicate the customer service 
process and potentially lead to unintended consequences.  
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Chapter Five: Stakeholder 
Perspectives on Cultural Change 
Introduction
In addition to examining the cultural change processes each of the banks have underway, we also gathered 
the perspective of a range of stakeholders in the industry about these changes. To capture diverse views, 
we interviewed regulators, banking industry representatives, employee unions, consumer advocates, 
representatives of business, and representatives of investors. We were particularly interested in the kind of 
change which had taken place since 2008, what had driven this change, who were laggards and leaders in the 
industry, barriers and facilitators of cultural change, initiatives which each organization we spoke with already 
had underway and their views on regulation.  
Changes since 2008 
Increase in legislation. All the stakeholders we spoke with noted that there had been a signiﬁ cant growth 
in the amount of new legislation. Much of this is a direct result of problems which had been identiﬁ ed 
within the bank sector following the ﬁ nancial collapse. A banking industry group pointed out that the 
sheer amount of new regulation which banks are being required to process at present is signiﬁ cant. Putting 
into place initiatives such as ring-fencing retail from investment banking operations takes many years and 
signiﬁ cant effort to achieve. This means there are a number of initiatives currently under way, but it will 
take until about 2019 until they are fully implemented. While some were cautious about this increase in 
the amount of legislation, others (particularly consumers groups) pointed out that the previous ‘light touch’ 
regulation had led to poor outcomes. Therefore a signiﬁ cant increase in legislation and enforcement of that 
legislation was warranted. 
From compliance to conduct. As well as dealing with a signiﬁ cant load of legislation, they also pointed out 
that the focus of this legislation had shifted from ensuring compliance and fostering competition to focusing 
on conduct issues. Perhaps the most important aspect of this was the foundation of Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). The implication is that banks now ﬁ nd that many of their internal processes such as the way 
they measure and reward performance have become the focus of heightened regulatory interest. A related 
change has come with recent regulation (the senior persons regime) which seeks to hold individuals to 
account for wrong-doings. The aim of this was to avoid what one of our interviewees described as the ‘Orient 
Express defence’ whereby everyone claims another person was responsible. It was also to address a deep 
public feeling that following the ﬁ nancial crisis, particular individuals needed to be held to account. 
Culture becomes a board issue. With the growth of legislation, particularly around conduct issues, many 
of our interviewees told us that culture and other conduct issues has become a board-room issue. This is 
partially due to the fact boards need to process and ensure the implementation of a range of new legislative 
initiatives. But perhaps more importantly, it is because boards are being asked to develop more knowledge 
about what is actually happening within their businesses. To do this, they are increasingly seeking to keep 
track of a wide range of compliance issues such as the structure of remuneration, promotion, performance 
evaluation and general cultural issues. The result is that boards are no longer focusing solely on ﬁ nancial 
metrics. They are starting to use a wide range of metrics to capture the ‘softer’ aspects of the business. Most 
respondents pointed out this interest in culture and compliance issues will become heightened once the 
senior persons’ regime is in place and board members are required to document the reasonable steps which 
they took in observing and mitigating risks. Many stakeholders told us that the public expected senior leaders 
to be held to personally account for the culture of their organization, particularly when it results in failures. 
There was an agreement that the Senior Persons regimes goes some way to addressing the issue. Some of 
the people we spoke with thought the Senior Persons regime may be too onerous, making it difﬁ cult to 
attract appropriate candidates to serve on boards. However, many others told us that the senior persons’ 
regime was a way of holding individuals to account. This was an issue which was sorely lacking during the 
ﬁ nancial crisis, leading to widespread public anger that no individuals were held to account for widespread 
failure. There was also some concern about the ensuring that the Senior Persons regime was not progressively 
watered down as it was implemented within banks.  
The growth of risk and compliance function. As new legislation has worked its way through the banks 
and boards have begun to pay more attention to legislative issues, there has been a growth of the risk and 
compliance function. This has resulted in risk and compliance departments moving from being staffed by 
relatively powerless junior staff to them becoming more powerful within the organization and staffed with 
more senior people. In addition, risk and compliance issues have become part of day-to-day work involved 
in many transactions. The result is that many interactions with customers involve some checks for risk and 
compliance which go beyond computer based credit scoring. This means all the banks which we spoke with 
spent more time taking customers through more formal processes to highlight potential risks associated with 
the ﬁ nancial products. 
Introduction of balanced scorecards. There have also been changes in the way employee’s performance 
is assessed at most levels of retail bank. As we have already seen, in the past sales were the most important 
measure of performance in most retail banks. In the last chapter, we pointed out that none of the banks 
which we spoke with now measure their staff purely on the basis of sales. Instead, balanced scorecards have 
become the most important measure of performance. Most of the stakeholders we spoke with pointed out 
that this meant the outlook of bankers are likely to be more balanced. Provided that these changes were 
accompanied by reforms to performance management and reduced implicit pressure on staff to sell then 
these reforms would reduce the focus on sales numbers. 
Disconnect between top and bottom. Although there was agreement that the measures had improved, 
there was some concern about whether changes in banks were largely conﬁ ned to the top of the 
organization. Some of our respondents were sceptical about the extent to which more rounded measures 
had actually trickled down to the branch levels. We were told about white-boards tracking staff against sales 
targets being formally banned from branches, but informally reintroduced. We were also told about sales 
targets being relabelled as ‘customer needs assessment’. When we spoke with staff who actually worked in 
the branches of the major banks we got a mixed picture of the extent to which top down culture change 
initiatives were actually being taken seriously. The staff at Barclays noted that things had got signiﬁ cantly 
better following the introduction of the transform programme. In contrast, staff of two other major banks 
pointed out things had only got worse in recent years and they felt under greater pressure. One issue of 
grave concern was that continued cost cutting exercises meant that branches were routinely understaffed. 
The result was that customers waited for a long time, got angry and then took their frustration out on the 
staff. What this ultimately meant was a disconnect between the ‘tone from the top’ and the practices and 
products which customers were confronted with. 
How much has really changed? About half of the stakeholders we spoke with remained very sceptical 
about cultural changes in major banks in recent years. Some pointed out that change would be slow within 
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the major institutions. They pointed out that cultural change was about more than having the bank’s values 
displayed in its head ofﬁ ce or on the walls of the lifts. Others noted that really culture change could 
take ‘a generation’. Some even went as far as to suggest that as long as the major banks remained 
dominated by people with backgrounds in investment banking, there would be no meaningful change at all. 
While opinion differed, it was clear there remained a signiﬁ cant degree of scepticism about the prospect of 
change in the sector. 
Drivers of cultural change 
Economic cycle. The ﬁ rst major driver of cultural change which some commentators picked out was broader 
micro-economic trends. One of our respondents told us that changes were driven by a 60-70 year long debt 
cycle which had seen the provision of easy credit leading to over-investment in weak assets, resulting in wide 
spread failure and subsequent contraction of lending. As a result the banking sector has had to adopt a more 
cautious approach to lending – resulting in the currently more risk averse culture which we see in banks. 
Although the macro-economic analyses of the current situation may differ, there was a broad agreement 
among some of our respondents that the tightening of the economy and the more cautious economic 
outlook this encouraged had resulted in a change in approaches to lending not just within the banks, but also 
within the broader society.
Bank failure and public ownership. The second major driver of change was the failure, or near failure of 
some of the largest UK banks during the height of the ﬁ nancial crisis in 2009. They pointed out that the 
public bail-out of Lloyds and RBS meant that politicians as well as the broader public were in a position to 
put greater pressure on these banks. 
Scandals. Most of our respondents pointed out large-scale public scandals like the mis-selling of PPI and 
LIBOR were actually a more important trigger to cultural change than the 2009 bail-outs of the banks. These 
scandals were seen as evidence that the banks had learnt nothing from the ﬁ nancial crisis. Our respondents 
pointed out that following the ﬁ nancial crisis there was ongoing and sustained pressure from the media for 
widespread cultural change within the banks and the industry as a whole. 
New regulation. Following these scandals, a range of new regulations have been introduced within the 
banking sector. Pieces of legislation which were picked out for particular attention included the ring-fencing 
regulations and the senior persons’ regime. In conjunction with a range of previous regulatory changes, 
the result has been a signiﬁ cant pressure on the major banks to change their approach. Some respondents 
pointed out that all these new regulations, although apparently less important on their own, add up to an 
important change to the industry as a whole. 
Barriers
Short termism. A big barrier to culture change some stakeholders pointed out was the pressure for 
shareholders for relatively short term returns on investment. They pointed out that the obsession with 
providing a return on investment over a three year investment cycle meant that CEOs of banks had relatively 
short decision making horizons. The result was that some stakeholders are sceptical about the ability of CEOs 
to maintain focus on culture change over a sustained period of time. This becomes compounded by the fact 
that the tenure of many CEOs within banks has declined signiﬁ cantly. A senior regulator told us that in the 
past bank CEOs were in position for 7-10 years, now it is 3-5 years. This means if the economic results from 
culture change programmes are not forthcoming within a few years, the investors will put pressure on the 
CEO to focus on more aggressively creating shareholder value. 
Imperfect market. Another barrier to meaningful culture change identiﬁ ed by stakeholders was the lack 
of proper competition within the industry. They pointed out that the retail banking industry is made up of 
companies offering largely similar products. Because it costs a lot to establish a new bank, there are also 
relatively high barriers to entry. Finally, because consumers are relatively uninformed – in some cases they 
possess low levels of ﬁ nancial capability – there are high levels of information asymmetries. Customers are 
also subject to behavioural biases which make decisions about long-term products which involve risk and 
uncertainty difﬁ cult to make. This means customers are often not in a position to select between products 
and identify the best deal for them. This is compounded by the fact that the products and pricing structures 
are often un-necessarily complex and there is an un-necessarily high degree of choice. Instead of rewarding 
loyalty some markets for retail banking products took advantage of the inertia of customers. The result is 
too few banks offer too many overly complex products to consumers who are not in a position to make a 
meaningful and informed choice. 
Employment conditions. Many of the people we interviewed pointed out that the levels of pay in front 
line retail banking are relatively low. In many case they are close to the minimum wage. One staff member 
pointed out that many staff rely on welfare payments to ‘get by’. These poor levels of pay are compounded 
by the fact that employment in the industry has been falling in recent years. Widespread job cuts have 
meant there is a pervasive feeling of insecurity within the industry. This can mean that staff might be under 
implicit pressure to meet sales targets even if the bank has removed the ﬁ nancial incentives for selling 
products. Some staff we spoke with reported feeling like they are doing the job of two or more people. 
They also report being a target of verbal abuse from customers who are angry at ‘the bankers’. In addition, 
some employees we spoke with noted that they were not paid for all the hours they worked. They described 
arriving at work at least half an hour before they started to get paid, in order to attend a team meeting and 
then having to leave work half an hour after they had stopped being paid in order to deal with customer 
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demands. In one case, an employee regularly turned up early to participate in a ‘huddle’ with her team before 
the day began, and then participated in a ‘cuddle’ meeting to review the results of the day. None of this time 
was paid. One employee told us that all this unofﬁ cial over-time meant she had worked about 26 unpaid 
days during the year. Low wages, increasing demands, insecure employment, angry customers and unpaid 
overtime mean that life at the customer coal face can be stressful, resulting in high levels of sick leave and 
employee cynicism. 
Trust is slow moving. Some of our respondents underlined the fact that rebuilding trust in the industry will 
take a signiﬁ cant amount of time. One industry representative group told us that ‘trust is easy to lose and 
hard to rebuild’. Although the banks may be doing all the right things to rebuild trust, it will take some time 
before this is likely to have any real impact on public trust in the industry. Some pointed out that there is a 
real concern with trust being further undermined by the ‘long tail’ of scandals which are only now coming to 
light (such as the manipulation of commodities and foreign exchange markets). 
Facilitators
Board attention. The ﬁ rst major facilitator of cultural change picked out by many of our respondents was 
the signiﬁ cant attention of the board to cultural issues. Because board members are interested in monitoring 
and transforming the culture of the organization, they are likely to keep up pressure on the members of 
the organization to do this. This pressure is facilitated by the recently passed senior persons’ regime, which 
requires senior members of the organization to show they have been keeping track of the culture of 
the organization. 
New entrants. The second major driver of cultural change which a number of respondents pointed out 
was the presence of new entrants in the banking market. They pointed out the presence of challengers 
would hopefully drive up standards within the market. They would do this by introducing new practices 
from outside the market which they hoped would drive up overall standards within the industry. They hoped 
that through competition, ethical and customer service standards within the industry would slowly increase. 
Alternative forms of ﬁ nance. The ﬁ nal factor which might facilitate cultural change was the presence of 
substitutes for banking. This was mentioned in relation to the business lending market, where businesses 
are increasingly exploring alternative forms of ﬁ nance such as bond issuance, crowd funding and venture 
capital. There are also clearly analogues within the consumer banking sector where individuals are exploring 
alternative ways of fulﬁ lling their ﬁ nancial needs such as crypto-currencies and peer-to-peer lending. Some 
people we spoke to pointed out these new models of ﬁ nance may lead to customers going outside the 
banking sector to address their ﬁ nancial needs. If there was such a shift, there was a hope that incumbents 
in the industry would need to improve their offer to attract customers back. 
Conclusion 
The stakeholders in the banking industry we spoke to had mixed understandings of the cultural change in the 
industry. We did not get the sense that the major retail banks had undergone a signiﬁ cant transformation. 
Our respondents did acknowledge that there was signiﬁ cant work underway to change cultures within these 
institutions. This has resulted in a signiﬁ cant shift in the industry where there was more legislation, a greater 
focus on compliance, culture had become a board-room issue, and risk and compliance departments and 
processes had ballooned. However, there remained scope for a signiﬁ cant disconnect between what was 
happening at the top of an organization and the practice on the front line. 
There seemed to be broad agreement that culture change was largely driven by a conﬂ uence of extreme 
events in the environment including a shift in a long-wave economic cycle, the failure and subsequent public 
bail-out of some banks, large scale ﬁ nancial scandals and the introduction of new regulation. All these issues 
are still being worked through within the large banks. The result is that they very much remained at the top 
of the agenda for many senior executives. Some were less certain about what would happen when these 
immediate pressures disappear. 
The caution of many of our respondents about culture change in the industry was reﬂ ected in the 
existence of some signiﬁ cant barriers to change. These included an ongoing short term focus, the existence 
of imperfect markets, poor employment conditions, and damaged trust. Although there are some potential 
facilitators of change (such as board room focus and presence of new challengers), it remains rather 
uncertain about whether this will be enough to overcome the signiﬁ cant sources of inertia that exist in 
the industry. 
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Chapter Six: An Analysis of 
Cultural Change in Banking 
Introduction
In the previous chapters, we traced the historical drivers of the ﬁ nancial crisis, an important one of which 
was culture. There have been some signiﬁ cant attempts to resolve these issues through large scale culture 
change within major banks, the entry of new challenger banks, and the continuity of the culture within other 
institutions. This has been the beginning of what many stakeholders judge to be a relatively fragile process. 
In this chapter, we analyse this change process as a whole and draw some conclusions. To do this, we will 
sketch out the following over-arching case: the retail banking industry was dominated by a macro-culture 
of sales. This was not speciﬁ c to one organization, but seemed to be shared across the entire industry. It was 
a macro-culture. Following the ﬁ nancial crisis, there has been a slow burning crisis in this macro-culture. It 
is slow burning because for nearly 5 years following the on-set of the ﬁ nancial crisis, there was little real 
recognition in many of the major banks that something fundamental needed to change. However, following 
the LIBOR scandal, major banks began to devote signiﬁ cant resources to transforming their cultures. What 
these efforts add up to is a collective attempt to transform the macro-culture within the industry. However 
doing this, particularly in the context of large banks, is likely to be slow and very complex. The result is there 
are always signiﬁ cant forces of inertia which may be likely to impede change projects. To over-come these, 
continued pressure from regulation and also commitment for change and transformation from industry 
level is needed. This has resulted in some palpable changes, and indeed some improved outcomes, but much 
remains to be done. This leads us to conclude that ensuring meaningful cultural change in the industry will 
require signiﬁ cant and sustained attention. 
A macro-culture
Following the ﬁ nancial crisis, many of the inquiries into the failure of particular banks and the wider banking 
system have identiﬁ ed a long list of causes. However, one persistent theme that many of the people we 
spoke with identiﬁ ed was the rise of a sales culture in retail banking. What was striking about this sales 
culture was that it was not just limited to one organization. Instead it was replete throughout the industry. 
It is therefore more accurate to call it a ‘macro-culture’ that cut across the entire industry. The result is 
that bankers in a wide range of different organisations shared a set of routines, rituals, values and sets of 
assumptions about the world. The only thing which mattered to them was making a sale, irrespective of 
customer needs and longer term risk.
This macro-culture gave bankers a shared way of looking at the problems they faced. At the same time, it 
enabled bankers to systematically overlook longer term risk and the genuine fulﬁ lment of customer needs. 
Problems quickly accumulated, leading to many of the factors at the root of the ﬁ nancial crisis. However, 
because the wide macro-culture of sales was so ingrained into members of the industry, it remained difﬁ cult 
if not impossible for most industry members to really call it into question. There was also the pressure that 
to raise concerns about the sales culture could result in the person losing their job. 
Denial and crisis 
Many of the problems associated with the sales macro-culture became blindingly obvious to the broader 
public following the ﬁ nancial crisis. However, there was a stubborn unwillingness on the part of the industry 
to acknowledge many of these problems. One policy maker explained to us that among senior bankers, there 
was a hope that the problems would blow over and the banks would be able to return to business as usual. 
The result was that the major banks remained attached to a macro-culture of sales even as late as 2012 – 
ﬁ ve years after the ﬁ rst throws of the ﬁ nancial crisis. 
It was only with the revelations about the ﬁ xing of LIBOR rates, the PPI scandal and the subsequent crisis 
that there was a genuine resolve on the part of policy makers and regulators to begin pressuring the banks to 
address their culture. Such pressure coupled with important transformations at the top of the organization 
meant that the key players within the industry found themselves able to start rethinking the macro-culture 
of sales. This ushered in a period of self-reﬂ ection within the industry as a whole which eventually led 
banks publicly committing themselves to abandoning the sales macro-culture and seeking to develop an 
alternative. However, the incumbent macro-culture of sales remains strong. 
Three paths to reform 
Having accepted there was a need for widespread transformation of the macro-culture of sales, we found 
there were three different paths which organisations in the industry took. 
The ﬁ rst path is the one taken by the major banks. They have all sought to change the industry through 
internal culture change initiatives. They operate on the basis that by creating the right tone from the top, 
and then cascading it downwards, it will be possible to develop a culture which is more customer focused 
and encourages integrity. 
The second path is followed by institutions which perceived themselves as already having a culture which 
was not completely infected by the relentless focus on sales. These organisations put great store by the need 
to be customer focused and build integrity. They saw their major challenge as preserving, reproducing and in 
some cases ﬁ ne-tuning their culture. 
The ﬁ nal path to change involved new comers who sought to establish new cultures from scratch. These 
institutions sought to build a novel culture from the ground up which would be highly focused on customer 
needs. Often what they sought to do was to bring ideas about culture in from other sectors or other countries. 
Each of these three paths to change has had some impact on the industry as a whole. The presence of new-
comers offers consumers choice. The ﬁ ne-tuning of institutions which saw themselves as having the right 
culture in the ﬁ rst place represents an important return to earlier cultures of banking in some cases. But 
the most important path to change which will have the greatest impact on industry macro-culture is the 
transformation of the major banks. These make up the great majority of the market and have a profound 
impact on how banking culture develops within the sector.
Change is slow, multidimensional and complex
Transforming the macro-culture within the industry is likely to be a slow, multidimensional and complex task. 
Many of the people we interviewed told us that changing culture within the industry is likely to take years – 
if not a generation. 
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From our research on the banks, we found that they had made signiﬁ cant steps in addressing some of the 
facets associated with culture. All the banks which we spoke with had sought to put issues of customer 
service at the centre of their offerings. They had also sought to build a more customer centric culture 
through making changes to their measurement and remuneration systems. Each institution had an 
elaborated culture change process underway. This shows they have moved beyond ﬁ ne words and made 
signiﬁ cant investments in trying to build a different kind of culture. 
Despite the fact all the banks were investing in culture change initiatives, these are a work in progress at the 
major banks. There is a signiﬁ cant risk they may be only partially implemented and then entirely forgotten 
about. For these culture change initiatives to work, and become truly institutionalised, there needs to be 
constant support from both within the organization, but also beyond the boundaries of ﬁ rm. 
Slow improvement in some outcomes
The fact that many of the banks have committed themselves to engaging in a wide-ranging change in their 
culture has led to some improvements in outcomes of the banking sector. UK banks have become somewhat 
safer and more resilient. They have also made progress in eliminating questionable ﬁ nancial sales-incentives. 
Despite this progress, many indicators of banking sector performance remain stubbornly low. In some cases, 
results have actually got worse. For instance, many customer complaints are still not dealt with fairly and 
public trust in banks remains very low.
In order to make meaningful changes to these outcomes, it is necessary for the banking sector to persist with 
reform efforts. Changing public perceptions of banks is not something which can be achieved rapidly. Instead, 
it takes concerted effort on the part of the banks to genuinely build a customer focused culture. 
Overcoming the danger of inertia
It is clear there remains many facets of the macro-culture of sales which could easily derail culture change 
initiatives. Many of the banks we spoke with pointed out the very real challenges which they faced in 
implementing these culture change initiatives. These included integrating different cultures, internal blame 
shifting, demands for proﬁ t from investors and over-loading the organization with change initiatives.
In order to overcome these issues, some pressure from regulators seemed to be vital. In addition, creating 
the right tone from the top of each organization is needed. But these are really necessary, but not sufﬁ cient 
conditions for culture change. Many of our respondents pointed out that culture change initiatives risk 
getting lost as they cascaded down the organization. This reminds us that attending to how change processes 
are actually taken up and adopted on the front lines of an organization is vital. Listening to and acting upon 
feedback from frontline staff will help senior management measure progress.
Fragile drivers, signiﬁ cant barriers 
Vital drivers of change in macro-culture are present. Boards of large banks continue to pay signiﬁ cant 
attention to culture change issues. New entrants create some competitive pressure. However, these factors 
are fragile and could easily disappear. The agenda of boards could easily shift elsewhere. Competitive 
dynamics in the industry could also easily fall back into the long-run norm of the industry of being negligent. 
The sustained pressure for transforming the culture within the industry could disappear just as quickly as 
it appeared. 
At the same time as their being relatively fragile drivers of culture change, there are still signiﬁ cant barriers 
to change within the broader industry. These include pervasive short termism, the existence of a highly 
imperfect market, poor employment conditions and slow moving shifts in trust. To address these industry-
wide issues, there is clearly a need not just to change the culture within speciﬁ c organisations, but a greater 
need to transform the culture of the entire industry.
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have looked at how the dominance of a sales macro-culture had locked the retail banking 
industry into a harmful trajectory. This macro-culture remained a stubborn part of the industry following the 
ﬁ nancial crisis. Only in recent years has there been a genuine will on the part of various actors to question 
and even potentially change this culture.  
To transform this culture, pressure around the change process needs to be maintained. Industry members 
need to ensure the dangers of inertia are overcome, there is the patience to actually see change through 
and that this change involves more than just tone from the top. Ultimately this will involve transforming 
the cultures of the largest organisations. But perhaps more important, it will involve changing the wider 
macro-culture within the UK banking industry. In the next chapter, we turn to examining what exactly these 
changes might actually look like. 
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Chapter Seven:
Recommendations 
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we drew together the major issues facing the UK retail banking sector. We argued 
that many of the signiﬁ cant problems which appeared during the ﬁ nancial crisis were due to a widespread 
and aggressive sales culture within the industry. Reviews of the industry have identiﬁ ed a wide range of 
issues which need to change, some of which are in the process of being addressed through legislation. 
However, transforming culture has been seen as a matter largely for the banks themselves. We found that 
banks appear to have taken this challenge seriously and have launched a number of important culture 
change programmes. Stakeholders, while describing board level support for such initiatives as vital, also 
pointed out the many barriers that remain to securing meaningful progress across the sector. To achieve the 
desired results will take at least ﬁ ve years, and perhaps even a generation. 
We have identiﬁ ed a number of broad lessons: 
Encouraging continuity. One of the conclusions is that the tendency towards short termism will be the 
great enemy of creating meaningful culture change. For real change to occur, time and consistent focus is 
needed. The short term might bring quick wins, but to fundamentally change will require consistent effort 
and reinforcement. This will take at least ﬁ ve years. Other sectors like oil and gas which were previously 
known for poor practices have been able to fundamentally change their practices through a process of long 
term reinforcement. Throughout this long process, a safer culture became the new norm. 
Focus on the front line. Many of our respondents cautioned us that tone from the top was necessary, but 
not sufﬁ cient. There was concern that ‘the message’ got lost in the middle, and could be entirely absent on 
the front line. To make culture change more than just a collection of ﬁ ne words, it is vital there is a collective 
focus on how culture comes to be embedded at the ‘coal face’ of the organization. What this means is 
ensuring culture change actually makes front line employees’ experiences of working in banks better. They 
need to feel that pressure to hit sales targets does not continue under another name. If this does not happen, 
it is likely attempts to change the culture of the industry will be derailed.
Meaningful metrics. All stakeholders told us that a range of metrics were being collected to track culture. 
In some organisations, these were comprehensive. In others, they were more piece-meal. But what seemed 
to be vital was recognising that relying on a small set of metrics (such as customer complaints or annual 
employee opinion surveys) would not give you an accurate picture of culture. To properly understand culture, 
a mixture of qualitative and quantitative measures are needed. It is also vital that metrics are used to 
provide insight and they do not start to drive perverse ‘tick box games’.
Identifying problems early and often. One of the most striking ﬁ ndings was that institutions which 
focused on identifying problems and rewarding those who found them often performed well. One such 
system allowed employees to report failures, or point out ‘the elephant in the room’, through an online 
message board. By owning up to faults, banks are able to incrementally improve processes internally but 
also help rebuild public trust. The process of admitting to faults early and often and then seeking immediate 
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redress means small problems are stopped from festering and becoming large problems. Crucially, once 
problems had been ‘called out’, senior managers would take them seriously and report on the process of 
resolving them. Alongside these internal systems for identifying problems, it is also vital that forums are 
provided for whistle-blowers to identify more serious issues. These forums need to be independent. Ideally 
external forums such as regulators also need to provide channels for whistle-blowers. Finally, instances 
of whistle-blowing need to be celebrated. In many other sectors such as food, automotive and transport 
industries, continuous learning through recording and redressing small faults is normal. This has not always 
been the case. By building this culture, leaders in each of these sectors have been able to win back public 
conﬁ dence and trust. 
Beyond competition. There seems to be a widespread assumption among regulators that increasing 
competition will improve customer outcomes. We think that the presence of more competition is important. 
The new switching regime represents genuine progress. On its own, however, it is not enough. The UK retail 
banking sector has been dominated by a small handful of large players for over a century, and shows little 
signs of changing. There is no relationship between customer satisfaction scores and market share. There is a 
high degree of customer inertia: on average customers stay with their bank for 26 years. In comparison, the 
average marriage lasts just over 11 years. This means customers tend to stay with banks despite poor service. 
Regulators realise this is a serious problem. The Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) comprehensive 
review into personal accounts and SME banking is an indication of these concerns. If meaningful change is to 
be achieved, there needs to be a greater focus on supporting consumers in making the right choices, but also 
ensuring that the largest players have the right cultures. 
Changing macro-culture. The over-arching challenge for the industry will involve changing the macro-
culture. This means just focusing on transforming the culture within each individual institution is important, 
but not enough. There needs to be collective action to establish a new set of norms around what good 
banking looks like. This is a process which is facilitated not just by big players, but by a wider range of 
stakeholders including regulators, challenger banks, employee and consumer groups. The BSRC could play 
an important role here. Evidence from other industries suggests that macro-cultures only change through a 
process of collective action.  
In what follows, we consider what each of these broad lessons means for each of the stakeholder groups 
including banks, regulators, policy makers, the BSRC and investors.
Banks
Continuity. To deliver an appropriate culture, banks need to ensure there is a continuity in values. By 
continuity we mean that they need to avoid changing ofﬁ cial values and culture every few years. While 
culture programmes can change quickly, actual culture changes slowly. The best ﬁ rms had a set of values 
which they had stuck with for decades and only refreshed sparingly. Engaging in constant culture change, 
a refreshing of values and ethical rebooting programmes might make nice headlines, but are likely to be 
counter-productive. 
Consistency. An underlying culture needs to be consistently reinforced through a wide range of routines, 
rituals, artefacts, symbolics, and architecture in the organization. It also needs to be consistent with the 
business model. The best ﬁ rms had a culture which was clearly reinforced through a wide range of ‘touch points’ 
throughout the whole ﬁ rm. These might include how staff performance was appraised; how they were rewarded; 
decisions were made; messages communicated; feedback gathered; branches were designed and so on. The 
worst examples only focused on a few surface issues in the public eye such as values statements. Banks need to 
ask how all elements of employee experience might reinforce or detract from a particular culture. 
Ensuring accountability. Banks have placed great emphasis on senior leadership driving cultural changes, 
but there were some concerns among stakeholders that senior people in banks had not been held 
accountable in the past. One person we interviewed told us about the prevalence of the ‘murder on the 
Orient Express’ defence in a bank. Many of the stakeholders we spoke with told us that the public demanded 
individuals be held accountable for failings in banks. Banks told us that the board was a ‘guardian’ of the 
culture. The new Senior Persons regime goes some way to addressing these issues. However, it is vital this 
regime is implemented in a meaningful way. At a minimum, Chairs and CEOs need to be demonstrably 
accountable for culture.  
Tone from the top is not enough. Most banks have the right tone from the top. However, some 
stakeholders are concerned about messages getting lost in the middle. We encountered some scepticism 
that change initiatives were consistently and constructively reaching the frontline. In the best cases, front 
line staff have seen real change in the ways they are managed, rewarded and appraised. They feel proud 
of the bank they work for. In the worst cases, some report that sales targets have just been relabelled as 
customer needs targets. Managers need to constantly ask whether their culture change programmes are 
making the experience of front line staff better or worse.  
Improve the experience of front line workers. The way front line employees are managed has a direct 
impact on the way customers are treated. It also has a big impact on how staff make decisions when faced 
with an ethical dilemma. In the best organisations, front line staff feel engaged and empowered. They 
report that things are getting better as the myopic focus on sales targets has been relaxed. In other cases, 
employees suffer signiﬁ cant stress due to decreased stafﬁ ng levels and increasing demands associated 
with new regulation. We also noticed that front-line staff are frequently the target of generalised customer 
anger at ‘bankers’. This means in some cases their jobs have got worse. Employees need to be supported and 
engaged if they are to implement this new culture.
Establish whether front line employees are paid for the time they spend at work. Some front line 
employees we spoke to reported not being paid for arriving early and leaving late. They would come into 
the branch early for meetings and leave late because they had to deal with customers who had arrived 
just before closing time. Much of this time was unpaid because it was outside of formal work hours. In one 
bank, we were told that employees spent up to an hour of unpaid overtime on ‘huddles’ before opening and 
‘cuddles’ after the branch had closed. Banks need to establish whether such practices are common. If they 
are, steps need to be taken to ensure that front line staff are fully compensated for time spent at work.
Pick up on small problems before they become big problems. Many of the best banks had systems 
which allowed staff throughout the organization to routinely log small problems which they noticed. They 
were actively encouraged and rewarded for reporting these problems. This allowed banks to continuously 
learn and address these small problems before they became big problems. A similar process is in place in 
other industries such as oil and gas which have undergone profound culture change following high proﬁ le 
scandals. Similarly, whistle-blowers who raise serious concerns in banks should be protected and should not 
fear reprimand or reprisals as a result of their actions. All the banks we spoke to say they encourage whistle-
blowers but we did not see any examples of where whistle-blowers have been rewarded.
Voluntarily admit problems and make up for them. Public trust in the banking sector remains low. Part 
of this is the widespread perception that banks will only communicate failures and make up for them when 
they are under pressure from the regulator. This stands in marked contrast to best practice in other sectors 
(such as pharmaceuticals, automotive, aviation and food and beverages) where if an important fault is 
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discovered which is a threat to consumer safety, then the ﬁ rm will admit the fault publicly, recall the product, 
and take voluntary action to mitigate harm. This shows a clear duty of care to customers and rapidly wins 
trust – even when things go wrong. Banks need to do more to highlight the top issues which raise customer 
complaints and explain what actions they are taking to tackle the root causes of these complaints.
Shareholders shouldn’t just want short term returns. Many banks mentioned one of the major barriers 
to culture change was shareholder demands for return on investment. However, investors and other industry 
observers we spoke to told us that many major shareholders have accepted that large banks will not have 
the kind of large returns on investment which they have had in the past. They also are willing to accept lower 
returns on investment which are sustainable in return for safer institutions. This message needs to be heeded 
by senior management. Their duty towards shareholders is not to maximise shareholder value, but provide 
sustainable value for shareholders through doing the right thing.
A range of metrics is required. We noticed that there was no ideal set of metrics which could be used for 
managing culture. Instead, in the best institutions a wide range of metrics was used. These metrics capture 
input, process and output aspects. They measured cultural inputs by looking at factors which provide the 
raw materials for creating a culture. They measured cultural processes by using metrics which captured how 
culture is lived. Finally, they sought to capture the outputs of culture by looking at the impact on customers 
and others. This includes looking at standard customer metrics like customer satisfaction, recommendations, 
and complaints. It also involved metrics examining other stakeholders’ views such as those of the local 
community, of regulators and of business representatives. 
Measuring employee attitudes is not enough. The standard way of capturing culture was by measuring 
staff attitudes using annual employee surveys. This is an important annual indicator, but it is unlikely to 
give banks a detailed understanding of how culture works in their ﬁ rms. More detailed approaches looked at 
behavioural aspects of culture. They examined how culture is actually lived. Some institutions looked at core 
behaviours they thought were appropriate for building their culture and provided measures and feedback on 
these behaviours. There is also scope for banks to use new technology to measure how culture is embodied 
in communication. For instance, by tracking the patterns of communication and words which are used in 
email and other forms of messaging, senior managers can gain a sense, in real time, of the climate and 
culture of various parts of their organisation. 
Ensure that sales metrics aren’t simply relabelled. All the banks we talked with had dropped sales targets. 
However, a number of stakeholders reported that in some cases these targets unofﬁ cially lived on under 
a different name (usually targets for identifying customer needs). This was reinforced through an informal 
culture at the branch level and unspoken expectations. These targets also became the focus of gaming. 
Unofﬁ cial whiteboards with sales targets were erected in some branches. In the best cases, staff were clear 
that new targets were not simply sales targets re-labelled. Such clarity is needed to root out any vestiges of 
an aggressive sales culture.
Generational change and leadership development are needed. Many people we spoke with told us that 
real change in the banking industry will require a ‘generational change’. This is because a whole generation 
of retail bankers have been brought up in an aggressive sales culture, with past incentive schemes rewarding 
those who conformed to behaviours and ideals now deemed inappropriate (and side-lining those who did 
not). Changing their underlying assumptions about banking will take time. In the best banks, we found they 
were addressing this by harnessing the experience of people who were versed in a more traditional approach 
to banking. Many employees reported feeling liberated by being able to return to doing banking in the 
way they thought it should be done. Some banks also attempted to counter such a sales-driven ethos by 
recruiting staff from more customer facing industries. Finally, there was recognition of the importance of 
leadership development in changing the culture, not only at the top, but throughout the organization. 
Focus on substance, not just image. We know that culture change tends to fall ﬂ at when surface level 
changes clash with deeply held assumptions in the organization. To make culture change work, banks need 
to ensure that surface level changes such as newly espoused values, new branch design, new rituals, and 
protocols are linked with underlying values. It is important that values are actually put into practice. Many 
people we talked to in banks talked about the importance of ‘being seen to do the right thing’. We think for 
genuine culture change to occur, it is vital people do the right thing, even when no one is looking. 
Overhaul product design processes and consider how they generate revenue. Failures in product design 
processes have been at the heart of numerous mis-selling scandals. Banks need to overhaul their product 
design processes to focus on designing products which help people manage their money and achieve their 
ﬁ nancial goals. As part of the product design process, banks must evaluate not only the total price which will 
be paid by the customer, but also how they charge for their products; whether or not revenue gained is the 
result of customer inertia; or if a lack of knowledge is being taken advantage of. 
Reconnect with the purpose of banking. Everyone we spoke with emphasised how important it was for 
banks to clearly reconnect with their purpose. This does not just involve making money for shareholders. 
It involves considering the wider social and economic purpose of banks. Banks need to clearly answer 
the question: why do we exist? Having a clear response to this question, which people throughout the 
organization buy into, is necessary in order to build a more sustainable culture and rekindle trust. 
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Regulators 
Increasing competition is not the ultimate solution. There was an assumption among regulators that 
increasing competition in the banking sector would inevitably lead to better culture and better customer 
outcomes. We think this is partially true. The rise of disruptive technologies may also introduce new 
competitive dynamics. But competition is not the whole story. First, there has been a lack of competition in 
the UK banking sector for 100 years. It is an issue which is periodically raised, but only partially addressed. 
Second, it appears that customer inertia is a major barrier- even when better offers are available, clearly 
marked out, and easy to access. Finally, it is not clear whether increased competition will actually lead banks 
to become more ethical. Between 2000 and 2007, competition in the industry increased, but this was one 
of the central drivers of an increased sales culture within most institutions. This leads us to conclude that 
increasing competition is important, but by no means enough. There needs to be a focus on internal conduct 
and culture within ﬁ rms. In addition, regulators may want to ensure there is a diverse ecosystem in the 
banking sector so banks do not all converge on similar ownership models.
Use behaviourial economics to overcome customer inertia. A major reason for the lack of “good 
competition” is customer inertia, reﬂ ected in the low level of switching from one bank to another. However, 
our analysis suggests that this inertia results to a large extent from the maintenance of an important 
information asymmetry and opacity in the market. These make it difﬁ cult for customers to compare a variety 
of offers and identify the best option. Consumers’ associations and regulators have an important role to play 
here by making the information about goods and services available to customers transparent. League tables 
and rankings based on the behavioural analysis of customers’ actual needs can certainly help. According to a 
growing body of works in behavioural economics, customers can be nudged towards better decisions. Their 
cognitive biases and inertia could be mobilized to preserve them from opportunism and hence enhance 
forms of competition that develop consumer well-being. Studies based on the analysis of actual customer 
behaviour from the Fairbanking Foundation and Which? have already shown how insights from behavioural 
economics can be used to enhance customers’ well-being. The vast body of academic evidence from 
behavioural economics could be more extensively mobilized to enhance further “good competition” in the 
retail banking. 
Look beyond customer outcomes. There was a heavy focus among regulators on customer outcomes. 
This is good, but there are limits. Some customer metrics can be ‘gamed’ easily. For instance, banks can 
reduce their reportable number of customer complaints by dealing with a customer complaint before the 
close of the next business day, acknowledging the complaint and in some cases offering a small pay-off. If 
this happens, the complaint is not reported to the FCA. As a result customer complaints can mask deeper 
problems. Only looking at customer metrics like these may not necessarily pick up early warning signs of 
problems occurring in the sector. For instance, customers may be satisﬁ ed by being able to take out a loan 
which they cannot afford if interest rates rise. This suggests regulators need to carefully monitor internal 
processes within ﬁ rms which might lead to these negative social outcomes. They might also consider 
measures which go beyond customers and take into account a wider range of stakeholder groups. 
Ask what is actually happening on the shop-ﬂ oor. One of the most striking ﬁ ndings is that although 
all the banks say the right things at the top of the organization, the reality at branch level can look very 
different. If the regulator hopes to pick up issues before they become large scale problems, they need to 
go beyond listening to the voice of senior management and consider what is happening at branch level. 
Reviewing central policy is not enough. They should look at actual selling practice in branches and the 
experiences of employees in bank branches. This may bring to light overlooked, but potential signiﬁ cant 
issues relating to customer service and treatment. 
Create an open channel. There is scope for insights about what is happening at branch level to get lost, 
especially as they move through the hierarchy of the large banks, and are communicated to regulators. 
It is important that all staff, regardless of seniority, can approach and communicate their concerns with 
regulators. This will ensure information does not get lost, censored, or censured as it moves up the chain 
of command, and across the boundary between bank and regulator. This should help regulators to develop 
a more rounded perspective on what is happening within banks. 
Transparency is important. One way to re-build trust in the sector is to be transparent about the progress 
which banks are making. Regularly tracking banks on the basis of clearly described standards, can help the 
public understand whether banks are actually fulﬁ lling their promises and making improvements. 
Constant restructuring is a red ﬂ ag. Many banks seem to engage constantly in change and restructuring 
initiatives. For instance, one large bank told us they had under gone multiple change initiatives following 
the ﬁ nancial crisis. This resulted in constant changes in senior management and strategic direction. It left 
many employees feeling uncertain and over-burdened. Sometimes changes are necessary. However, they 
often do more harm than good. This is because they chip away at institutional memory, increase stress 
levels and decrease consistency and focused knowledge in the organization. The frequent introduction of 
new restructuring initiatives without clear connections between them is an early warning sign of problems 
in an organization. 
Policymakers 
Banks need time to change their cultures. All banks have implemented large scale change processes. 
All of them appear to be heading in the right direction. However, the people we spoke to pointed out that 
culture change within the industry would be a long term process. These are large, complex organisations 
which are often very difﬁ cult to manage. Policy makers need to recognise change will take time. They also 
need to accept that in the interim new scandals will emerge which were largely the products by previous 
cultures. Policy makers need to have some patience with senior leaders in the banks. But they also need to 
ensure culture change remains an important agenda item. Such high level pressure can help ensure that the 
change the industry needs is fully delivered. Most banks estimated that such change in the industry will 
take about three years. We think it will be over ﬁ ve. A complete transformation in the culture will take a 
generation. It is therefore advisable that the BSRC present its annual assessment of the sector to the Treasury 
Select Committee every year, in order to help inform policy makers on whether sufﬁ cient progress is being 
made. The most important question to ask will not be whether banks have a culture change programme in 
place, but how the culture is actually being lived at branch level and what this means for customers.
Market culture can trump ﬁ rm culture. There are a number of looming crises (Forex, Commodities trading) 
which may lead politicians to revisit regulation in the banking sector. We think investigating ﬁ rm culture will 
only get them so far in these cases. It is important instead that regulators like the Bank of England look at 
the culture within these particular markets. Looking at market culture and market design, rather than just 
ﬁ rm culture, may help to deal more effectively with these crises. It will also ensure that the reform of culture 
within the retail banking sector is not blown off course. 
Keep the PCBS agenda alive. Roughly half the issues the PCBS identiﬁ ed as underlying the ﬁ nancial crisis 
have been adopted and transformed into formal legislation. This is a signiﬁ cant achievement. However there 
is much work that remains to be done. One aspect is ensuring the spirit of the legislation is actually kept 
alive within institutions, and is not slowly undermined by the banks. Politicians need to keep track of how 
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well these issues have actually been addressed. It is also important that other issues identiﬁ ed in the PCBS 
are pursued. Some of these issues include diversity, the role of the auditors, the role of ratings agencies, the 
ability of ﬁ rms to learn from past crises, a lack of personal responsibility and accountability, just to name a 
few. To ensure these issues are resolved, there should be a systematic review of the progress made on the 
issues raised by the PCBS every two to three years. This will avoid all the good work done by the commission 
being lost. 
BSRC 
An important initiative which requires the full support of the banks. The BSRC is a vital initiative for 
ensuring that culture change in the industry continues. It should build on some of the excellent work already 
being done, and focus on tracking and encouraging further progress. Banks should support the initiative by 
providing sufﬁ cient resource and cooperation. 
Avoid regulatory capture. In order to ensure its legitimacy and independence, the BSRC cannot be 
perceived as being captured by, or another trade body of, the banking or wider ﬁ nancial services industry. 
It’s most senior roles cannot therefore be primarily staffed by bank secondees, nor should there be allowed 
to develop a revolving door whereby senior BSRC staff leave to work for the big banks.
Feed in to FCA. Although the BSRC is an independent body, it can help to support the work of the FCA. 
This would involve communicating insights about culture it gains from independent research. It can also 
informally communicate how honest and open they think the banks are being as part of the review. 
Engaging with Parliament. As stated above, we believe the BSRC should present its ﬁ ndings on the 
health of standards in sector to the Treasury Select Committee on an annual basis. As well as providing 
Parliamentarians with a useful indicator of cultural progress, such an exercise may also help highlight areas 
of potential concern and action. 
Work with measures already used by banks. Many of the banks we spoke to expressed a sense of 
measurement fatigue. There were many external bodies asking for slightly different numbers. It is important 
that the BSRC designs any measurement exercise with a clear eye on the metrics which are already being 
collected by the banks themselves and other industry bodies. By relying on a range of data points which are 
not necessarily just from within the bank, the BSRC is likely to get a more accurate and rounded perspective 
of the state of a bank’s culture.
Talk to the front line. Stakeholders often noted a disconnect between how top management view their 
organisation’s culture, and the experience of front-line employees. If the BSRC’s culture measurement 
exercise is to be meaningful, it needs to examine how the culture looks at the coal face. This does not just 
mean talking with staff who are hand-picked by the senior management. It involves trying to get a slightly 
more objective and realistic view of what is actually happening on the front line through processes like 
random sampling or talking with union representatives. Exit interviews may also serve as an excellent way 
of gauging the culture of an institution. We suggest that front line staff be surveyed on at least an annual 
basis by the BSRC. Such a survey should be methodological rigorous, well-resourced, and its results should 
be reported on publicly. As part of the survey, front line staff should be asked questions about how they 
are actually assessed and measured. This may be helpful in determining the extent to which banks have 
progressed beyond an aggressive sales culture. 
Use qualitative measures too. Banking is a highly numerate industry. This means bankers want a number 
put next to everything. However, culture cannot be completely quantiﬁ ed. Even Alan Greenspan has recently 
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Assess Management-Information (MI) produced by banks to monitor compliance with their internal 
codes of conduct: Banks were not lacking in internal codes or values statements prior to the ﬁ nancial crisis. 
However, it is clear that banks failed to monitor compliance with these codes or take action to deal with 
any problems raised. 
Investors 
Give senior management time. All our respondents were clear that culture change is going to take time. 
There is also likely to be further scandals emerging from legacy issues. Investors need to ensure that senior 
leadership have the time and support to implement a new culture. Over-reacting to short term proﬁ ts will 
be unhelpful. What is helpful is support and gentle pressure from investors to ensure an upwards trajectory 
in improving culture which will drive more sustained business performance. This may involve ignoring the 
shrill voices of short term investors in favour of the majority of longer term investors. 
Focus on building sustainable value. The myopic focus on maximising shareholder value clearly has not 
worked as a governance principle in banks. It is important that investors rethink the governance principles 
they look for in ﬁ rms. An alternative approach is building sustainable value. This involves clarifying the 
purpose of the bank and being clear how this relates to longer term ﬁ rm value. To do this, shareholders 
need to ensure they ask longer term questions about purpose and monitor whether the ﬁ rm is drifting 
from its purpose.  
Support continuity. We were struck by how hyper-active short termism within the banks led to constant 
and often wasteful change programmes. These would typically only be run for a short period and not 
be given enough time to actually deliver value. The sheer number of these initiatives sometimes meant 
employees were distracted from the core tasks of the ﬁ rm, with the introduction of yet more initiatives 
often corresponding to changes in senior management. We noted the shortening tenures of CEOs meant 
there was little scope for learning and high pressure for new change initiatives. By giving CEOs and other 
senior managers more time, it is likely there will be greater consistency, scope for learning, and longer 
time horizons. 
turned to studying social anthropology to understand many of the forces which drive human behaviour. 
Metrics can – and often are – manipulated. Therefore, it is important that the BSRC use qualitative measures 
of culture in conjunction with quantitative measures. This might involve in-depth interviews with a range of 
bank employees. But it is also likely to involve using ethnographic and symbolic methods commonly used 
by anthropologists. One way to capture the culture may involve using ‘in-house ethnography’. Bank insiders 
would be seconded, trained in basic ethnographic methods, then asked to go around their organization and 
collect up evidence of their culture. With guidance from professional organizational ethnographers, they 
could then produce a report which gives a rich picture of the organisations culture. This could be matched 
with other evidence to give a much richer picture of the organisations culture. These in-house ethnographers 
could compare their results with those working in other banks. In addition, the BSRC could pay attention 
to data sources such as exit interviews, interviews with front line staff, whistle-blow procedures and cases, 
product offerings and the design process. 
Beware of metric manipulation. Many of our respondents were aware that the growth of metrics often 
goes hand in hand with the manipulation of metrics. The BSRC needs to think carefully about how the 
introduction of metrics in some industries such as healthcare have driven dysfunctional outcomes. 
Creating dialogue. The BSRC should be used as a forum where those responsible for culture change can 
privately discuss the process of developing more customer-focused cultures. The BSRC could help to create 
such a ‘community of practice’.
Ask how metrics can be used to drive self-regulation. In many other industries metrics and ranking 
systems drive clear competition and self-regulation. However in the banking sector, many metrics associated 
with good behaviour seems to be largely ignored. In a normal competitive market, you would expect a 
correlation between market share and customer satisfaction. This relationship does not exist in the banking 
sector. The BSRC needs to look at metrics systems and league tables in other industries which trigger 
self-regulation and ask why they seem to inspire such strong reactions. In the context of higher education, 
rankings such as the Financial Times league table or the Research Excellence Framework have inﬂ uenced how 
business schools and universities compete with each other, and have sometimes drastically reshaped internal 
practices. This reactivity to rankings emerges because key stakeholders from the ﬁ eld, such as customers 
or public funders, use these rankings to inform their decision making. However, one of the stakeholders we 
spoke with told us that in the retail banking industry, actors are less reactive to shifts of their position in 
league tables or to poor rankings. In other industries such as the electronic goods industry, any change in 
rankings or league table would trigger the engagement of senior managers with the ranking producers. The 
senior managers would seek to understand why and how customer preferences or usage of goods or services 
had changed, with a view to improve the product. It seems that such opportunities to learn about how to 
tailor goods and services to enhance customer satisfaction are not used in the retail banking sector. 
Review the outcome of banks’ decision-making processes: As well as looking at decision-making 
processes, the BSRC must also focus on the outcome of such processes in order to evaluate how banks 
have weighed up the commercial pressures they face to generate revenue with the need to uphold high 
professional standards. It should also examine how senior management have dealt with any concerns raised 
with them by frontline staff.
Provide an early-warning system for potential problems: The BSRC should focus on reviewing evidence 
gathered internally from the banks and external sources of intelligence such as consumer groups, customer 
complaints and whistle-blowers. From these sources it should identify the key list of potential risks to 
banking standards and ask banks to provide details of the actions taken to tackle these risks.
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In this report we have explored the progress which the UK banking sector has made in transforming culture. 
In particular, we have looked at whether banks have moved away from the high pressure sales culture which 
was at the root of many recent scandals. 
To answer this question we analysed all the major inquiries into the banking sector following the ﬁ nancial 
crisis. We looked at the changing performance of UK banks across a number of ﬁ nancial and non-ﬁ nancial 
metrics. We examined the culture change processes under way in all the major UK ﬁ nancial institutions, as 
well as culture in a number of medium sized players and challengers. In addition we spoke with regulators, 
policy makers, customer representatives, investors and employee representatives. 
The picture which emerged from our research was striking: 
Sales culture is to blame. An aggressive sales culture appeared to be at the heart of many of the problems 
UK retail banks have faced in the past. This culture is the result of the formation of universal banks, 
increasing expectations for proﬁ tability on retail banking divisions, and changing social understanding of 
debt. The result was institutions that focused their entire energy on generating sales of ﬁ nancial products. 
This drove widespread bad practices which have cost the retail operations UK banks and building societies 
£38.5 billion in ﬁ nes and redress since 2000.
Culture change is the bank’s responsibility. The PCBS and other processes identiﬁ ed a range of regulatory 
reforms designed to improve the banking sector. However, they largely place the responsibility for culture 
change ﬁ rmly in the realm of the banks themselves. The BSRC has been set up to support this process.
Poor outcomes remain. Despite signiﬁ cant changes in recent years, the performance of the banks across 
a range of dimensions is relatively poor. It is not unlikely that more bad news will come to light. Banks may 
have become safer and more resilient institutions based on prudential measures. However, many of the 
non-ﬁ nancial measures such as consumer, employee and ethical outcomes remain relatively negative, and in 
some cases are actually getting worse. 
The banks are trying to change their culture. All the major banks are making signiﬁ cant efforts to change 
their internal cultures. In the largest banks this involves cascading culture change down from the top of the 
organization. In some medium and smaller banks this involves reinforcing a culture they think is already 
relatively ethical. In challenger banks this involves importing new cultures from other sectors and countries. 
The result is that culture in the banking sector is currently in a period of transition. 
But it will take a generation to achieve. The stakeholders we spoke to emphasised that although the 
banks are making progress with their culture change projects, there are many barriers that could easily derail 
these processes. These include cultural inertia, becoming overloaded with change initiatives, pervasive short 
termism, and change initiatives getting lost before they actually get to the front line. Overcoming these 
issues is going to take a longer term commitment to transforming culture within the industry. Many said 
making meaningful progress in changing their culture will take 5 years. To completely transform the culture 
in retail banking will take a generation.  
To address these challenges, we have suggested a number of important steps which each actor in the 
industry needs to take: 
Ultimately, rebuilding the culture within the UK retail banking industry is going to be a long process which 
will require the collective contribution of all stakeholders. The process is likely to be difﬁ cult. However the 
reward is worth it: a safer, fairer, trustworthy and sustainable banking sector which produces better outcomes 
for customers and the broader UK economy. 
Conclusion Banks need to focus on consistency and continuity of delivering the culture change agenda. 
An important aspect of this is ensuring the tone from the top does not get lost as it cascades to the 
front line. Any culture change should ultimately make the working lives of those facing customers 
better. This will improve customer outcomes signiﬁ cantly. Banks should also put in place systems 
which allow faults to be admitted early and often, providing them with a source of continuous 
learning and improvement. Making these cultural changes will take at least ﬁ ve years.
Policy makers should provide the banks with the time needed to change their cultures. 
This does not mean adopting a ‘hands-off’ approach. Instead, pressure must be kept on banks to 
keep moving their cultures in a positive direction, and the agenda and recommendations of the 
PCBS must also be revisited and assessed so that important issues don’t slip off the agenda or 
remain unresolved. 
Investors need to recognise that if they want to reduce the signiﬁ cant regulatory, reputational 
and redress costs the banks face, then they need to provide consistent support for the culture 
change processes underway. Over-reacting to short term proﬁ ts will be unhelpful. Instead, what 
is needed from investors is support and gentle pressure in favour of improving standards, which we 
believe will in turn drive more sustained business performance.
Regulators need to think beyond just increasing competition. Ensuring competition in the 
banking industry is vital, and will pay a role in improving standards. But real change will come 
through lifting the general standards of the industry through tracking a wider range of outcomes 
including internal dynamics and the potentially corrosive effects of constant restructuring and 
frequent changes of direction.
The BSRC needs to support a process of collective action to change the culture of the 
UK banking industry. It can only do this by maintaining its independence and public credibility. 
This means taking steps to ensure its independence cannot be questioned. It must also produce 
assessments of the sector which are incisive and constructive. In order to do so, especially with 
regards to culture, it must go beyond ‘thin’ quantitative metrics and also use ‘thicker’ qualitative 
measures.  In particular, we suggest the BSRC survey front line staff on an annual basis to explore 
to what extent the vestiges of an aggressive sales culture still exist. Finally, we believe the BSRC’s 
annual assessment should be presented to the Treasury Select Committee
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Appendix One: 
Methods 
Background
This report was commissioned by New City Agenda. It was carried out by a research team at Cass Business 
School, City University of London. The team consisted of Professor André Spicer, Professor Jean-Pascal Gond, 
Professor Peter Fleming, Szilvia Mosonyi, Christopher Benoit and Simon Parker. The Cass team received 
extensive support from New City Agenda Staff, in the persons of Kawan Patel, Matthew Ball and Dominic 
Lindley. The research took place between late August and early November, 2014. 
The report set out to explore what retail banks have done to change their culture following the ﬁ nancial 
crisis beginning in 2008. Some sub-questions which we wanted to answer were: (1) what was the historical 
background to these cultural change initiatives, (2) what was the content of culture change initiatives, (3) 
how were they being implemented, (4) what progress had been made, (5) how was culture being measured, 
(6) what were the barriers and facilitators, and (7) what role did regulation play in the process. 
We began by drawing together a range of documentation which trace the development of the UK banking 
sector. The results of this historical analysis are reported in Chapter One.
The next question which we were interested in was the changing policy context in response to the banking 
crisis. To track the policy context, we analysed a number of core policy documents which had been produced 
in the UK following the ﬁ nancial crisis. The results of this analysis are reported in Chapter 2.
We then wanted to establish an understanding of the performance of UK banks across a range of metrics. 
In order to do this, we gathered together a number of the ranking and analyses of performance of UK banks 
which have been produced in recent years. We sought to ensure each of the ranking initiatives we looked at 
involved different dimensions which had been identiﬁ ed as important by previous policy exercises detailed 
in Chapter 2. We selected ranking and assessment exercises which had a degree of rigour and creditability. 
Some of the dimensions we looked at included ﬁ nancial stability, customer outcomes, employee outcomes, 
ethical outcomes and public trust. The list of dimensions we investigated here is by no means comprehensive. 
It is simply intended to indicate the current performance of UK banks across a range of dimensions. The 
results of this analysis are reported in Chapter 3.
To understand culture change within each of the banks we interviewed 27 senior people in 12 retail banks 
and building societies. In addition, we conducted one focus group with 12 employees from all the 4 major 
retail banks. These institutions were largely selected on the basis that they are largest institutions in the 
market. When selecting smaller challenger banks we largely did this on the basis of their size, proﬁ le and 
whether they provided an interesting example of a different model of banking. Two notable institutions 
which are excluded from our sample are Lloyds banking group and The Co-operative Bank. Despite repeated 
approaches, both institutions did not feel in a position to participate in the research. This was largely because 
both institutions were in the process of launching large scale new strategies at the time the research was 
undertaken. We did however seek to understand culture change initiatives within each of these organisations 
by using secondary evidence. In addition to collecting primary evidence through interviews, we also collected 
a range of secondary data. To help us better understand culture change programmes within particular banks, 
we collected up written materials such as annual reports, values statements and in additional literature 
about their culture. The results of these interviews form the basis of what is discussed in Chapter 4. 
In order to broaden our understanding of these change processes, we also interviewed 19 stakeholders 
from 16 different organisations. When selecting these stakeholders, we aimed to gain a view of most of 
the key stakeholder groups in the retail banking industry including employees and their unions, banking 
industry groups, business groups, consumer groups, regulators, investors and policy makers. In addition to the 
interviews, most stakeholders provided us with additional material such as submissions to policy processes, 
reports they had produced and other publicly available documents. The results of these interviews form the 
basis of what is discussed in Chapter 5. 
The interviews were typically semi-structured and took place over about an hour. Almost all interviews were 
conducted face to face. An indicative sample of the questions which we asked banks and stakeholder can be 
found in Box A1.1. and Box A1.2.
Box A1.1: Key topics and sample interview questions for the interviews with banks 
Topic 1: Your background and your organizational context
1.1. Background
• Could you please let us know about your personal background and current role?
• How is to work for an organization like [name of the organization]?
• What difference in terms of culture did you notice in contrast with prior organizations?
• Your organization’s cultural context and the trigger events associated with culture changes.
• What is the (actual) culture? The desired culture? Is culture being measured in any way?
• Is there a culture change initiative underway at your organization?
• Which factors, actors or events have played a decisive role in the decision to engage 
 this cultural initiative?
Topic 2: Cultural change initiatives at your organization
2.1. Content and design
• What cultural change initiatives are currently taking place at your organizations? 
• Could you describe its most tangible elements (e.g. cost, level of commitment/endorsement 
 from the top, number of employees concerned by the change program, expected impact)? 
• Could describe the key practices or the content of this change?
• How is cultural change linked to other aspects of the organization (such as performance 
 assessment, pay, and structure)?
82  |  A report on the culture of British retail banking    A report on the culture of British retail banking  |  83
2.2. Deployment
• How is the culture change initiative actually being deployed? Who is in charge 
 of deploying it?
• What is the time line? Where are you now?
• How do you measure progress? What kind of indicators are you using to track progress?
2.3. Impact 
• What kind of impact or inﬂ uence is the change program me or culture having in 
 the organisation? How do you measure its impact?
• How do you justify or demonstrate to different audiences that cultural change 
 has happened? 
• What are the main successes related to this initiative?
2.4. Barriers and enablers of cultural change 
• What do you regard as the main challenges or barriers related to this change initiative?
• What are the main factors facilitating this cultural shift (if any)?
Topic 3: Cultural change in your industry and at your competitors
• What are the benchmarks or best practice examples you have?
• How does your own organization compare to the competitors? How would rank 
 yourself within the industry?
• Which competitor do you regard as a clear leader/laggard in this domain?
• What are your views on how the industry as a whole has progressed in relation 
 to cultural change since 2008?
Topic 4: Industry regulation and cultural change
• What are your perceptions of regulation in this industry?
• Which regulatory organizations are the most relevant and important to your work? 
• How does regulation relate to culture? 
• Do regulators help support your process of cultural change? 
• In your opinion, can regulation be conducted more effectively? 
• How could regulation better support cultural change in your organization?
Topic 1: Your background and the role/mission of your organization
1.1. Your background
• Could you please let us know about your personal background and current role?
1.2. Your organization’s purpose
• Could you please let us know more about your organization and its purpose/mission?
• What concrete means and resources do you have to fulﬁ ll this mission?
Topic 2: Your views about cultural change in the retail banking industry
2.1. Background
• What are your views about the change of culture in this industry since 2008?
• According to you, what have been the main forces driving cultural change in the bank industry?
2.2. Speciﬁ c organisations/initiatives
• Which organisations / banks would you regard as leaders / laggards in relation to 
 cultural change in the industry? Could you explain why?
• Which cultural change initiatives seem to you the most exemplary, important or salient 
 in the industry?
2.3. Perceptions of barriers/enablers 
• According you, which barriers, if any, prevent or inhibit cultural change in banks?
• According you, which factors, if any, contribute to facilitate cultural change in the different 
 organisations that you have observed?
Topic 3: The role of your organization in relation to cultural change in the retail 
banking industry
• What are the relevant initiatives underway by your organization in relation to cultural 
 change in the retail banking industry (if any)?
• Did your organization support the process of cultural change at banks? In which ways?
• How do you see the role of your organization in relation to cultural change?
Topic 4: Industry regulation and cultural change
• How could regulation better support cultural change at banks?
• Which regulatory organisations, behind yours, are the most relevant / inﬂ uent? 
• Is there any way regulation could be done more effectively?
• How do you foresee the future of regulation and cultural change in the UK retail 
 banking sector?
Box A1.2: Key topics and sample interview questions for the interviews with stakeholders
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Appendix Two: Organizational 
Culture: What is it? How does it 
change? How to measure it? 
Widely discussed, poorly understood. As an analytical concept, it has been in use for at least four decades. 
As a managerial tool, it has been popular since at least the early 1980s. As a concept used by policy makers, 
it has recently enjoyed a surge of interest. In particular, the concept of culture has been widely used by policy 
makers, commentators and regulators in recent years to talk about the intangiable organizational aspects 
which explain large scale failures in systematically important organisations and sectors. For instance, there is 
a discussion of ‘tick box culture’ in healthcare, ‘a culture of neglect’ in the care sector, and a ‘bonus culture’ in 
the banking sector.  
Multiple deﬁ nitions. Looking at the expert literature on organizational culture, it is easy to become more 
confused. There are many thousands of different deﬁ nitions of the concept which are subtly different. 
Culture is often used to refer to a wide range of different things (see Table A2.1). This confusion is only made 
worse by the fact there are many proprietary systems promising organisations the ability to understand, 
manage and even change their culture. Despite the various different deﬁ nitions, there is a general implicit 
agreement that organizational culture typically involve the following aspects: (1) It is shaped by the 
history and tradition of the organization, (2) It has some degree of depth, is difﬁ cult to easily understand, 
and therefore needs to be interpreted, (3) It is collective and shared by members of an organization, (4) It 
typically refers to ideational aspects of an organization such as assumptions, meanings, symbols, beliefs and 
so on, (5) It is holistic, intersubjective and emotional rather than just being analytical and rational.5
Table A2.1: Schein’s Model of Culture 
Our approach. To provide a more precise understanding of culture, we build on what is perhaps the classic 
deﬁ nition of culture provided by Edgar Schein. According to Schien, culture is a ‘pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members 
as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relationship to these problems’.
In order to understand a culture more precisely, Schein argues that culture has three components: (1) 
Artefacts which are the visible structures and processes in an organization, (2) Espoused beliefs and values 
which are the formally articulate philosophies, goals and strategies of the organization, (3) Underlying 
assumptions which are the taken for granted through feelings on which culture ultimately rests. To formally 
analyse culture, there are a range of things which an analyst can look for ranging from the visible artefacts 
such as architecture and rituals, espoused beliefs such as values statements, and underlying assumptions 
such as ideas about how internal integration is achieved and how an organization should adapt to its 
environment (see Figure A2.1). 
Three Levels of Culture (Schein)
Basic Underlying Assumptions
Epoused Values
Artifacts
Visual organisation
Structures and processes
(Hard to decipher)
Strategies, goals, philosophies
(Espoused justiﬁ cations)
Unconscious, taken for granted beliefs, 
perceptions, thoughts and feelings
(Ultimate source of values and actions) 
5 Mats Alvesson, Understanding Organizational Culture, p.6
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Table A2.2: Approaches to measuring culture
Authors Authors
Dimensions of 
cultures distinguished 
by the tool
Dimensions of 
cultures distinguished 
by the tool
Focus of the tool Focus of the tool
Organizational 
Culture Proﬁ le
Organizational 
Culture 
Inventory
Culture Gap 
Survey
Competing 
Value Model
Organizational 
Culture
Company’s 
Culture 
Assessment
Organizational 
Beliefs 
Questionnaire
Competing 
value model 
– FOCUS 1993 
– evaluative part
Organizational 
Values Scale
Organizational 
Practice Scale
Competing 
Values Model
Competing 
Value Model 
– FOCUS 1993 
– Descriptive 
  part
Organizational 
Culture Index
SYMLOG
O’Reilly et al. 
(1991);
Chatman (1991);
Chatman & Jen 
(1994); 
Sheridan (1992)
Cooke & Lafferty 
(1989)
Kilman-Saxton 
(1983)
Quinn & 
Spreitzer (1991)
Reynolds (1986)
Calori & Sarnin 
(1991)
Sashkin (1984)
 
Hofstede et al. 
(1990)
Hofstede et al. 
(1990)
Rohrbaugh 
(1991)
 
Litwin & Stringer 
(1968); 
Wallach (1983)
Poumadère 
(1985)
• Respect for people
• Team orientation
• Stability
• Innovation
• Outcome orientation
• Attention to detail
• Task culture
• People culture
• Security culture
• Satisfaction culture
• Technical concern
• Human concern
• Short term orientation
• Long term orientation
• Group culture
• Developmental culture
• Rational culture
• Hierarchical culture
• Task vs. social
• Individual vs. collective 
 decision making
• Cooperation vs. 
 competition 
• Safety vs. Risk
• Stability vs. innovation
• Informal vs. formalized 
 procedures
• Solidarity
• Internal cooperation
• Personnel involvement 
 and know-how
• Authority
• Attitude/change
• Firm’s performance
• Worth and value 
 of people
• Innovation
• Being the best
• Growth/proﬁ t
• Attention to details
• Support
• Innovation
• Goals
• Rules
• Need for security
• Work centrality
• Need for authority
• Employee vs. job oriented
• Process vs. results 
 oriented
• Cohesion; morale
• Human resources
• Stability; ﬂ exibility
• Productivity; Planning
• Support
• Innovation
• Goals 
• rules
• Support culture
• Innovative culture
• Bureaucratic culture
• Individualism-egalitarianism
• Acceptance vs. Opposition 
 to management task’s 
 orientation
• Dominance-obedience
54 120
28
28
14
60
50
40
57
54
38
37
24
26
VALUES INVENTORIES PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOURS QUESTIONNAIRES
Bureaucratic 
Orientation
Bureaucratic 
Orientation
Innovation 
Orientation
Innovation 
Orientation
Outcome 
Orientation
Outcome 
Orientation
People 
Orientation
People 
Orientation
Number 
of items
Number 
of items
Name of 
the culture 
questionnaire
Name of 
the culture 
questionnaire
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Qualitative
Deductive process
Mutual simultaneous shaping of factors
Context-bound
Patterns, theories developed for understanding
Accurate and reliable through veriﬁ cation
Emerging design – categories identiﬁ ed 
during research process
Inductive process
Cause and effect
Context-free
Generalisations leading to prediction, explanation, 
and understanding
Accurate and reliable through validity and reliability
Static design – categories isolated before study
Quantitative
Authors
Dimensions of 
cultures distinguished 
by the tool
Focus of the tool
Comparative 
Emphasis Scale
Organizational 
Norms 
Opininnaire
Survey of 
Management 
Climate
Meglino et al. 
(1989)
Adkins et al. 
(1996)
Alexander 
(1978)
Gordon & 
Ditomaso (1992)
• Helping and concern 
 for others
• Achievement 
• Colleague/associate 
 relations
• Teamwork/communication
• Training/development
• Innovation/creativity
• Performance/excellence
• Proﬁ tability
• Integration/communication
• Development and 
 promotion
• Fairness of reward
• Innovation/risk taking
• Clarity of strategy/
 shared goals
• Action orientation
24
42
61
PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOURS QUESTIONNAIRES
Bureaucratic 
Orientation
Innovation 
Orientation
Outcome 
Orientation
People 
Orientation
Number 
of items
Name of 
the culture 
questionnaire
* All tables have been constructed from the working paper of Delobbe, N., Haccoun, R.R. & Vandenberghe, C. 2002. ‘Measuring Core Dimensions of Organizational Culture: A Review of 
Research and Development of a New Instrument’, unpublished manuscript, Universite catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
Please consult directly the working paper for the full references of the authors mentioned in the Table: https://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/iag/documents/WP_53_Delobbe.pdf
Actual vs espoused culture. One of the most difﬁ cult aspects of studying culture is that there is typically 
a large gap between what senior managers claim the culture is and what the culture actually is. Typically, 
the understanding of an organisations culture which is embodied with things like value statements is only 
loosely related with what the actual artefacts, beliefs and underlying assumptions of an organization are. 
This is even more pronounced when there are formal exercises to codify a culture or there are culture change 
projects. What this means is just asking high level managers of a ﬁ rm what the culture is will most likely 
lead to an inaccurate representation of what the culture actually is. What you are most likely to get is an 
account of what the espoused beliefs of the ﬁ rm are. The researcher is unlikely to understand completely the 
artefacts which make up an organizational culture and the underlying assumptions of the culture. 
Our focus. In this project, we were unable to spend the time required to get a deep sense of the culture 
within each organization. As a result we were at best able to scratch the surface of the culture of each 
organization. Thus what our results report on are really the espoused beliefs of senior management and some 
of the artefacts which they ﬁ nd important. We did get some indication from employees what this culture 
looks like from the coal face. As we expected, there was often quite a gap between the ofﬁ cial and unofﬁ cial 
version of the culture of each bank. However, because we did not have sufﬁ cient time to delve into the 
cultures of each institution, it is impossible for us to systematically map out these gaps.   
Measuring culture. One of the most vexed questions in the study of organizational culture is how to study 
and potentially measure culture. There are a range of propitiatory systems which offer broad heuristic 
frameworks for studying culture (See Table A2.1). Within the academic literature, there are some relatively 
well-established approaches to quantifying culture. One of the more established quantitative measures is 
based on the competing values framework allows a research to map out an organizational culture across 
two dimensions – the extent to which it is focused on stability vs change, and the extent that the culture 
is internally vs externally focused. This helps to identify four basic types of culture: clan cultures which have 
an internal focus and are relatively ﬂ exible, hierarchical cultures which are internally focused an relatively 
stable, adhocratic cultures which are externally focused and ﬂ exible and market cultures which are externally 
focused and stable (see Figure A2.2). 
Table A2.3: Qualitative vs quantative approaches to culture
Participant observation. While there are many other quantitative tools for studying culture, they will often 
only give you a ‘thin’ understanding of culture within an organization. To develop a ‘thick’ and more in-depth 
understanding of a culture, qualitatives research methods are needed. All the best studies of organziational 
cultures have involved some used of ethnographic methods. These involve periods of extended participant 
observation whereby a research spend times observing and to some extent participating in the daily life of 
the organization. This will allow the research to get beyond the attitudes of employees and espoused values 
of senior managers. Instead they will be able to identify the artefacts that are important to organizational 
members, what the range of espoused values are within an organisation, and most importantly what the 
underlying assumptions are within an organization. Undertaking an ethnographic study involves an extended 
period of observation which is recorded in ﬁ eld notes and then written up into an ethnographic account. 
Ethnographic research is time intensive, but can yield insightful in-depth accounts of a particular culture. 
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Reference Findings
Dietz et al 
(2004) 
Saparito et al 
(2004) 
Smith 
(1990)
Survey of 160 branches 
of retail bank in the USA. 
2,616 branch employees 
and 17,480 customers
Survey of 1093 small 
ﬁ rm customers and 217 
bank managers
Interviews with middle 
managers and corporate 
trainers in an organizational 
redesign programme at a bank 
(systems analysis, credit cards 
and branch-bank division) 
• Increased customer contact correlated to increased 
customer satisfaction 
• The idea that there is a uniﬁ ed organizational service 
climate is refuted – the service climate differed across 
different branches 
• Recommendations – Should focus on individual branches 
not the overall organizational approach to service
• Employees who deal with customers have stronger 
relationships with customer attitudes 
• Banking service is not the same interaction again and 
again – it is a relationship
• Relational trust is important in maintaining a good 
relationship with customers. It prevents customers 
switching to competitors
• Consultants and internal corporate trainers blaming 
“managerial bloat” and middle management for poor 
performance. 
• Don’t acknowledging the poor strategic decisions made 
by senior management. Middle management are used as 
a scapegoat.
• Middle management actually play a very important role 
in productivity
• However, attempts were made by senior management 
to aggressively increase productivity standards. Such 
attempts were counter-productive as they provided 
a lack of job security and a decrease in the likelihood 
of promotion
Methods/Sample
Table A2.4: Studies of culture change in banking 
Weeks
(2004)
Schneider et al 
(1980) 
Ho
(2009)
Michel 
(2012) 
8 month participant 
observation with interviews 
and ﬁ eldwork over the next 
6 years at one UK bank
Surveys and Interviews of 
subset of a bank in the USA 
and 2060 customers
17 month observation and 
over 100 interviews in New 
York Investment Bank
9 year participant observation 
including 600 interviews 
with 200 informants at 2 US 
investment banks
• Members of the bank incessantly criticizes the bank as 
too centralized, bureaucratic, risk averse and not customer 
focussed, yet display apparently strong loyalty to it
• Complaints were actually a way of signalling a shared 
understanding of the context and culture
• Blaming bureaucracy was a way of blaming a faceless 
system and not individuals for the problems at the bank
• Managers used the complaints to legitimise unpopular 
decisions like cost-cutting
• Individuals remained loyal to the bank despite their 
complaints due to a love of particular branches (not the 
bank), hopes for the future and that their bank was “better 
than nothing”
• Employees were sensitive to customer perceptions of 
branch service quality 
• Branch employees are more enthusiastic and less 
bureaucratic about service than management
• Many recruits are looking for ‘the next Harvard’ and the 
social status and elite lifestyle offered 
• Graduates enter into a ‘white-collar sweatshop’ with long 
hours and tough assignments – reinforced by Wall Street’s 
money meritocracy 
• Despite the money meritocracy one overriding goal of 
‘shareholder value’ underpinned everything
• There was a short-term focus and a culture of job 
insecurity and volatility 
• Immediate responses to the market leading to a ‘strategy 
of no strategy’ and thus no long term plans 
• Banks espoused autonomy and work-life balance. 
However, there was habitual overwork that bankers 
experienced as self-chosen. 
• Initially the bankers were socialized into a culture of 
hard-work and long hours. Overwork caused conﬂ ict 
between bankers and their bodies. 
• After 4 years body breakdowns threatened their 
performance
• By year 6 bankers learnt to ‘listen to their bodies’. 
Inadvertently, this closer relationship with their body led 
to unquestioning loyalty to hard work.
• It was only by accepting natural limitations that the work 
regime was sustainable 
Reference FindingsMethods/Sample
Buono et al
(1985)
Wright
(1990)
Surveys and participation at 
2 banks pre and post-merger
Interviews and Surveys with 
264 bank tellers (USA)
• During the merger there was a signiﬁ cant issue of 
“culture shock” between the two banks
• Culture was seen as the foundation for one’s life 
providing symbols and meanings
• For non-career oriented tellers, job satisfaction and 
organization commitment will be affected positively 
through association in a cohesive effective work group 
and prefer a supervisory style 
• For career oriented tellers, job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment are enhanced by participation 
in decision making, job challenge, promotion opportunities 
and a people-oriented supervisory style
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Reference FindingsMethods/Sample
Benkhoff 
(1997)
Knights and McCabe 
(1998)
McCabe
(2009)
Knights and McCabe 
(1997) 
Survey of 340 employees in 
41 bank branches in Germany
Observations, interviews 
and document analysis. 25 
staff at a bank involved in 
organizational change
Observation. 54 interviews 
with management 82 
interviews with employees 
at a UK high street bank
Case Study – multiple 
methods, observation and 
interviews. 2 UK bank branches 
implementing TQM
• Employee commitment is signiﬁ cantly related to
the ﬁ nancial success of individual bank branches
• Commitment and hard work leads to good branch 
performance
• Process of re-engineering sparked political dynamics
• Good communication or strong leadership do not ﬁ x the 
problems relating to change
• Strong leadership actually generated an intensiﬁ cation of 
organizational politics
• Organizational change altered the identity and self-
perception of bank employees
• Deregulation and increased competition in the retail 
banking sector leding to a sales culture
• Job cuts, proliferation of call centres and back ofﬁ ce 
processing centres led to branches becoming selling spaces 
• Entrepreneurial discourse encouraged by the bank led to 
employees challenging the bureaucratic structures of the 
bank using the new rhetoric
• Top-down approach to culture and quality was deemed 
difﬁ cult and troublesome due to the difﬁ culty to control 
employees, the intangibility of customer satisfaction and 
the complexity of organizational power relations
• The procedural-based approach towards quality was 
ill-suited to address the ‘people’ or more cultural issues 
in banking
• Culture change was resisted on the shop-ﬂ oor as tellers 
solved issues through tacit skills and not reporting issues 
back to managers
Michel 
(2014)
Chreim
(2006)
2 year observation looking at 
2 investment banks
46 Interviews at two 
federal banks in Canada 
(24 employees)
• Bank 1 was particularly poor at changing and reacting to 
the market. Bank 2, however, were the market leaders
• Bank 2’s ability to change did not depend on whether 
top management provided the right design, plan, 
strategy or leadership. They were successful at changing 
and adapting due to the mundane decisions individuals 
made in real time lower down in the organisation
• Explores introduction of sales culture and subsequent 
resistance by employees
• Employees opposed the introduction of a sales culture 
by drawing upon already existing institutional discourses 
such ‘quality service’ and resisted and challenged what a 
sales culture should mean
Reference FindingsMethods/Sample
Kerr and Robinson 
(2012)
Nayak and Beckett 
(2008) 
Historical account of 
Scottish Banking – focussing 
particularly on RBS. 
Sample: Academic papers, 
ﬁ nancial press and Scottish 
newspapers. 
Historical/secondary sources, 
consumer data, speeches and 
11 interviews.
• The old guard in Scottish banking consisted of paternalistic 
and conservative notions that reproduced the local Scottish 
identity of prudence and caution
• Rise of a new disposition inﬂ uence by USA business 
culture. Senior management gaining MBAs from US 
business schools
• Led to changes to branches that saw them become sales 
outlets. This process of modernizing saw staff transformed 
from professional advisors embedded in the community 
into salespeople with targets to meet
• A ‘culture of fear’ proliferated 
• Retail banking shifted from a ‘social obligation’ to 
creating ‘conﬁ dent consumers’
• Until the 1970s banks were characterized by their 
social obligation to a range of stakeholders. Now, banks 
are characterized by a strong market orientation that 
emphasizes shareholder value
• Banks previously offer life-time employment, structured 
progression and welfare-oriented personnel policies. Now 
employees must learn speciﬁ c customer related skills 
reinforced through rigorous monitoring, appraisals and 
performance related pay
• Previously rewards were given for length of service, 
now they are determined through a workload model 
(often with points for every product sold) and a series of 
personal interventions on a daily bases including morning 
‘phone ins’ or ‘huddles’ hosted by the area manager
• Successful achievement of targets is crucial for managers. 
Their salary, bonus, career progression, status and job 
security relies on their ability to achieve required results 
within the performance culture
Hargie et al 
(2010)
Knights and Tullberg 
(2011)
Analysis of public testimony 
of 4 banking CEOs in response 
to the crisis
Analysis of historical 
documents and empirical 
research on ﬁ nancial service 
boards in the UK and Sweden
• Expressions of ‘regret’ by senior leaders was used to 
avoid culpability
• An alignment with others affected by the crisis
• Invoke the spectre of impersonal global events which 
mitigate personal responsibility
• The banking crisis stemmed partly from masculine 
autonomous self
• Notions of ‘self-interest’ linked with masculine discourses 
common in the the business elite
• Poor ethical standards stemmed from the conditioning of 
individuals to not recognize their social interdependence
• High salaries and bonuses serve as a proxy for the 
social recognition that is so elusive and precarious in 
the banking industry
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Reference FindingsMethods/Sample
Knights and McCabe 
(1997)
Carretta et al 
(2010) 
Harris 
(2002)
Questionnaires, case studies 
and company visits.
96 companies – 55 insurance, 
15 banks and 26 building 
societies. (16% board, 50% 
middle management, 34% 
senior management)
Text-analysis approach
Sample: national regulators 
(Italy), Italian banks and Basel 
Committee
Interviews relating to new 
technology projects in the UK 
banking industry
43 bank managers and 
consultants and 5 case studies
• Examining organizational change such as quality circles, 
ﬂ attening hierarchies and encouraging communication 
• Changing culture is not easily done
• Senior management must set the terms for the new 
agenda and managers need to lead by example, consider 
new systems of reward and keep in touch with how staff 
experience the policies they pursue
• There is a signiﬁ cant difference in culture between 
regulators and banks. This is indicated in the language they 
used in organisational statements 
• Learning from past mistakes, or even building upon 
past successes, continues to be the exception rather 
than the rule 
• There is a reluctance to disseminate lessons learned 
throughout the organization
• As a result the full potential offered by new technologies 
will continue to elude banks
• ‘Banking Culture’ is an attitude of complacency amongst 
the major players based upon historical success rather 
than commercial reality. Banking culture tended to reduce 
their perceived need to learn from past mistakes and 
hence inhibited the potential of new technologies
One recent approach to ethnographic research which could prove useful in studying banking culture is 
‘in-house ethnography’. Instead of having a trained ethnography come into an organization and learn the 
culture from scratch, people who are already embedded within a culture are trained in ethnographic methods 
so they can record their own culture. This approach has some signiﬁ cant beneﬁ ts – it overcomes access 
problems and means the researcher is already seen as an insider. However, it possesses a signiﬁ cant challenge 
– often the in-house ethnographer ﬁ nds it difﬁ cult to get signiﬁ cant distance from their own organization 
to begin to see its unique and strange characteristics. To achieve this, they need to be provided with some 
basic training in concepts of culture and ethnographic methods. They also typically need ongoing support 
and supervision which ensures they are able to effectively ask questions and gain some degree of perspective 
on their own organization. This can be facilitated by working alongside other in-house ethnographers in other 
similar organisations. Some excellent pointers to the practice of in-house ethnography in organisations are 
provided in Mats Alvesson’s book chapter ‘at home ethnography.  
Culture change in banks. There is a signiﬁ cant body of existing academic literature looking at the process of 
culture change in banking. To provide a solid background for our research, we undertook a systematic review 
of the literature on this topic. We located 25 studies exploring culture change in banks which we thought 
were relevant. Each of these studies used a range of different methods including surveys, historical and 
archival analysis and extended participant observation. The ﬁ ndings of the studies are extremely varied (See 
Table A2.2). However, we think there are ﬁ ve themes which cut across these studies: 
• The rise of a sales culture. Many of these papers track the shift from a more stable ‘welfare’ oriented 
culture with-in banking towards a sales culture. They point out this shift mirrored a broader shift in society 
where society became more consumerist, a culture of ‘enterprise’ became widespread, and there was a 
willingness by customers to take on more debt. In addition, these studies point out the rise of sales culture 
gave rise to profound changes in the way bankers thought about themselves at work. In the words of one 
book, they started to think about themselves as ‘sellers’, not as ‘tellers’. 
• Bankers become cut off from society and their own bodies. A number of studies, particularly in the 
investment banking context, found the hard-driving culture had some profound personal implications for 
bankers. It meant they began to ignore other demands or issues in society which could not be put into 
strictly economic terms. It also meant they began to ignore their own bodies, and would often become ill 
or troubled through overwork. 
• Trying to create a single uniform culture is wishful thinking. Another ﬁ nding cutting across many 
studies is that banks which gave different branches and divisions some freedom to translate a culture to ﬁ t 
with their own speciﬁ c concerns tended to be more successful in driving through culture change initiatives. 
People were most loyal to their particular location or branch, not to the bank as a whole. Banks which 
insisted on a single uniform culture throughout the bank tended to face a far more difﬁ cult challenge. 
Often these uniform change initiatives would be derailed.  
• Culture change sparks resistance and politics. A number of studies we looked at documented how 
culture change initatives often sparked intense political jocking and resistance. Often change initiatives 
were undermined through many processes of resistance within the bank. One study of large UK bank found 
that multiple change initiatives created a ‘culture of complaint’. People were actually bound together by a 
common fondness for complaining about the most recent managerial initiative.
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Appendix Three: 
Additional Tables
Date:
Date:
Scandals
Scandals
Reports and Policies
Reports and Policies
Regulations
Regulations
Northern Rock Liquidity 
Crisis/FSA ﬁ nes Egg, Liverpool 
Victoria and Land of Leather 
over PPI failings
Treasury Committee: 
The run on the Rock
SEPT 
2007
JAN 
2008
Nationalisation of 
Northern Rock
FEB 
2008
Table 2.1: Timeline of ﬁ nancial crisis
Which? Research into credit 
card PPI / FSA update on PPI 
sales review
Banking Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (BCOBS) comes 
into effect (excessive fees)
Banking Act 2009 comes
into force
FSA: The Turner Review 
- A regulatory response to 
the global banking crisis
Treasury Committee: 
Banking Crisis - regulation 
and supervision
FSA policy paper (09/23): 
The assessment and redress 
of PPI complaints
Treasury Committee: Banking 
Crisis - dealing with the failure 
of the UK banks / Treasury 
Committee: Banking Crisis - 
reforming corporate governance 
and pay in the City
FSA bans sales of 
single-premium PPIs
Competition Commission: 
PPI - ﬁ nal report
Collapse of Lehman Brothers / 
HBOS rescued by Lloyds TSB
Government bails out RBS, 
Lloyds TSB and HBOS / FSA 
ﬁ nes Alliance & Leicester for 
PPI mis-selling
Competition Commission: 
PPI Market Investigation - 
provisional ﬁ ndings
JUN 
2008
SEP 
2008
NOV 
2008
FEB 
2009
JAN 
2009
OCT 
2008
MAR 
2009
MAY 
2009
JUL 
2009
SEP 
2009
FSA: Quality of advice on 
structured investment products 
(Lehman-backed structured 
products - SCARPs) / FSA: 
Treating customers fairly - 
structured investment products 
/ OFT: Review of the personal 
current account market in the UK 
- follow up report (OFT1123)
OCT 
2009
Walker Report on 
corporate governance
FSA Consultation 
Paper (CP10/3): Effective 
corporate governance 
HMRC Code of Practice on 
Taxation (voluntary)
Future of Banking Commission 
set up by Which? / Supreme 
Court ruling in favour of banks 
in OFT overdraft fees case
NOV 
2009
JAN 
2010
DEC 
2009
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Date: Scandals Reports and Policies Regulations
FSA ﬁ nes RBS for poor 
complaints handling
FSA: Review of complaint 
handling in banking groups
FSA consultation paper 
(CP10/16): Mortgage Market 
Review - Responsible lending
FSA Report: The small ﬁ rms 
ﬁ nancial crime review
FSA ﬁ nes RBS for inefﬁ cient 
money-laundering controls
The Future of Banking 
Commission Report / FSA 
policy paper (10/6): The 
assessment and redress of PPI 
complaints / OFT: Review of 
the personal current account 
market in the UK - unarranged 
overdrafts (OFT1216)
APR 
2010
JUL 
2010
MAY 
2010
AUG 
2010
MAR 
2010
OFT: Review of the personal 
current account market in the 
UK - progress update (OFT1275) 
/ FSA policy paper (10/15): 
Effective governance - ﬁ nal rules
FSA ﬁ nes Barclays for mis-selling 
investment products
CEBS guideline on bonuses
Annual levy on banks
OFT: Review of the personal 
current account market in the UK 
- progress update (OFT1319)
SEP 
2010
JAN 
2011
DEC 
2010
MAR 
2011
FSA announces new rules for PPI 
selling / High Court rules against 
banks in PPI mis-selling case / 
PPI claims process / Competition 
Commission order for PPI market
ICB (Vickers) Interim ReportAPR 
2011
Date: Scandals Reports and Policies Regulations
FSA Consultation Paper 
(CP12/17) on packaged bank 
accounts - ﬁ nal rules
HM Treasury/BIS: Banking 
reform (White paper)
Introducing Banking Reform 
Act into Parliament
FSA ﬁ nes Santander for mis-
selling structured products / 
Barclays to pay for aggressive 
tax avoidance / HMRC case 
against HSBC for tax avoidance 
(Jersey, whistle-blower)
FSA settlements with Barclays, 
HSBC, Lloyds and RBS over 
redress for mis-selling interest 
rate hedging products (IRHPs) 
/ FSA ﬁ nes Barclays for LIBOR 
manipulation / LIBOR scandal 
in the media
FSA Consultation 
paper (CP11/10): 
Consumer complaints
Treasury Committee 
response to ICB Interim 
Report
FSA Consultation Paper 
(CP11/20) on packaged 
bank accounts 
FSA Report: Banks’ management 
of high money-laundering risk 
situations
FSA ﬁ nes Coutts (RBS) 
for inefﬁ cient money-
laundering controls
Citizens (RBS) settles overdraft 
fee lawsuit in the US
FSA Structured Product 
Review - guidance
ICB (Vickers) Final Report
FSA: The failure of the Royal 
Bank of Scotland / FSA policy 
paper (PS11/15): Financial 
Crime - a guide for ﬁ rms
Financial Services 
Act 2012 passed
FSA announces 
new complaints 
handling rules
FSA ﬁ nes Bank of 
Scotland (Lloyds) for poor 
complaints handling
FSA ﬁ nes HSBC 
(NHFA) for mis-selling 
investment products
FEB 
2012
JUN 
2012
MAY 
2011
JUL 
2011
OCT 
2011
JUN 
2011
MAR 
2012
APR 
2012
SEP 
2011
DEC 
2011
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Date: Scandals Reports and Policies Regulations
PCBS appointed / FSA new 
rules on selling packaged 
bank accounts 
FSA settlements with Co-
operative Bank, Santander, 
Northern Bank, Allied Irish 
Bank, Bank of Ireland, 
Clydesdale and Yorkshire banks 
over redress for mis-selling 
interest rate hedging products 
(IRHPs) / Serious Fraud Ofﬁ ce 
criminal investigation into 
LIBOR manipulation
DFS ﬁ nes Standard 
Chartered for inefﬁ cient 
money-laundering controls
The Wheatley Review of 
LIBOR - ﬁ nal report / FSA 
review of sales incentives
CP11/31): Mortgage Market 
Review - ﬁ nal rules / FSA 
Consultation Paper (CP12/26): 
Regulatory rules and guidance 
relating to approved persons
JUL 
2012
AUG 
2012
SEP 
2012
OCT 
2012
FSA ﬁ nes CPP for mis-selling 
card and identity protection
RBS ﬁ ned for LIBOR manipulation
FSA ﬁ nes Co-operative 
Bank for incorrect handling 
of PPI complaints
FSA: Final guidance - Risk 
to customers from ﬁ nancial 
incentives / OFT: Review of 
the personal current account 
market in the UK
Lloyds TSB suspends selling 
packaged bank accounts (phone/
branch) / UBS ﬁ ned for LIBOR 
manipulation / DFS ﬁ nes HSBC 
for inefﬁ cient money-laundering 
controls
NOV 
2012
FEB 
2013
JAN 
2013
DEC 
2012
Santander suspends selling 
packaged bank accounts
FSA: Interest Rate Hedging 
Products - Pilot ﬁ ndings
FSA new rules on selling packaged 
bank accounts come into force
MAR 
2013
Date: Scandals Reports and Policies Regulations
Increase in complaints 
about packaged bank accounts 
(Financial Ombudsman)
Salz Review on Barclays’ 
business practices
FSA interest rate hedging 
products (IRHP) review 
and redress
BBA: Libor Code of 
Conduct (FCA conﬁ rmed 
industry guidance)
Financial Services Act 2012 
come into force (establishing 
FCA, PRA, FBC)
Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking Standards (PCBS): 
Changing banking for good
UK Uncut protest against 
HSBC for tax avoidance in 
the media
MAY 
2013
JUL 
2013
APR 
2013
JUN 
2013
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Date: Scandals Reports and Policies Regulations
FCA ﬁ nes Credit Suisse 
and Yorkshire Building Society 
for ﬁ nancial promotion failures 
(mis-selling of structured 
products)
FCA ﬁ nes RBS for poor 
mortgage records and 
advice / DFS ﬁ nes Standard 
Chartered for inefﬁ cient 
money-laundering controls
Lambert Banking 
Standards Review
Lloyds ﬁ ned for 
LIBOR manipulation
JUN 
2014
AUG 
2014
MAY 
2014
JUL 
2014
Underlying Issues Resolutions
Type of issue: Economic 
Table 2.2: Analysis of problems 
Boom and bust cycles
Moral hazard
Periods of cheap debt led to easy 
credit, poor investment decisions 
which eventually go bad resulting 
in crisis 
Banks were ultimately did not did 
not bare the risk for their activities 
as they were implicitly backed up 
national governments. This means 
they took more risk decisions than 
they would if they did not have 
state as backstop.
Monitoring by Bank of England of 
macro and micro prudential risks
Alternative mechanism for dealing 
with failed banks. Bail-ins. 
Description
Underlying Issues Resolutions
Type of issue: Market-place 
Lack of competition
Increasingly complex products
Domination of market by small 
number of banks with similar 
offers meant no incentives for 
good behaviour
Financial products were overly 
complex, making them difﬁ cult 
or impossible to understanding. 
There was often no justiﬁ cation in 
customer needs. 
Personal account switching regime
FCA investigation and ﬁ nes of 
some product classes 
Voluntary introduction of more 
simple products by banks
Description
Poorly informed customers Customers were not given the 
information they needed to make 
informed choices. They also did 
not have ﬁ nancial literacy required 
to make these choices.
Voluntary provision of information 
to customers by banks 
Some campaigns around 
ﬁ nancial literacy 
Large and Wyman: RBS 
Independent Lending Review
Increase in complaints 
about packaged bank accounts 
(Financial Ombudsman)
Administration of LIBOR 
changes from BBA Libor to 
ICE Benchmarks Limited
Mortgage Market Review 
changes come into effect 
Treasury Committee: 
Terms on reference for 
SME lending inquiry
FCA research on the 
overdraft market
FCA ﬁ nes Lloyds (TSB, Bank of 
Scotland, Halifax) for serious 
sales incentive failings / RBS, 
Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan ﬁ ned 
for LIBOR manipulation (UBS 
and Citigroup immunity)
BBA: LIBOR Consultation 
Paper feedback summary
Banking Reform Act passed
NOV 
2013
JAN 
2014
FEB 
2014
APR 
2014
DEC 
2013
Current account 
switching service
SEP 
2013
Mis-selling of card and identity 
protection in the media
Announcement of CPP 
card and identity protection 
compensation scheme
AUG 
2013
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Underlying Issues Resolutions
Type of issue: Psychological 
Inability to learn 
from past crises
Responsibility shifting 
following failure 
Faith in mathematical models
Many lessons from past asset bubbles 
and failures in the ﬁ nancial system 
were largely forgotten. The result was 
past mistakes were repeated 
Key actor sought to avoid 
responsibility for failures. They 
would shift responsibility onto 
other parties. 
Rise of automated processes 
resulted in reliance on decisions by 
a computer system rather than the 
use of rounded expert judgement 
N/A
Senior Persons Regime
N/A
Description
Underlying Issues Resolutions
Type of issue: Structural 
Ownership model
Integration of investment 
and retail banking
Shareholders demand increasingly 
high short term returns, resulting 
in pressure for increasingly risky 
behaviour. When mistakes were made, 
they would be borne by shareholders, 
not employees or executives 
Investment bank culture and 
demands bled into retail 
banks. This resulted in the rise 
inappropriate demands and 
culture in retail banking
N/A
Ring fencing of retail and 
investment banks
Description
Underlying Issues Resolutions
Type of issue: Governance
Poor understanding of 
risks taken by institution 
Board and senior 
management ignorance 
of shareholder interests
Treatment of legal 
compliance as substitute 
for good conduct
Lack of diversity at 
senior levels
Lack of understanding by senior 
management and board of risks 
which were being taken at lower 
levels of the organization. This 
resulted in high levels of risk taking 
without appropriate oversight
Lack of understanding and 
connection with longer term interests 
of shareholders. Often high levels 
of risk were taken with gains being 
syphoned off by high level employees 
and losses born by shareholders
Bank executives assumed all 
they needed to do was comply 
with regulation. This lead to poor 
practice which was not strictly 
outside the bounds of compliance 
being seen as acceptable. 
The lack of diversity gave rise of 
group-think, which meant many 
central assumptions were not 
challenged and fool-hardy risks 
were taken on.
Increasing monitoring of risk and 
conduct by FCA.
Dramatic expansion of risk and 
compliance within banks.
Replacement of individual 
senior management, but no 
structural changes.
Increasing monitoring of conduct 
rather than compliance by FCA
Some voluntary compliance 
by banks
Some industry initiatives
Description
Underlying Issues Resolutions
Type of issue: Incentives 
Incentives for institutions 
to pursue rapid growth
Poor Incentive structure
Banks and executives were rewarded 
by ﬁ nancial markets for rapid 
expansion. This meant they often 
took on risks from businesses which 
were not properly understood.
High levels of compensation often 
for poor performance
Poor structuring of incentives with 
cash over short term
N/A
Longer bonus vesting period 
and claw-backs
Description
106  |  A report on the culture of British retail banking    A report on the culture of British retail banking  |  107
Underlying Issues Resolutions
Type of issue: Oversight and regulation
Tax structure favours 
debt over equity
Failure of ratings agencies
Failure of auditors to 
expose undue risks
Lack of strong professional 
bodies and associated duties
The tax structure rewards banks 
for taking on greater amounts of 
debt, resulting in a lack of equity to 
cushion the bank if failure occurs
Credit ratings agencies had 
conﬂ icts of interest and would 
often not provide accurate 
ratings of investment products 
or institutions. 
Auditors had conﬂ icts of interest 
and did not do their duty of outline 
major risks being run by banks
Lack of common professional 
standards meant bankers were not 
held together by common morals 
or norms
N/A
N/A
Some switching between 
auditors of large banks
Establishment of BSRC
Description
Underlying Issues Resolutions
Type of issue: Punishment
Lack of individual 
responsibility
Lack of ability to speak up
Individuals were able to take great 
risks and fail signiﬁ cantly, without an 
punishment. In particular there were 
no custodial sentences given out.
When employees saw wrong 
doing they did not have proper 
channels for raising concerns.
Senior persons regime
Voluntary whistle-blowing 
mechanisms in banks 
Description
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Table 2.4: Overview of key policy reports 
Policy documents Role of regulatorsDeﬁ nition of Culture ReportingAreas to consider 
under culture
OwnershipView of Culture Change Recommended changes 
(in relation to culture)
Metrics proposed
Walker Review
ICB Report 
Salz Review
The Future of 
Banking Commission
PCBS: Changing Banking 
for Good Report
FSA: The failure of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland
Culture as encompassing 
norms, something 
more engrained than 
plain conformity
Culture as enabler of 
long-term customer 
oriented retail banking
Culture as practices 
and values that show 
how things are done 
and should be done
Culture as good governance
Culture as set of standards
Culture as attitude to 
the balance between 
risk and growth 
Change is needed
N/A
- Rules to be supplemented 
 by a clear set of values 
- Need clear plan and 
 should monitor/report 
 progress
- Reinforce industry 
 standards to address 
 employee scepticism 
- Culture change is not a 
 goal. Change the tangible 
 things, focus on problems 
 that need changing
- Change is needed 
- Change is difﬁ cult
- Responsibility of   
 management
- Reinforce through   
 employee incentives
- Change is needed 
- Change will be slow
- Need clear evidence 
 of change
N/A
- Risk management
- Board challenge
N/A
- Customer complaints
- Code of conduct
- Remuneration
- Employee engagement
- Code of conduct
- Whistle-blowing
- Recruitment
- Code of conduct 
- Governance 
- Remuneration
- Code of conduct
-  Tone/standards at the top
- Remuneration
- Diversity
-  Whistleblowing
- Board oversight and 
 challenge
- CEO’s leadership
-  Risk management
Responsibility of the Chairman
N/A
Board’s management 
and oversight
Board led, senior management 
supported culture
Role of the auditors in 
transparency and accountability 
Role of credit rating agencies 
in transparency 
Tone at the top, in the middle 
and at the bottom
N/A
N/A
- Culture cannot be regulated
- Supporting culture is needed 
 for regulation to work effectively 
- Regulation alone is not the answer
- A new professional body is needed 
 to set and enforce standards
- Industry code of conduct is needed
- New professional standards body 
 is needed to set and enforce 
 standards
- Regulators only to set limits 
- Senior executive selection should 
 not be the responsibility of the FSA
- FSA to reinforce changes to 
 remuneration
- Financial stability regulations 
 will not remedy poor culture
- New professional body as a 
 major force for culture change
- FCA to support whistle-blowers 
FSA lacking sufﬁ ciently detailed 
approach to identify speciﬁ c 
deﬁ ciencies / robust approach to 
ensure that all risks were mitigated
N/A
N/A
Regularly report on progress made 
against targets and seek external 
assurance to rebuild trust
- Effect of the company’s activities 
 on the stability of the ﬁ nancial  
 system in the Annual Report 
- Fund managers to report process 
 they seek to inﬂ uence banks
- Auditors to report all signiﬁ cant 
 risk factors
Annual reports to include gender 
breakdown of trading operation
N/A
N/A
Independent governance and 
culture for ring-fenced banks
- Establish sense of purpose 
 and develop standards (senior 
 leadership to be responsible 
 and promote)
- Develop employee learning 
 programmes (senior management 
 to lead or attend)
- Development of Code of Conduct 
 (support shared values)
- Set targets and report on progress
- Amend remuneration system 
 (link to values)
- Enable issue escalation
- Reinforce values through 
 recruiting and induction 
- Development of an industry 
 Code of Conduct
- Introduce governance measures 
 (transparency and independence)
- Amend remuneration system 
 (link to customer measures)
- Increase shareholder oversight 
- Strengthen role of accounting 
- Increase independence of credit 
 rating agencies
- Establish new professional body 
 for banking to introduce non-
 ﬁ nancial incentives
- Report on gender breakdown 
 of trading operations 
- Enable issue escalation 
 (whistleblowing)
- Introduce governance measures 
 (appropriateness of appointments)
- Increase executive team 
 challenge and teamwork
- Encourage positive thinking but 
 not over-optimism
- Amend executive remuneration 
 system (link to capital, liquidity, 
 asset quality)
- Increase Board oversight 
 and challenge
- Enhance role of risk management
- External effectiveness review of 
 Board to take place every 2-3 
 years and to be shared with FSA
- Record key elements of Board 
 and sub-committee meetings
N/A
N/A
- Employee, customer and 
 other stakeholder surveys
- Breaches of code 
- Use of the escalation 
 and whistle-blowing 
 procedures
- Risk assessments 
- Customer satisfaction
- Complaints level and 
 resolution
- Regulatory compliance
Gender breakdown
No rigorous mechanism 
that can accurately assess a 
ﬁ rm’s culture
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Policy documents Role of regulatorsDeﬁ nition of Culture ReportingAreas to consider 
under culture
OwnershipView of Culture Change Recommended changes 
(in relation to culture)
Metrics proposed
Lambert: Banking 
Standards Review 
KPMG: Reinvention 
of Banking
Economist Intelligence 
Unit: Crisis of Culture
Deloitte: Culture 
in Banking
Culture as shared 
values that drive or 
prevent employee 
decisions and actions
N/A
N/A
Culture as way we do things 
around here, culture as glue
- Change will be slow
- Industry should work 
 together
- Cultural change underway 
 in all big banks
- Change will take time and 
 serious will power
 - Most ﬁ rms started to 
 change culture -
 Supported by senior 
 executives - But execs 
 struggle to understand 
 importance
- Knowledge gaps need 
 to be understood to be 
 more resilient - lack of 
 communication between 
 departments the norm
- Change is underway 
- Change will be slow 
 (3-4 years) 
- Most Executives over 
 estimate ability of their 
 ﬁ rm to change 
-  Tone at the top
-  Remuneration
-  Whistleblowing procedures
-  Customer complaints 
-  Product transparency
-  Handling businesses 
 in distress
-  SME lending decisions
- Incentive frameworks 
- Sales regimes 
- Training
 - Incentives 
-  Perception of reputation 
-  Employee evaluation 
-  Awareness raising 
- Code of conduct
- Incentives 
-  Metrics 
- Governance and 
 management knowledge 
- Whistleblowing 
Tone at the top, in the middle 
and at the bottom
Tone at the top. 
Tone at the top. Integrated 
management committee and 
ownership important
Tone at the top, business unit 
heads most important
- A new professional body 
 is needed to set and enforce 
 standards
- New body to complement and 
 not duplicate regulators’ work
- Over-reliance on statutory 
 regulation will reduce 
 competition and build barriers to 
 entry and innovation in the sector
-  Adopt product life 
-  Cycle approach 
-  Provide space for banks to apply 
 regulation based on customer  
 need 
- Need for global co-ordination  
 among regulators 
Tightened regulation around 
issues like M & As helped some 
countries avoid problems during 
ﬁ nancial crisis.
Too much regulation
Self-assessments to be published 
every year
N/A
N/A
N/A
- Establish new professional body 
 for banking (Banking Standards 
 Review Council - BSRC) to 
 develop standards and compile 
 good practice (internal challenge, 
 whistleblowing, complaints 
 resolution mechanisms, 
 values, remuneration, customer 
 satisfaction, transparency)
- Banks to measure and report 
 progress (self-assessment)
N/A
N/A
- Performance Metrics metrics 
 which balance risk and reward, 
 and focus on behaviour as well 
 as performance. 
- Changing compensation 
 composition and timing 
- Facilitate ability to speak up 
- Provision of training.
- Understanding of values 
 and codes of conduct by 
 employees
-  Embeddedness of values 
 and codes of conduct 
-  Design and use of 
 whistleblowing procedures
-  Levels of diversity
-  Feedback from employee 
 and union representatives
N/A
N/A
N/A
Table 2.4: Overview of key policy reports (continued)
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BARCLAYS BANK PLC 
Historical/Background: • In 2012, Barclays undertook a fundamental review of how the business operates, 
looking at the bank in terms of business performance and in terms of culture 
because of the belief that only a business driven by strong values can deliver strong, 
sustainable returns.
•  The result was the launch of the Transform Programme, with the goal to become the 
‘Go-To’ bank, which launched in early 2013 a set of newly deﬁ ned Purpose and Values 
across Barclays globally. These are fundamental to Barclays long-term success and 
represent the set of standards under which all colleagues at Barclays will work, and 
against which the performance of every employee will be assessed and rewarded.
•  A fundamental belief that is driving the strategy and building the ‘Go-To’ Bank is that 
healthy societies need healthy banks.
•  The aim is therefore to establish a culture where colleagues can deliver the ‘Go-To’ 
goals, who understand how our day-to-day decisions impact on broader society 
and that we can create products, services and solutions that as well as delivering 
commercial value can also have a beneﬁ t to society.
Table 4.1: Summary of interview comments
Deﬁ nition of Culture  
Content of Culture / 
Espoused Values 
(i.e. Core Values)     
Programmes for 
Rebuilding Culture     
•  Since the unveiling of the current strategy, values and behaviours, the culture in 
Barclays has been progressing and evolving at pace. 
•  At the moment, there are high levels of awareness of the deﬁ nitions for all of these 
across the Bank, with attention being focused on the implications of being value-
driven, and what impact a common purpose will have on the ways of working
•  Barclays has described the transformation as an integrated framework, deﬁ ned as a 
goal of becoming the ‘Go-To’ Bank which can be achieved through the Bank’s purpose 
of ‘helping people achieve their ambitions - in the right way’, for which explicit values 
and behaviours have been launched. The overall progress is measured through a deﬁ ned 
balance scorecard.
•  5 values were launched in 2013 - Respect, Integrity, Service, Excellence and Stewardship, 
each containing 5 behaviours.
•  The approach to transforming Barclays has been holistic, with various activities taking 
place in parallel across Barclays. These have included communication & engagement 
campaigns, leadership development, adjustment of processes and systems, among 
others. The following describe some of the activities most closely connected to affecting 
culture change. 
•  Since the values and behaviours were launched, all colleagues have been part of face to 
face Values Workshops in 2013, designed to discuss and better understand the values, 
purpose and culture that was being launched.
•  In addition, signiﬁ cant focus has been placed on supporting leaders’ development, 
particularly related to the role they play in creating and supporting the values-driven 
culture at Barclays. E.g. Leadership Academy, focusing on Authentic, Values-driven 
Leadership designed for MDs, Global leadership curriculum for leaders and managers, 
and the Colleague Curriculum for the broader employee population, all of which are 
connected to the Barclays’ values & behaviours and Leadership Capability model.
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FIRST DIRECT
Historical/Background:  
Deﬁ nition of Culture
Content of Culture
/Espoused Values 
(i.e. Core Values)     
Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring of Culture 
(continued) 
Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring of Culture  
Views on Regulation     
Processes Through Which 
Change Is Achieved    
• Deep history focusing on customer services. 
• Business tailor made for the customer.
• Mechanisms implemented and designed to manage the customer experience. 
• Culture very customer focused. 
• Installing values in employees so that employees place values in customers
• Culture very customer centric. 
• Emphasis placed in improving: 
    - The customer experience.
    - Personalisation / contact.
    - Challenging the perceptions of depersonalized direct banking. 
• Incorporating change to make sure that services were always the best possible. 
• Culture developed to enhance the quality of the experience from customers.
• Deliberate willingness in designing a customer centric culture (intended culture)                               
• Emphasis placed in management of the customer and employees experience 
• Employees’ experience managed through the notion of “people experience” 
• First Direct Comment: “obsessed about creating the right context for employees so 
that they will do the right things for customers”.
 –  Metrics are also set at business and unit levels to ensure alignment and 
 connections through the Bank
 –  BSC metrics are now used as part of the Performance Management system for 
 all colleagues
•  In addition, effort is underway to continue to build dialogue and transparency 
across the Bank, which aligns with the expectations set-out through the Transform 
programme and speciﬁ cally the values and behaviours that have been deﬁ ned 
for Barclays.
•  Barclays has developed a balanced scorecard model which explicitly introduces a long-
term dimension into the setting of short-term objectives for individuals. All employees 
are assessed through the performance management system with a composite rating 
based on what they deliver alongside their living of the values, 
the “how”.
•  Though no single metric is being used to measure culture, a series of surveys, studies 
and other data points (e.g. Employee Opinion Surveys, external benchmark surveys, 
the Balance Scorecard metrics) are being used to contribute to the understanding of 
the progress that is being made
•  Barclays has established a Balanced Scorecard measured through 5Cs: colleague, 
citizenship, company, conduct, and client: 
 –  Metrics have been set for each C for the group as a whole, which are used as part  
 of the performance reporting process
•  Barclays does not comment on its relationship with its regulators.
•  As described in the previous section, Barclays has undertaken a series of activities to 
engage all colleagues, with particular emphasis on the leadership of Barclays, to enable 
greater dialogue and discussion around the transformation process, and to support 
building accountability for the process.
•  Currently, the focus is primarily on embedding the new values and behaviours, the use 
and understanding of new systems and processes, and ensuring colleagues feel conﬁ dent 
about their role in driving the transformation of the Bank. 
•  This focus on embedding is connected to the belief that Barclays’ values and behaviours 
are inextricably linked to performance.
Programmes for 
Rebuilding Culture     
•  The approach to transforming Barclays has been holistic, with various activities taking 
place in parallel across Barclays. These have included communication & engagement 
campaigns, leadership development, adjustment of processes and systems, among 
others. The following describe some of the activities most closely connected to affecting 
culture change. 
•  Since the values and behaviours were launched, all colleagues have been part of face to 
face Values Workshops in 2013, designed to discuss and better understand the values, 
purpose and culture that was being launched.
•  In addition, signiﬁ cant focus has been placed on supporting leaders’ development, 
particularly related to the role they play in creating and supporting the values-driven 
culture at Barclays. E.g. Leadership Academy, focusing on Authentic, Values-driven 
Leadership designed for MDs, Global leadership curriculum for leaders and managers, 
and the Colleague Curriculum for the broader employee population, all of which are 
connected to the Barclays’ values & behaviours and Leadership Capability model.
•  The redeﬁ ned code of conduct has been launched in 2013, known as the Barclays’ Way, 
and outlines the Values and Behaviours which govern the way of working across our 
business globally. It constitutes a reference point covering all aspects of colleagues’ 
working relationships, speciﬁ cally (but not exclusively) with other Barclays employees, 
customers and clients, governments and regulators, business partners, suppliers, 
competitors and the broader community. 
•  Various communication campaigns have taken place since the launch of Transform 
to provide awareness and share the experience and applications of how the business 
is changing across the Bank. One recent example is the ‘Millions of Stories’ to share 
examples of the values in action.
Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture   
RECRUITING & TRAINING
•  Recruiting based on attitudes and personality – emphasis on sharing the brand 
through training.
•  Assessment/Analysis of changes in the marketplace.
•  Tracking the right people, then recruiting them, ensuring these people deliver the best 
experience to the customer. 
  - 25% of new hires recommended by workers - like-minded people are recruited 
 as a result.
•  Brand focused training. 
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Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture 
(continued)   
View on Regulation  
Processes Through Which 
Change Is Achieved  
•  HSBC and FD: Training focused on:
  - How to have a conversation with customers. 
  - How to react to needs. 
  - Heavy socialization processes to team.
  - Environment learning.
  - Progressive development of relationships with customers. 
  - Heavy support to ease the quality of the relationship with customers.
•  Mentoring scheme:
  - Systematic, in team, weekly/monthly meetings. 
  - help identify problems and need for support in each training group.
•  Nature of the HR: employees VALUE the CUSTOMERS.
  - Addressing all demands in a timely manner.
•  Role of regulation is fundamental.
•  Comment ‘a need for balance between getting Banks to do the right thing vs not 
creating unnecessary steps for customers that prevent from delivering the best service’.
•  Regulators need to be more customer-centric. 
•  Interpretation of rules and regulations. 
•  Increased engagement with the regulatory body to discuss appropriate interpretations 
that do not affect negatively the quality of customer services.
•  Growing competition needed and is about to happen
•  Push high street Banks to compete more
  - New entrants will have an easier life
Regulators need to emphasise what metrics to monitor for cultural change
•  Clear explanation of what should be monitored: 
•  Sales’ quality
•  Satisfaction – industry-wide eye on trust and indicators of trust from the customers’ 
perspective
Comprehensive set of metrics: 
• Focus on (employees) monitoring the quality of the customer experience.
•  Focus on the quality of interaction ensuring that culture is maintained over time.
• Measuring values and their adoption through appropriate behaviours. 
•  Measure on activities: 
  - Quality of interactions with customers. 
  - Focus on understanding the needs of customers. 
  - Analysis of management of customers’ contacts.
  - Efﬁ ciency to cover calls (AVG).
  - Monitoring the happiness, attribution and reasons for leaving the organization.
  - Evaluation of how employees contribute to create the right environment and culture.
  - Weekly survey checks on quality of delivery to customers. 
  - Evaluation of speed to resolve customer queries.
•  Management of risk processes 
•  Conducted audits to evaluate whether regulatory requirements are met 
•  Measurement of the quality of sales
HANDELSBANKEN
Historical/Background 
Deﬁ nition Of Culture
Content Of Culture / 
Espoused Values (I.E. 
Core Values)
Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture
Processes Through Which 
Change Is Achieved 
Assessment/Measurement
/Monitoring Of Culture
•  Unique/Innovative banking model developed by Jan Wallander Swedish economist based 
on decentralisation. 
•  Founded in 1871, Handelsbanken was reorganised according to this model in the 1970s. 
•  Proven model - reference to the Swedish ﬁ nancial crisis in 1991 and global ﬁ nancial 
crisis in 2008. Opened ca.130 of its >180 UK branches since the global ﬁ nancial crisis
•  Starting point: “Our Idea of how we should run a successful universal bank is based on 
trust and respect for the individual, both customers and employees.” “We have great 
conﬁ dence in our staff and great respect for what they achieve. We look upon them as 
sensible and competent and ﬁ lled with a natural desire to do a good job. We believe that 
they have great potential, enthusiasm and ability to learn about new conditions, new 
technology and new forms of work”, Jan Wallander. 
•  Refer to staff as “Handelsbankers” to convey a sense that their staff and organisation’s 
values fully align.
• “Our main goal is achieved through focusing on having the most satisﬁ ed customers as 
well as the lowest costs”.
•  Decentralised customer relations and decentralised decision making. 
•  Trust in individuals. 
•  Employees have more ownership (“You decide”). Long-term approach. Courage to make 
decisions and take ownership. Collaborate to achieve joint goals.
• “We are not enacting on any program of culture change. Instead, we ensure we protect 
our culture and allow it to continue growing and ﬂ ourishing as Handelsbanken does... 
we are careful to select staff that reﬂ ect our values, and truly live and breathe them”.
• Current programmes in place relating to culture:
 - Employee recruitment: focus on hiring people who would ﬁ t the culture.
 - Requirement to be passionate about the same values (long term relationship, 
 customer satisfaction). 
 - Performance management: no sales targets. 
 - Evaluation based on how “Handelsbanker” someone is (culture-bearer, interested,   
 engaged). 
 - No bonuses. 
• Customer satisfaction: “listening system” to ensure customers are heard and responded to.
•  All the senior employees at Handelsbanken act as “culture bearers”. Fine tuning 
of our culture and model is gradual, continual, and an expected part of remaining 
Handelsbanken. The ﬂ at organisational structure (3 mgmt levels) gives conﬁ dence for 
staff to make suggestions or raise issues and for management to listen and respond. 
•  No current metrics in place to measure effectiveness of culture. Instead a continual 
process of looking and listening all over the organisation (and power to respond quickly 
devolved in all areas). Individual performance assessment has “culture bearer” role as a 
key assessment criterion. 
•  Opposition towards something that would increase centralisation or micromanagement. 
- ‘to measure is to affect’
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HSBC BANK PLC
Historical/Background 
Views On Regulation
Assessment/Measurement
/Monitoring Of Culture
•  60s-70s close relationship / trust with customers through branch network as sole 
channel available
•  80s-90s importance of growth / development of a culture that over focuses on sales 
started to emerge
•  During this last period, shift in the physical contact with less direct contact with people 
(channel migration) was seen across the FS sector in order to reduce costs and centralise 
decision making
•  Also, last period saw signiﬁ cant growth through acquisition for HSBC, which brought 
about cultural integration challenges which are notoriously different
•  00’s Increased complexity of products, opportunism and proﬁ t motive led to a culture 
which did not always focus on the interests of the customer. The banks including HSBC 
borrowed some of the selling techniques of high street retailers to bundle products
•  Western economic policy and attitudes of consumers to ﬁ nance changed to be less 
conservative. Governments including the US drove lending to consumers who possibly 
could not afford it. Controls and measures were loosened. Consumerism exacerbated 
the issue
•  HSBC faired the crisis relatively well - it’s prudent policies and early exits from certain 
products such as PPI and sub-prime meant it withstood the economic crisis well. HSBC 
had a strong capital position
•  The cultural issues that affected the rest of the industry impacted HSBC in a slightly 
different way - The DPA has been the strongest trigger event for HSBC - while the 
organisation was looked well upon due to its capital position it emerged that we had 
breached our own standards and we had not had effective controls in place around 
money laundering and terrorist ﬁ nance
•  Culture was inconsistent and not understood - We have embarked on a group-wide 
assessment of culture though our values embedding approach. The result is that 
employees worldwide had contributed to a culture where we under pressure drove 
the numbers and:
 1. Conformed and ﬁ tted in rather than upholding our values
  2. Blindly followed the rules or orders without consideration to the consequence
  3. Feared judgement and the consequences of action
•  What emerges is an organisational bias, where good people let bad things happen 
to survive
•  HSBC initiated its cultural embedding work in 2008 through the identiﬁ cation of its 
values - the programmes continue and are outlined below. It did this before the breaches 
of values or the DPA emerged.
•  “Agnostic” towards regulation: it didn’t matter how it develops as long as it applies to 
everyone equally. The bank’s only corporate goal is relative to its competitors.
• Follow outcomes that show overall success: 
 - Financial stability.
 - Customer satisfaction.
 - Loyalty. 
Deﬁ nition Of Culture
Content Of Culture / 
Espoused Values (I.E. 
Core Values)
•  Current culture is difﬁ cult to deﬁ ne in an organisation of 240,000 people in over 75 
countries however there are some emergent themes. We have undertaken various surveys 
and sampled employees using different tools. The current culture is changing. In 2011 
we started to measure our European organisation, starting with the UK bank, in terms of 
their decision making preferences. We worked with and pioneered a survey now used by 
Professor Roger Steere. The survey’s results in short form show that we:
 1. Are very principled in our decision making both at home and work (we use our 
experience to make judgements)
 2. But we do change between work and home - at work we seem to value policy at the   
expense of care, whereas at home we are very caring people
• A bias emerges in the workplace. This has changed over the last few years; unfortunately 
since the DPA, the strengthening of regulation, widespread criticism of the sector and 
therefore a growing fear of doing wrong thing we have seen an increase in policy driven 
behaviour at the same time as a decrease of using our moral compass in decision making.
•  This is backed up by the research carried out through most recent values embedding 
programme that demonstrates that when we are not at our best or under pressure we:
 1. Conform and ﬁ t in rather than upholding our values
 2. Blindly follow the rules or orders without consideration to the consequence
 3. Fear judgement and the consequences of action
•  However, it must be noted that since our programmes began there is a very different tone:
 1. Senior leadership are visibly sponsoring and leading
 2. Attendees to programmes talk of change and a more open culture
 3. Groups of advocates or change agents are forming to embed the values in the day 
 to day
•  HSBC recognises that the culture of an organisation has to be aligned to the 
organisations Vision, Purpose, Strategy and Values. 
•  HSBC has deﬁ ned its values around Courageous Integrity - 
 - Dependable: Standing ﬁ rm for what is right, delivering on commitments, being 
 resilient and trustworthy. Taking personal accountability, being decisive, using 
 judgment and common sense, empowering others 
 - Open to different ideas and cultures: Communicating openly, honestly and 
 transparently, welcoming challenge, learning from mistakes. Listening, treating people 
 fairly, being inclusive, valuing different perspectives. 
 - Connected to customers, communities, regulators and each other: Building 
 connections, being aware of external issues, collaborating across boundaries. Caring 
 about individuals and their progress, showing respect, being supportive and responsive.
•  The values were not deﬁ ned as part of a marketing proposal but as a way to identify 
what the organisation itself deﬁ nes as important. The Values were deﬁ ned through 
an appreciative enquiry where more than 5000 employees described us at our best. 
In addition to the Values HSBC has re-stated its purpose, which was also deﬁ ned by 
employees and customers:
•  Throughout our history we have been where the growth is, connecting customers to 
opportunities. We enable businesses to thrive and economies to prosper, helping people 
fulﬁ l their hopes and dreams and realise their ambitions. This is our role and purpose. 
•  These statements allow us to build a programme for change and provides a narrative 
for our people to create meaning in the way they deliver in their roles, wherever they 
are in HSBC.
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Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture
Processes Through Which 
Change Is Achieved
Processes Through Which 
Change Is Achieved 
(continued)
•  The embedding of values started in 2008 and continues through to today across 
the organisation:
 - 2008/9 Values identiﬁ cation through Appreciative Enquiry
 - 2010 Communication of Values across HSBC
 - 2012-13 Values Embedding initiated through the development of Values Based 
 Leadership programme c.20,000 leaders attending
 - 2012 - ongoing Embedding the values in our people processes. Recruitment, Pay and 
 Reward, Recognition, Performance Management etc
 - 2013-14 - Values Lead High Performance culture programme developed and deployed to 
 all senior management as follow-up to the ﬁ rst programme c.25,000 leaders attending
 - 2015 - programme redeﬁ ned as ‘At Our Best’ asking leaders to bring their best even 
 in adversity. c.120,000 employees targeted in customer facing roles - programme to be 
 leader lead
 - 2015 - The other supporting initiatives include:
•  Group wide re-deﬁ nition of our operating model and structure alongside a revitalised 
strategy 
•  Development of a Global Standards programme Group wide to ensure the proper 
standards and controls are in place to protect the bank, customers, shareholders.
•  Group wide communications campaign to support embedding - telling stories
•  Leader tool-kits to support deployment
•  Up skilling organisation wide in six sigma to put customer at the heart of process 
and product
•  Exchange - group wide learning circles run to drive continuous improvement and 
identiﬁ cation of key cultural and performance blockers
•  Development of group wide capabilities and implementation of values and risk 
culture elements into all learning curricula
•  Culture engagement programme supported by a refresh of the leadership curriculum, 
speciﬁ cally for ﬁ rst line managers in how to build a Values Led High Performance team.
•  Follow up with leadership and the development of a group wide group of advocates 
to embed the change
There are essentially 3 ways the change is being deployed:
1. Policy, process and procedure - HR and Business processes are being evaluated 
and designed to support the values embedding and the desired culture. Six sigma 
is being used to this end.
2. Learning and development - all learning curricula from induction to technical 
training are being evaluated in terms of the culture they drive. Speciﬁ c 
programmes such as Values workshops and leadership training are being run on a 
project basis and now to be leader led.
3. Communications - the values and culture is being embedded in all group 
communications. The phase 3 programme will have a group wide campaign of 
stories describing the culture as we desire it.
Examples:
• HSBC have ‘culture advocates’ in the UK who act as advocates to share the values 
and beliefs of the new culture. 1500 are being developed for 2015.
• HSBC run global workshops that ‘touch’ over 220, 000 employees.
• There is a values 360 feedback approach that all senior management go through 
• HSBC is also pioneering a way to embed the change:
1. HSBC uses hard hitting media content as a truth and reconciliation session to help people 
understand and acknowledge their contribution to the culture even if they have not 
committed some of the reported acts
2. HSBC has identiﬁ ed the cultural blind spots that caused the issues and is using 3 habits 
that directly act as cultural antidotes to these issues that overcome the limiting beliefs
 •  The Culture change programme consists of 4 major elements as antidotes to the 
 blind spots: 
  - Case for change - what happened (human impact) and how culture cased it.
  - Who I am - identiﬁ cation of values and purpose and how it ﬁ ts in HSBC.
  - Deciding what’s right - how to overcome our personal and organisational bias in 
   decision making
  - What we Do - creating an environment where we all call out issues and feedback
Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring Of Culture
Views On Regulation
•  Measurement exists in the current form:
 - Std customer satisfaction and engagement surveys
 - Employee engagement surveys
 - Std process metrics and HR measures - complaints, grievances etc
 - Speciﬁ c cultural diagnostics
•  However, HSBC is developing a group wide measurement framework so our Audit teams 
can audit culture. The measurement framework is being pulled together at group level. 
The challenge is that some lead measures may be counter intuitive - an open culture 
will initially increase customer complaints upheld and likely see more grievances.
We also:
• Conduct behavioural assessments in performance management
• have a full assessment of learning effectiveness covering knowledge and 
behaviour change
•  In-depth assessments against values at all stages of employee lifecycle
•  HSBC utilize a measurement tree concerning the relationships between the 
different processes.
•  Cultural change is challenging. The ﬁ rst barrier to change is that this issue, in this 
industry, actually our economy/society, has never happened before. Leaders therefore 
are unlikely to know how to make the change. There is no corporate memory to solve 
the issue.
• The other barriers we face are cultural. A belief system that says - In order to survive I...
 1) have to ﬁ t in or conform (we compromise our own values blindly)
 2) have to follow the rules (there are too many and rule following without judgement 
removes empathy)
 3) have to look good to get on (corporate performance is judge by hitting targets to 
market expectations)
• This has implications on the environment created for the banking sector:
 a) media, political and social scrutiny will only increase fear
 b) over-regulation will have the opposite effect than the desired outcome
 c) the whole socio-economic and political system needs to support the change
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METRO BANK PLC
Historical/Background 
Deﬁ nition of Culture
Content Of Culture / 
Espoused Values (I.E. 
Core Values)
•  Inspired by Commerce banks in the US  
•  Ethos - Focus on what customers don’t like about their banking experience               
 - This inspired the Metro Business Model
•  How we treat our colleagues is how they behave... with each other and also with 
our customers. 
•  So our culture is about enabling colleagues to create FANS by surprising and delighting 
our customers. Everything aligns to that.
•  Captured in acronym AMAZEING… (The “ING” is about leadership)
 - Attend to every detail
 - Make every wrong right
 - Ask if you’re not sure - bump it up
 - Zest is contagious - share it
 - Exceed expectations
 - Inspire colleagues to create fans
 - Nurture colleagues so they grow
 = Game change because this is a revolution
Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture
(continued)  
Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture  
Processes Through Which 
Change Is Achieved
•  New colleagues spend their ﬁ rst day at Metro Bank attending Visions which is our 
cultural immersion and ends in a celebration of all the new colleagues who have joined 
including them being given their M Pin or Metro name badge. 
•  On their second day colleagues explore our AMAZEING behaviours. 
•  We always put behaviours ﬁ rst during discussions with colleagues in reviews and one 
to ones.
•  If a colleague is a cultural ﬁ t but is in the wrong role we will ﬁ nd them another job... but 
if they are not a cultural ﬁ t we will suggest they go and ﬁ nd somewhere where they do 
ﬁ t and will be happy.
•  We have no sales or product targets in stores or AMAZE DIrect (our contact centre) - we 
measure colleagues on service with weekly magic (mysetry) shops, net promoter surveys 
and customer feedback.
•  Internally we share brilliant stories which reinforce our culture through yammer and 
recognise our cultural ambassadors annually at our AMAZE Awards. One of the Award 
categories is all of our employees who have been awarded an “I AMAZE” (the top rating) 
for their behaviours in their AMAZEING review and we publish the names of these 
people for all to see.
•  We are fanatical about language and make sure that all our communications reinforce 
our culture and vision including our Revolution Updates (Town Halls) and “In the Know” 
our weekly e-zine with great customer and colleague stories.
•  We engage with and listen to colleagues through store and team visits, revolution 
updates, forums such as “brainiacs”, voice of the colleague and of course our annual 
survey. Our monthly exec team meeting dedicated to people is called the “Voice of the 
Colleague” meeting and we listen to and learn from our colleagues in the same way that 
we listen to and learn from our customers.
•  We are not rebuilding culture. Everything we do reinforces our culture. 
•  We hire for attitude and train for skill so we hire for cultural ﬁ t. 
•  Embodied in architecture
 - We don’t have incentives 
 - Everyone is on the same reward scheme which is linked to company culture/delivery 
 and personal behaviours and delivery.
•  Presentations are referred to as ‘revolution updates’ 
•  Importance of consistency of direction
•  Recruitment – mainly recruit on the basis of interpersonal skills, intellect, work ethic
•  Focus on vision through various updates
•  Magic shoppers (not mystery shoppers)
•  Customer service scores
•  No set sales targets
• Reduced incentive based bonuses 
•  Belief that in how you treat staff is how they treat the customers
•  Everyone gets share-options – there is a 5 year vesting process 
•  % of employees from friends and family referrals 
Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring Of Culture
Views on Regulation
•  Net promoter score and magic shops
•  Voice of colleague survey 
•  % of hires from friends & family referrals
•  The regulators are going through their own cultural change process
124  |  A report on the culture of British retail banking    A report on the culture of British retail banking  |  125
NATIONWIDE
Historical/Background 
Deﬁ nition of Culture
Programmes for 
rebuilding culture  
Content of culture / 
espoused values (i.e. 
core values)
•  Nationwide has mutual (as opposed to Public Limited Company) status, which means 
that it is owned by and run for, the beneﬁ t of its members. 
•  Nationwide is the largest building society - signiﬁ cant presence in savings 
and mortgages. 
•  A major provider of current accounts, credit cards and personal loans. Nationwide has 
over 14 million members. 
•  It describes itself as a “modern mutual”; traditional and uncomplicated but also 
ambitious in provding full banking services for members. 
•  Nationwide has over 160 years of expertise and experience at being a building society, 
looking after the interests of its members. 
• Member focus to all activities. 
• PRIDE (see below) is the framework for the decisions Nationwide makes and guides 
behaviour and the commitment made to members. 
• PRIDE is well understood throughout the organisation and part of Nationwide’s heritage. 
•  Not being a bank has helped Nationwide in the run-up, during and after the crisis to 
focus on member interests. Culture and approach enabled Nationwide to come through 
the ﬁ nancial crisis unscathed by conduct ﬁ nes. 
•  Nationwide’s values are not a response to the ﬁ nancial crisis: PRIDE has been in place for 
over 12 years. Having this already well-established values set has been important. 
•  Additionally, having a very stable senior management team to plan for the long-term 
has been crucial in this.
•  Nationwide’s PRIDE values are: 
 - “Putting Members First - With no shareholders, the interests of our members always  
 come ﬁ rst: ‘On your side’ 
 - Rewarding Membership - We focus on long term relationships. Members who trust us 
 with more of their money and ﬁ nancial service requirements get more value in return. 
 - Inspiring Trust - We are honest, straightforward and build trust through a fair and 
 decent approach.
 - Doing the Right Thing - We develop and train our people to stand out from the 
 competition, to stand up for our members and to help them make the most of 
 their money. 
 - Excelling at Service - We strive to offer the best customer experience on the high 
 street, delivering an unbeatable combination of advice, products and service.”
Processes Through Which 
Change Is Achieved 
Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring of Culture
Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring of Culture 
(continued)
•  Constantly reviewing PRIDE. October 2013, PRIDE was refreshed to align even more 
closely to the corporate plan and customer brand promise ‘On your side’. 
•  Customers - Nationwide’s customer survey scores are industry leading. 
•  Employees - annual employee survey shows that employees display high levels of 
satisfaction. In particular, Nationwide’s engagement and enablement scores are 
industry-leading. From Nationwide’s December 2013 employee satisfaction survey, 90% 
of employees stated that they fully understood how PRIDE helps them do their job and 
were proud to work for Nationwide. 
•  Nationwide were the only building society or bank to feature in the Sunday 
Times 2014 list of the top 25 best big companies to work for.
Views on Regulation •  There are multiple important regulatory developments in train relating to 
accountability, responsibility and behaviour in ﬁ nancial services, many arising from the 
recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Nationwide 
is constructively engaging with the regulator on these matters. 
•  An individual organisation’s integrity and culture cannot be regulated, Nationwide 
are very supportive of the Banking Standards Review Council as a voluntary, 
industry-led initiative. 
•  Nationwide were one of the seven organisations that approached Sir Richard Lambert to 
ask him to come up with proposals for the new body. The Society has been very closely 
engaged with the BSRC’s work from the outset, believing that collective action can play 
an important role in raising standards across the industry. 
•  As the BSRC takes shape, Nationwide considers useful information sources for the 
Council to be focused on customer outcomes. Therefore focus should be on customer 
discussions, employee discussions (at all levels) and discussions with unions. It should 
also make use of whistleblowing and any complaint data. Mystery shopping will also be 
an important mechanism for getting a clear picture on customer outcomes. 
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Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring of Culture
SHAWBROOK BANK LTD
Historical/Background 
Deﬁ nition of Culture
Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture  
Processes Through Which 
Change Is Achieved  
Content Of Culture / 
Espoused Values (I.E. 
Core Values)
•  Formed from a market opportunity when many lenders withdrew from the market 
following the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis. 
•  It is private equity backed and launched as Shawbrook Bank in 2011. 
•  It is composed of a savings arm and specialist SME lending business units. 
•  The chairman is Sir George Stephenson. There is limited direct consumer facing activity 
(primarily savings). Most of the lending business is b2b through intermediary networks.
•  The bank is forward looking, specialist, operates to high service standard and sees itself 
very much as a specialist in particular markets.
 - Retail savings – bonds and notice deposits. 
 - SME lending.
•  Transformation programmes to integrate business acquisitions. 
•  Quarterly business updates with stats for each part of the business. 
•  Quarterly staff meetings.
•  Executive team meetings and cascade meetings.
•  Professional standards hub.
•  Provision of industry relevant training – e.g. Online training.
•  Induction programmes –involve at least CEO and other colleagues.
•  Ensure people are specialist – e.g. In SME lending making sure that employees are 
specialists in the business area they are ﬁ nancing e.g. Wheeled vehicle ﬁ nancing, marine, 
off shore wind farms.
•  Robust compliance management process.
•  Nimble and smaller company.
•  Building relationships with SMEs, retail via direct.                         
•  Focusing on products and service delivery.        
•  Shawbrooks ensure employees have expert knowledge and customer know how to 
deliver a personal service.
•  Focused on specialist products and service delivery.                       
•  Key values: 
 - Personal. 
 - Pragmatic (‘get the deal signed’.
 - Expert (know business area).
 - Progressive (talk to customers).
 - Entrepreneurial.
Views on Regulation •  Clariﬁ cation concentrating on funding lending via retail deposits.
•  Further clariﬁ cation of how the Funding for Lending scheme is structured.
•  Clariﬁ cation about access to lending data. 
•  Issues such as capital requirements. 
•  Most of Shawbrook’s lending is funded via retail deposits, we have made limited use of 
access to FLS. Shawbrook is supportive of the Government’s commitment to ensuring 
that SMEs whose lending requests are declined by major high street banks should be 
signposted to other funding sources. A greater levelling of the ﬁ eld in respect of capital 
treatment as between ‘standardised’ ﬁ rms and ‘IRB’ ﬁ rms would be helpful.
THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC
Historical/Background 
Deﬁ nition of Culture
•  RBS has experienced unprecedented changes over the last two decades which have had 
a signiﬁ cant impact on its culture. 
•  Following a period of rapid expansion, the ﬁ nancial crisis and government bailout were a 
trigger for the bank to re-examine the importance of value and culture. 
•  In the wake of the crisis, the bank’s immediate priority was to rebuild its balance sheet 
and demonstrate that it no longer posed a risk to ﬁ nancial stability. 
•  Following this period, in early 2012 we moved our focus to how our shared vision and 
values could galvanise the organisation, reenergise our staff and rebuild our reputation 
with customers and communities.
•  Following consultation with our leadership teams, employees and customers, we 
developed a shared bank-wide Purpose, Vision and Values which centred around our 
commitments to serve our customer well and set about engaging all our employees in 
what this meant for the future.
•  Since becoming Chief Executive in 2013, Ross McEwan has cemented our customer 
purpose by clearly articulating our ambition to become No.1 for Customer advocacy, 
trust and service by 2020.
•  Our culture has been derived from how we work and our priorities, which themselves 
have evolved with a greater emphasis on customers. 
•  We have a critical focus on execution, which has been a core strength of rebuilding the 
Bank - but over the course of the last few years, and with the introduction of our ‘Values 
approach’ we are incorporating a more long term view. 
•  The depth and breadth of regulatory changes have also resulted in a compliance focus, 
which now needs to be tempered with empowerment - allowing our managers and 
employees to provide the best possible customer service. Hence the focus on ethical 
decision making and doing the right thing.
•  Our culture was more ‘closed’ than ‘open’ - a retrenchment following the crisis has 
an impact on the information that could be shared, and external reputational images 
meant our front line, mainly branch, staff were having to defend the actions of the 
whole organisation to the public; people were scared to talk about working here for fear 
of recrimination. This meant we turned in on ourselves.
•  Finally, we had a more ‘internal facing’ than ‘customer facing’ - rebuilding the 
organisation was something we needed to do to regain a sure footing and trust in the 
investment community. Coming through this means we now need to look outward 
to secure our continuing success, and regain some of the pride experienced over the 
previous 200 years of banking. 
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Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture  
Processes through which 
change is achieved  
Content of culture / 
espoused values (i.e. 
core values)
•  In 2012 we undertook extensive work to deﬁ ne our shared Purpose, Vision and Values - 
working with leaders and people from across the Bank and deﬁ ning our approach over 
the coming year. 
•  In 2013 - 2014 we moved into the phase of engaging our people and starting our change.
•  Our change programme was split into 5 key components: 
 1) Campaign – Think outside the bank communications campaign underpinned by 
  our values. 
 2) Involvement -  How our people understand, engage with and own our values. 
 3) Organisational change – How we’ll embed our values in our business and 
 people practices. 
 4) Local change – Improvements within our businesses, embedding our values and 
changing the way we operate. 
 5) Measurement – Develop and implement a measurement framework.  
•  The Involvement stage of the change included over 3,000 senior leaders across the bank 
attending a Think outside the bank Regional Leadership Workshop designed to help them 
to understand and engage with our purpose and values and to equip them to lead the 
onward engagement of the organisation. This was subsequently followed up with Local 
events for those Leaders to deliver in their businesses.
•  In 2014 we are embedding changes above and identifying further areas for improvement.
•  A series of ‘behavioural observations’ have been implemented in our Markets Business. 
Trained observers attend key meetings across the spectrum of business activities, and 
observe and give feedback on ‘Values in action’. 
•  As well as speciﬁ c campaigns and initiatives to embed our values internally, it is 
important that cultural change is championed by senior management. Since becoming 
Chief Executive, Ross McEwan has driven widespread structural and cultural change at 
the bank, underpinned by how we treat and think about our customers.
•  The bank continues to work through conduct issues, which can be damaging to trust and 
staff morale. The way in which we respond to these events is also important in realising 
cultural change. As evidenced with recent conduct issues, the bank has taken a proactive 
stance in: condemning wrongdoing, accepting responsibility and underscoring the 
importance maintain the highest standards of conducts and ethics.
•  Our ambition is to be No. 1 for Customer Advocacy, Trust and Service for 2020, 
underpinned by our Values of Serving Customers, Working Together, Doing the Right 
Thing and Thinking Long Term. We will be measuring our progress on service via 
regular customer feedback surveys – primarily net promoter score. 
Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring of Culture
Views on Regulation
•  An extremely comprehensive approach is taken towards measurement and monitoring 
across the Bank including HR, employee, customer, risk, ﬁ nancial and conduct measures. 
•  In this respect our HR team managing this also work very closely with our Audit 
function to ensure the approach is robust, repeatable and indeed telling us what we 
need to know. 
•  Regulators are making a similar shift in culture to the banks
•  Any organisation needs to examine regulation from the start point of ‘what behaviour 
are we trying to change / adapt?’ and therefore ensure the application and assurance of 
regulation is integrated into the organisations way of doing things rather than ‘bolted’ 
on to the side.
Views on Regulation 
(continued)
•  Regulators needs to be cogniscent of this to ensure the best outcomes for consumers, 
employees, regulators and stakeholders. 
SANTANDER
Historical/Background 
Deﬁ nition of Culture
•  Santander UK is an autonomous subsidiary of Santander Group. 
•  Since Santander’s entry into the UK market in November 2004, Santander UK has 
been transformed, moving from its heritage of three former building societies (Abbey 
National, Alliance & Leicester, Bradford and Bingley) focused on mortgages and savings 
into a full-service retail and commercial bank. 
•  At the core of its transformation has been a programme to change its culture, so that 
all we do is Simple, Personal and Fair. Our extensive opinion research of our customers 
and our team revealed that these three words embody all they want for their bank and 
place of work”. 
•  Our aspiration is that everything we do is simple, personal and fair for our people, 
customers, shareholders and communities.
• We do not see culture as a programme or the responsibility of one individual; to us, 
culture is how we live and work every day. So our programme of change, while led by 
the CEO and senior leaderships, is one in which everyone has a part to play.
Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture  
Processes through which 
change is achieved  
Content of culture / 
espoused values (i.e. 
core values)
• Through establishing and embedding a simple set of values: simple, personal and fair, 
Santander UK is driving a transformation of its business for all our stakeholders.
• This includes providing our people with a clear direction on Santander UK’s goals and 
reinforcing how being simple, personal and fair can link to everyone’s day-to-day work.
• This framework extends to our approach to risk. Everyone in the bank is responsible for 
identifying, assessing, managing and reporting risk, and simple, personal and fair helps 
everyone understand when they should raise their voice.
• To this end, we facilitate an open culture which encourages everyone to manage risk 
and a workplace in which no one is afraid to speak up when they see problems or 
have concerns.
• Simple, personal and fair guides our objectives and performance measurement, from 
our company goals right down to each individual.
• Simple, personal and fair is central to the balanced score card for the company - 
the Santander Compass - and is embedded in our performance management and 
people processes.
• For this reason, it is central to decision-making across the company - for example, in how 
we design products and provide services to obtain the right outcomes for customers. 
• Our purpose is to help people and businesses prosper.
• We will do this by being simple, personal and fair for our people, customers, shareholders 
and communities (the Santander Way) 
• This provides a framework for everyone in the bank to make decisions about what they 
do and how they do it.
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Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring of Culture
Views on Regulation
·  The Santander Compass (our balanced scorecard) contains performance indicators 
that measure our progress towards speciﬁ c targets for each of the quadrants: people, 
customers, shareholders, communities. 
·  Contribution to progress towards Santander’s goals are measured also through external 
quantitative and qualitative research. This includes an employee opinion survey: general 
questions and culture-speciﬁ c questions, focused around Simple, Personal, Fair; and also 
an extensive programme of regular quantitative research into customers’ views as to 
whether the bank is Simple, Personal and Fair. 
·  Analysis of leadership/management styles
·  Additional measures:
 - Attrition
 - Long term absence rates
 - Customer complaints
 - Customer satisfaction - dashboard scores
•  Since the ﬁ nancial crisis, there has been a regulatory overhaul accompanied by a more 
activist approach from the authorities, looking into unfair practices from the industry, 
and tougher enforcement.
•  The industry is working closely with the regulators to identify best practices and 
overcome the legacy of the pre-crisis period.
TSB BANK PLC
Historical/Background 
Deﬁ nition of Culture
•  TSB has been established to bring more competition to the UK and better banking to 
UK consumers.
•  Signiﬁ cant consumer research has told us that customers are looking for banks to be 
straight forward – to be clear about how customers money is being used and to offer 
straightforward products with “no funny stuff”. They also want their banks to be safe.
•  This is why we have the culture of a challenger, but a responsible challenger that is 
focused on long-term growth, careful with our customers money and focused on 
service over sales. We have a culture that is open and transparent about how we make 
money, how we run the bank, our products and in how we communicate with each 
other across all levels of the business.
•  “TSB’s culture is borne out of our heritage. We were speciﬁ cally created to bring greater 
competition to retail by delivering a better deal for customers”.
•  “We provide local Banking for Britain to help local people, businesses and communities 
thrive together”.
TSB have a culture of 
•  Service over sales
•  Transparency - Operattions/Product base
•  Partnership – “as the ﬁ rst UK bank to pioneer a shared-ownership structure, we have a 
culture where employees are vested in the long-term success of the business rather than 
short-term gain”. 
Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture  
Content of culture / 
espoused values (i.e. 
core values)
•  “In launching TSB as a values-led challenger brand, we built our culture from a blank 
sheet of paper”.
Focus on:
•  Shared ownership 
 – “At IPO every TSB colleague became a Partner in the business when they were awarded 
 with £100 worth of shares”. 
 – “In order to be remunerated employees have to hold on to these shares so that they 
 continue to have a stake in the long-term success of the business”.
•  Shared reward based on customer service. 
 – “The TSB Award is an annual performance-related reward that, if awarded, would pay to 
 all recipients a percentage of annual salary, determined on the same basis for everyone, 
 from CEO to front-line branch staff”. 
•  “We believe this move towards ﬁ xed rather than variable pay will promote a responsible 
working culture within TSB. Moreover, the award will only be paid to individual TSB 
Partners if they achieve key customer service metrics and the Bank is returning proﬁ t”. 
“Our values guide us in all we do and how we do it”.
TSB has ﬁ ve core values. 
•  Straightforward
•  Collaborative
•  Transparent
•  Responsible
•  Pioneering
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Programmes For 
Rebuilding Culture  
Processes through which 
change is achieved  
• Collaboration and listening 
 – To promote a bottom-up culture we have the Link programme. Every year 80 
 Partners across the business can apply to join our ﬁ ve Links – in Edinburgh, Sunderland, 
 Birmingham, London and Gloucester. The Partners in these groups are from across the 
 full range of business functions and grades in the region and meet in person every two 
 months to:
 – Share information on signiﬁ cant activities and changes which have implications for 
 both colleagues, customers and communities. 
 – Encourage open feedback - discussing things openly, with a clear route to getting 
 problems sorted. 
•  Get under the skin of the major topics in our business. 
• Help innovate and shape our business; what products we might want to provide, how we 
connect with our customers, and communities. 
•  Take action - Our people in The Link will take an active part in moulding our business. 
•  TSB has established a formal cultural transformation programme that focuses on 
initiatives helps to shape, embed, measure and reinforce the right behaviours and 
processes that will support the development of a culture which will out the customer at 
the heart of all that we do and help build a strong values-led brand
•  Strong tone and direction is given from Senior Executive & Board: A robust executive led 
communications plan is in place which is delivered to all partners across TSB and clearly 
sets the cultural tone from the top – there is a key focus on conduct risk and doing the 
right thing for our customers.
•  Codes of Responsibility: TSB codes of responsibility communicated within the business 
and forms part of the mandatory training plan for TSB.
•  We have in place an ongoing cultural programme across the branch network to deliver 
customer centric service
•  Bottom-up processes to feedback the cultural change through TSB Link and Interlink.
•  Redesign of HR processes from start to exit. 
 – Recruiting 
 – Induction
 – Socialisation
 – Management of HR processes
Assessment/Measurement 
/Monitoring of Culture
TSB has several key ways in which we can monitor culture:
•  TSB Pulse: An annual survey that measures what Partners think about performance, 
leadership an identity
•  Interlink: All employees are free to air concerns or questions on the interlink forum. 
This provides us with an informal way of measuring culture 
•  Cultural Dashboard
•  Customer satisfaction surveys including Net Promoter Scores
•  Complaints handling process
Views on Regulation •  TSB believes that regulation in the banking sector is very important and we are calling 
for more regulatory reform in a number of areas. 
• However, culture must come from individual businesses if it is going to be effective. 
• Same belief as Richard Lambert - “prime responsibility lies with the leadership of 
individual companies. Unless they are determined to change the culture of their business 
– to shape the implicit norms that guide behaviour in the absence of regulations – then 
nothing will happen.” 
A summary of our interview with Virgin Money is available in the online version of this report. 
The report is available at http://newcityagenda.co.uk/ .
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